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Konstantin Bykov

"KIEVSKIY

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The biggest defeat of the Red Army

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Great Patriotic War: Unknown Won

Scanned and created a book - itaQuapKow

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The biggest defeat of the Red Armin

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Hitler called this battle "the greatest battle in world history."

German generals called it "the biggest encirclement battle in the Second World War" and their "biggest victory".

Domestic researchers write about "the most terrible defeat of the Red Army" and even about "the greatest military disaster in the history of Russia."

In the Kiev "cauldron" of 1941, an entire front perished: four Soviet armies were routed and completely annihilated, two more were partially destroyed; according to German data, our losses reached 665 thousand people in prisoners alone - "the largest number of prisoners captured in one battle." {

Historians are still arguing, "what led to such a crushing defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front, to their death and captivity in the Kiev "cauldron" No."

WAS THIS a "deliberate victim of Stalin", who deliberately "surrendered" the front to the Germans, thus trying to buy time to prepare the defense of Moscow? Or the "fatal mistake of Hitler", who, in order to defeat our Kyiv group, delayed the attack on Moscow for a whole month and missed the victory?

Was the encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front a brilliantly conceived and carried out strategic operation by the Germans? Or just an improvisation, a random coincidence?

And - most importantly - could the catastrophe have been avoided? ..

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#### INTRODUCTION

The Kiev cauldron... With this gigantic and unsurpassed in scale encirclement of Soviet troops, which was called by Hitler "the greatest battle in world history" even at the planning stage!, The battle between the Southwestern Front and the troops of the South and Center Army Groups ended , which in August - September 1941 took place on the territory of Kiev, Chernihiv, Sumy, Poltava and

Cherkasy regions of Ukraine. This encirclement ended with "the largest single military victory in history, with the largest number of prisoners captured in a single battle"<sup>2</sup>. The destruction of the Southwestern Front opened the southern route to Moscow for the Germans, allowed them to break through to Tula, contributed to the creation of the Vyazemsky cauldron ...

What led to such a crushing defeat of the troops of the Southwestern Front, to their death and captivity in the Kiev cauldron? According to the Nazi and Soviet generals, participants in the war, the Battle of Kiev delayed the German attack on Moscow for a whole month, which allowed the Soviet troops to gain time and deliver a crushing blow to the Army Group Center attacking Moscow. This point of view leads many to think that Stalin deliberately "surrendered" the Southwestern Front to the Germans, thus trying to buy time to prepare the defense of Moscow.

Modern historians are not so unanimous. Some of them still continue to believe that the Kiev cauldron was Hitler's fatal mistake, due to which it was not possible to take

L alder F. Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces 1939-1942. M.: Military Publishing House, 1968-1971. Entry dated September 5, 1941.

a |; Alexander B. Hitler's 10 Fatal Mistakes. Moscow: Yauza; Eksmo, 2003.

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Moscow, or a deliberate sacrifice of Stalin, thanks to which it was possible to save Moscow. However, another part of historians, and also not without reason, believes that the Kiev cauldron was Stalin's fatal mistake, which, on the contrary, opened the way for the Germans to Moscow and to Left-Bank Ukraine. If the Stavka at the end of August and the beginning of September gave its reserves not to Timoshenko, Zhukov and Yeremenko for attacks on the enemy who deliberately went on the defensive, but to Kirponos and Budyonny, then there would be NO "cauldron" or attack on Moscow ...

Moreover, a close study of the documents that guided the opposing troops shows that the encirclement of the troops of the Southwestern Front was of an accidental nature, it was an improvisation that arose during the execution of a completely different operation, which did not provide for the encirclement of the troops of the entire Southwestern Front.

The plan for the Kiev pocket was already developed during the offensive of Army Group Center on the northern flank of the Southwestern Front, after Hitler became convinced that his troops, who deliberately went on the defensive in the central sector, were well holding up the blows of Zhukov's fronts and Yeremenko and that Moscow, enchanted by the strong-willed promises of the commanders of these fronts, does not even try to provide any serious assistance to the Southwestern Front.

The general situation at the beginning of the battle and until the decision to encircle was as follows.

By the 20th of August 1941, the front passed from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea along the line: the approaches to Leningrad (Narva), Lake Ilmen, the area between Smolensk and Yelnya, the area west of Bryansk, Gomel and further along the Dnieper through Kiev to Kherson.

Since the Barbarossa plan (the German plan of war against the USSR) had not been carried out by that time - the Soviet troops were not destroyed west of the Dnieper and Dvina - the war threatened to turn from lightning into a protracted one. According to Hitler, in order to continue the war, it was necessary to obtain additional resources for the Wehrmacht and cut off the resources of the Soviet army: that is, to seize Ukraine and, continuing to advance in the south, cut us off from the Caucasian oil. From a purely military point of view, in order to continue the offensive to the east (both Moscow and Ukraine), it was necessary to destroy the Soviet 5th Army, located between Army Groups "South" and "Center" and threatening German communications, which

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beckoned Major General of Tank Troops M.I. Potapov is a very aggressive, offensive type commander, a supporter of the creation of tank and aviation units and deputy G.K. Zhukov on the battles at Khalkhin Gol.

On August 19, anticipating a German sabotage against the 5th Army located north of Kyiv, the Soviet command ordered a retreat to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

On August 21, at the height of Potapov's withdrawal across the Dnieper, Hitler ordered part of the troops of the Army Group Center to turn to Ukraine and, together with the troops of the Army Group South, destroy the 5th Army. Thus began the battle, which in Soviet sources is called the second phase of the Kyiv strategic defensive operation, and in German - the Encirclement Battle in the Kyiv area. Both names were born much later than the Kyiv pocket and do not correspond to the actual plans of the parties on the 20th of August 1941.

On August 23, due to a mistake made by the command of the Southwestern Front and the commander of the 37th Army, General A.A. Vlasov, the Germans managed to cross the Dnieper in the A:A section. Vlasov - in the Okuninovo district (north of Kyiv).

On August 25, when significant forces of Potapov's army were sent to liquidate the Okuninovsky bridgehead, from the side of Gomel on the right wing of the 5th Army, which was located north of Chernigov, the troops of Army Group Center began an offensive. On the same day, the 21st Army of the Central Front, which was retreating into the zone of the 5th Army, was transferred to the Bryansk Front, which led to a mixing of troops and rear

two fronts performing different tasks.

On August 26, Guderian's tank group broke through the southern flank of the Bryansk Front, captured Novgorod-Seversky, and thereby created a threat of encirclement of the 21st Army and access to communications of the 5th Army.

On August 28, the 40th Army of the Southwestern Front was created on the basis of the troops of the right wing of the 5th Army, which actually acts in the interests of the left flank of the Bryansk Front. This made it much easier for the Germans to carry out the task of destroying the 5th Army, which had been disarmed by its own command.

August 30 G.K. Zhukov began the Elninsk operation with the troops of his Reserve Front. The headquarters, at the suggestion of Zhukov, ordered the commander of the Bryansk Front, Eremenko, to support Zhukov with a blow to Roslavl, which significantly weakened the Bryansk Front, which was forced to attack simultaneously in two directions - Roslavl, to help

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Zhukov, and Starodubsky, to help Kirponos. As a result of this dispersal of forces, Guderian's tank divisions continued to march almost unhindered from Starodub through Novgorod-Seversky to Konotop - into the deep rear of the Southwestern Front.

September 6, Hitler, seeing that the operation planned

August 21, developing more than successfully, ordered his

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Kyiv strategic defensive operation

troops to surround and destroy the entire Southwestern Front. Hitler's order of September 6, however strange it may seem to us, fully justifies A.I. Eremenko. Talking about the events of late August, he wrote: “It is possible that if they (the Germans) had succeeded in seriously violating the defense of the Bryansk Front in late August - early September, Hitler would have found the strength to develop success in the Moscow direction as well.” By

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Kiev battle according to V. Haupt (\leteg Nairi.

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German porcelain medal "Battle for Kyiv - 1941".

Since on September 6 the Germans did not plan to encircle the Southwestern Front, but were seriously thinking about turning to Moscow immediately after the defeat of the 5th Army, we have good reason to believe that a breakthrough of the Bryansk Front in the area of Trubchevsk or Starodub would have provoked Hitler to immediate attack on Moscow.

On September 8, the Yelnin operation, which did not achieve its goal, was stopped!, which, together with the Roslavl operation, led to the depletion of the forces and reserves of the Red Army, the encirclement of the Southwestern Front and the subsequent, after the Kiev pocket, the Germans broke through to the gates of Moscow.

As a result of an impromptu operation to encircle the troops of Kirponos, which was carried out by the Germans from September 8 to 26, the Southwestern Front was completely defeated, its military and political leaders were killed. According to Hitler's official data? Germany, published on September 27, 1941, 665,000 people were captured in the Kiev pocket, 884 tanks were destroyed and captured, about

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The purpose of this operation was not the liberation of Yelnya and not the creation of a guard, but the complete encirclement and destruction of the fascist troops on the Yelnin ledge. Yelnya was liberated, the guard was created, but the task of encircling and destroying the enemy troops was not completed.

? We specifically emphasize this, because the data of Hitler's Germany, and all modern researchers in Russia, the USA and modern Germany agree with this, are significantly overestimated. In reality, no more than 350-400 thousand people were taken prisoner (and according to the data of the Western researcher B. Fagat - 222,000 people). However, this does not diminish the enormity of the scale of our tragedy.

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4,000 artillery pieces, countless other military equipment, weapons, ammunition and vehicles.

Nevertheless, despite such high losses of the Soviet troops, the researchers are unanimous that the German victory in the battle of Kiev was only tactical in nature.

Principles in the presentation of the material. The first two principles for elucidating the history of the Kyiv Cauldron were suggested to us by Karl Clausewitz and S.S. Kamenev. "A detailed acquaintance with a few individual battles is more useful than a general acquaintance with many campaigns. Therefore, it is more useful to read more separate reports and diaries than historical books in the proper sense of the word," Clausewitz advised us in his "Supplement to the course delivered personally to the crown prince."

It is impossible to brush aside useful advice, especially coming from Clausewitz, whose science the tsarist officers who went over to the side of the Bolsheviks hammered into the heads of the young commanders of the Red Army. The author of the prefaces to the first Soviet editions of Clausewitz's books (in the 1920s) was Colonel of the Tsarist General Staff, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Republic and Chief of Staff of the Red Army Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev. "If you look at the history of our combat

failures - the attack history of the Red Army also has - then you come to the conclusion that combat failures increased our combat power. This is paradoxical, but correct," Kamenev taught not to despair and not to lose faith in the victory of the young Soviet commanders!

More reports and diaries about the course of individual battles of individual military units in separate, key sections of the Kiev pocket; and without howling, without throwing ashes on our heads, with the firm knowledge that our military failures lead to the exhaustion and death of the enemy, that they do not hypnotize us like a toad constrictor, but only toughen our resistance and ultimately lead us to victory, These are the principles laid down in this book.

Our third adviser, the source of the third principle, was the military historian David Glantz. Informing about his new

1 Kamenev S.S. Notes on the Civil War and military construction. M, 1963. S. 242. Kamenev was also Ch. Head of the Military Academy  
by tactics.

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German silver medal "Battle of encirclement near Kyiv - 1941"

In his book (Clanx, Rama M. Barfagozza von Kizza, 1941), ardent reviewers of historical literature noted the following main merit:

"Particularly noteworthy is that, in contrast to his earlier work, Glantz clearly emphasizes the Soviet perspective. Without ignoring German sources, this book uses all the latest Russian sources and demonstrates its difference from the part of the "classics" according to which the Germans fought against a faceless and ignorant enemy. Despite the surprise attack, poor equipment, insufficient training and inexperience of commanders, the Soviet forces not only reacted to German operations, but they planned and carried out their own operations. For the most part they were not able to achieve what they planned, but in any case this meant that the course of the entire campaign took the form of an interlocking rivalry between German and Soviet intentions and actions, and it was not only the Wehrmacht that set the tone on the roads to Moscow".

Reading the histories of the German divisions, we really saw in them the old Western "classics" - a faceless mass of "Ivans", "Soviets" and "Bolsheviks", who either stupidly fired back and ran away, or attacked bloodthirsty, and it is not clear for what purpose. . A similar shortcoming in the Soviet military "classics", when impersonal Germans were presented to the reader in the form of brutalized "submachine gunners", "Fritz" and "SS", is indicated in his books by modern Russian



sky military historian A. Isaev.

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This lack of "classics", which depersonalizes the enemy, forced us to copiously, but as far as sources are available, comment on the German materials with our (Soviet and Russian) documents, memoirs and research. This determined the form of the book: our story about the Kiev Cauldron is not a "historical book in the true sense of the word", but "relations and diaries" of the warring parties compared in time and space.

Principles of material selection. A huge number of infantry, tank and air formations of two army groups of the German armed forces participated in the encirclement of the troops of the South-Western Front. However, one cannot limit oneself to a mere list of divisions, as is usually done to illustrate the number of troops. Many units of corps and army subordination, heavy artillery battalions and a completely new type of German troops took part in the creation of the pocket - chemical mortar troops, which, by regiments and battalions, were very actively used in the Kiev pocket, starting from the destruction of the encircled 31st Corps 5 th Army and ending with the extermination of the remnants of our troops in the Piryatin area.

"The new types of weapons that entered service proved to be very effective means of increasing the firepower of troops," writes Müller-Hillebrand. - This applies in particular to rocket launchers. A new branch of the military, the chemical mortar troops, was equipped for this campaign with two types of multi-barreled rocket-propelled mortars. The 150-mm mortar of the 1941 model had six barrels and a firing range of up to 6700 m; a division of such mortars carried out a volley of 108 shells for ten seconds.

The reactive 280/320-mm mortar of the 1941 model had four barrels and a firing range of 2200 m. Along with high-explosive projectiles (mines), it was armed with a projectile (mine) filled with liquid oil. The lethal and moral qualities of this weapon were very high!

The list of tank formations used in the Kiev pocket, as well as in any other operation, as a rule, misleads the reader about the amount of armored vehicles used by the Germans. to quantity

' Müller-Gillebrand B. Land Army of Germany. 1933-1945 M.: Izographus, 2002. S. 251.

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tanks in tank regiments of tank divisions, armored vehicles of motorized regiments of tank and motorized divisions, anti-tank units of tank and infantry divisions, which were armed with self-propelled artillery mounts, should be added. Self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery should also be added here - powerful 88-mm cannons and faithful 20-mm installations, which were actively used by the Germans in the Kiev pocket as artillery means of direct infantry support.

To the number of armored vehicles used by the Germans, the Sturmgeschütze self-propelled artillery units, which are not part of the tank divisions, should be added! (assault guns). Entire divisions of these self-propelled guns? were, in essence, their use, armored vehicles for direct infantry support, destroyed our tanks, firing positions, helped the German infantry to seize and hold bridgeheads.

Since it is not possible to illustrate the course of the struggle with the histories of several dozen formations due to the large amount of material, we, based on what was said above about German weapons and "non-divisional" formations, approached the selection of German formations according to the following principle:

- blue and red arrows, whoever advanced or retreated, are not canceled - we selected those divisions that participated in the main centers of the Kyiv pocket;
- however, among them, we gave preference to those divisions, in the histories of which, to one degree or another, the participation of new types of weapons and new types of military formations can be seen;
- in addition, since the main thing in victory is a clear interaction between the troops, when selecting divisions, we paid attention to those of them whose stories deal with neo-divisions as "things in themselves", and where interaction with neighbors and with attached to this formations of corps units and aviation.
- "Crossing, crossing, left bank, right bank" - perhaps this is all that is written about the participation of Soviet sappers in the Great Patriotic War. Initially, we wanted to select those German formations in whose histories

| Self-propelled artillery installations 5shS.Sh.

? "During the period of the Western campaign, there were only a few copies of the ry," writes the "Sturmgeschütz" Müller-Gillebrand. Decree. op. S. 236.

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© Emsisd epetu Zyugsek

The centers of the Kyiv boiler according to B. Fagate (V. Girage).

the activity of the engineering troops is also being carried out. However, this was not specifically necessary. In the history of every German infantry and tank division, sappers occupy the same important place as in war - they went ahead of the combat units, along with assault groups and advanced mobile detachments.

As a result, the stories were selected and commented on:

- the 98th infantry division of the GA "South", which participated in the retention and opening of the Okuninovsky bridgehead on the Dnieper,

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in the creation of the first centers of the Kyiv pocket in the Chernigov region and in the destruction of the main forces of the 5th Army;

- The 260th Infantry Division of the GA "Center", which, having captured the Vyblinsky bridgehead on the Desna, diverted part of the forces of the 5th Army, created a threat of capturing the Chernigov bridges, which led to their premature undermining and the impossibility of retreating beyond the Desna to the main forces of the 5th army;

- The 3rd Panzer Division of the GA "Center", which, using the "permission" of the Headquarters and the Bryansk Front, broke through into the deep rear of the Southwestern Front, where, having joined with the 16th Panzer Division, closed the encirclement ring and participated in blocking the Piryatinsky hearth of the Kiev boiler;

- the 16th tank division of the GA "South", which, taking advantage of the attraction of Soviet troops for a counterattack on the Kremenchug-Derievsky bridgehead, almost unhindered passed from Kremenchug to Luben, where it joined with the 3rd tank division and participated in blocking the Orzhitsky hearth of the boiler;

- the 125th and 257th infantry divisions of the GA "South", which participated in blocking and clearing the Orzhitsky hearth of the Kiev cauldron;

- The 53rd and 54th bomber squadrons of the GA "Center" and GA "South", which bombed bridges, railway junctions and troops throughout the entire space of the Kyiv pocket.

This book also includes evidence of hand-to-hand fighting in the Baryshevsky hearth of the Kyiv pocket, which the German Foreign Ministry of the era of Hitler and Goebbels presented as atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers. It is completely incomprehensible why the Germans did not shoot General A.A., who fell into their hands, for these "atrocities". Vlasov - after all, it was his army that fought near Baryshevka ...

#### THE ORIGIN OF THE Kyiv KIT: FROM "INTERMEZZO" TO "THE GREATEST BATTLE IN WORLD HISTORY"

The Kiev pocket - the encirclement and destruction of the 5th, 21st, 26th, 37th, part of the 38th and part of the 40th armies of the Southwestern Front - this is the result, as we have already said, of further and not planned in advance the ongoing development of the joint operation of the troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "South" to destroy only one army of the Southwestern Front - the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov.

The order to destroy this army with the inner flanks of the GA "Center" and "South" was given by Hitler on August 21, 1941. The plan to encircle the entire Southwestern Front began to take shape only on September 6, when the days of the 5th Army were already numbered, and the 3rd Panzer Division of the Guderian Panzer Group approached the Seim, the last water barrier on the way to Konotop, which was Guderian's main goal from 21 August.

It was on September 6 that Hitler signed his most famous after Barbarossa Directive No. 35, which at the same time became the initial document for the German troops both to encircle the Southwestern Front, and to attack Moscow, and to continue the strike on Leningrad:

"Combined with progress in the encirclement of the Leningrad region, initial successes against enemy forces in the area between the flanks of Army Groups Center and South! provided favorable conditions for a decisive operation against Army Group Timoshenko?, which is attacking on the central front, says Directive No. 35. This army group must

1 This refers to the successful development of the operation to destroy the 5th army of M.I. Potapov and the 21st army of V.I. Kuznetsova. It was as a result of such an incident that the 21st Army on the same day, September 6, was transferred from the Bryansk to the South-Western Front.

? This refers to the troops of the fronts covering Moscow in the Western direction, whose commander-in-chief was Marshal S.K. Timoshenko.

be defeated and destroyed in a limited time, which is still before the onset of winter weather. To this end, it is necessary to concentrate all the forces of the army and aviation, which can be released from the flanks and which can be brought up in time.

Based on the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, I issue the following instructions regarding the preparation and conduct of these operations:

1. On the southern sector of the front, the goal is to destroy the enemy forces in the Kremenchug-Kiev-Konotop triangle by the forces of the Army Group "South", which are moving north through the Dnieper, acting in conjunction with the advancing southern flank of the Army Group "Center". As soon as the completion of this task allows, those formations of the 2nd and 6th Armies and the 2nd Armored Group, which become free, will be used for a new operation.

Not later than September 10, the mechanized forces of Army Group South, reinforced by infantry divisions and supported by the 4th Air Fleet in the main line of attack, will make a sudden rush from the bridgehead captured by the 17th Army! to the Luben area. At the same time, the 17th Army must develop its success in the direction of Poltava and Kharkov.

(The offensive against the Crimea from the lower reaches of the Dnieper will be continued from the Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead and with the support of the 4th Air Fleet; with all available forces ...)

2. On the central front, plan an operation against the Timoshenko army group in such a way that the offensive can be launched as early as possible (end of September) with the aim of destroying the enemy forces located in the area east of Smolensk, with a double envelopment in the general direction of Vyazma, with a strong concentration of tanks on the flanks ... "3

| Kremenchug bridgehead.

This part of Hitler's Directive, on the offensive from the Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead, is bracketed by us and not quoted in full, since in Directive-35, actually sent to the relevant top commanders, Hitler's adviser, General Walter Warlimont, replaced this phrase with the words: "The Fuhrer wants all mechanized divisions were added to the 1st armored group to attack from the bridgehead near Kremenchug, since the forces of the 4th air fleet do not allow supporting the offensive from the bridgehead near Dnepropetrovsk.

} This, the 2nd, and also the 4th paragraphs of Directive-35 are devoted to the attack on Moscow; in the 3rd paragraph, it is ordered to compress the ring around Lenin Grad, destroying its water supply. Directive-35 is cited in: Honder\$ W/ar Opesnue\$ 1939-1945. ECHIED YU N. V. TREGOG-KOREG. [... Zav\sk Apd Tasksoy, 1964. P. 97-98. (Mikega.Nb.t, OSV: Zvigir.)

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Counter tank strikes that led to the encirclement of the Southwestern Front (according to K.S. Moskalenko).

On September 9, 1941, when it became completely clear that the main forces of the 5th Army were securely surrounded and there were no obstacles to the encirclement of other armies of the Southwestern Front, the 3rd Panzer Division, without getting involved in the battles for Konotop, rushed further south - clubnam.

On September 12, two days later, tank and infantry formations of Army Group South, located on the Kremenchug bridgehead, joined in fulfilling Hitler's order to encircle the entire Southwestern Front. To the north, towards the 3rd Panzer Division of Army Group Center, the 16th Panzer Division rushed. The offensive from the Kremenchug bridgehead, as ordered by Hitler, was swift, and already on September 14, the 16th and 3rd Panzer divisions met in the Luben area. The Kyiv boiler was closed.

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The bloody drama continued until September 26 and ended with the death of the Southwestern Front of the first formation.

Then there was another Southwestern Front, but:

... farther come the falcon, the beating bird, - to the sea!

And do not baptize Igor the brave..

The fact that the encirclement of the South-Western Front by a joint strike by the troops of Army Groups "South" and "Center" was not planned in advance and was an accidental development of a completely different

operation, testifies the commander of the 3rd Panzer Group Herman Goth: |

"The directive of August 21, 1941, which demanded a shift in the direction of the main attack from the center to the south, justified this important decision: "The favorable operational situation that has developed as a result of reaching the Gomel-Pochep line should be immediately used to carrying out the operation by the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "South" and "Center" in converging directions. The operation carried out in accordance with this order ended in fact with a very great success. It was possible not only to carry out the planned destruction of the 5th Russian Army, but also to encircle three other enemy armies!, operating in the area of the cities of Kyiv, Cherkassy, Romny. It was the largest covering operation up to that time"?.

The German military historian Werner Haupt told us that the initial idea to encircle the troops of the Southwestern Front belongs to the commander of Army Group South, von Rundstedthus:

"... The 5th Soviet Army, under the command of the talented Major General Potapov, with three rifle and three tank corps, was located on the left flank of the German 6th Army and inflicted very heavy losses ...

... On August 8, the corps launched their first offensive on the Crete

1 The fact that the Germans, as a rule, do not name units of the 38th and 40th armies among the encircled ones is due to the fact that these units, having fallen into the cauldron, were transferred by the Soviet command to four completely surrounded armies (5- th, 21st, 26th and 37th).

? Got G. Tank operations. M.: Military Publishing House, 1961. S. 148.

2 It is interesting and natural that Rundstedt and Budyonny, opposing each other, assessed the situation in the same way - both saw the possibility of encircling the Soviet troops with a joint attack by the South and Center GAs. And both saw it much earlier than Hitler and the overly trusting intelligence of Sta  
line.

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post Kyiv. The regiments (95th, 71st, 299th, 99th, 75th and 44th Wehrmacht infantry divisions. - Author) were literally "devoured" by forests, fire and fanatical Russian soldiers. In the course of four days of bloody battle, they were unable to achieve serious results, and the commander of the 6th Army suspended the battle ...

... 24 hours after this order (Gitle's order on August 21. - Auth.) was issued, the OKH ordered the 2nd Guderian Panzer Group of Army Group Center to move all its forces from Gomel in the direction of Chernigov, neutralizing to destroy the 5th Soviet Army and thus open the way to

Kyiv for the 6th Army of Field Marshal von Reichenau.

At 05:00 on August 25, Guderian's armored divisions opened the "Battle for Kyiv" ...

... With the successful development of this operation on the right flank of the neighboring Army Group Center, the commander of Army Group South realized that a suitable starting position was being created for the battle in the great tradition'.

On 27 August, Field Marshal von Rundstedt informed the OKH of his vision for the coming weeks). | 7th Army was to advance from the Kremenchug region to create a bridgehead northwest of Luben. At the same time, the 1st Panzer Group was to advance between Vorskla and Psel to the north in order to establish contact with the 2nd Panzer Group. This plan, in fact, led to the largest encirclement battle in World War II?

... The rapid development of events in the area of operations of the Army Group "South" impressed the OKH (capture of the Derievsky bridgehead near Kremenchug. - Auth.), and additional orders were given, especially since the 2nd Panzer Group reached the Gomel region and Chernigov from the north.

Field Marshal von Rundstedt, having come to the conclusion that the situation was suitable, on September 4, without consulting the OKH, ordered Infantry General von Stülpnagel to immediately begin

1 In the source: "ogaashe t Pe hap4 ga yup". This refers to the classical environment.

2 Ten days before, on August 17, M.P. Kirponos, based on the operational and strategic situation, accurately predicted the course of the future encirclement. But, except for Budyonny, no one listened to Kirponos (see the chapter on the 3rd Panzer Division). Interestingly, Kirponos' forecast was more in line with the D-35 dated September 6 than the plan for the Kyiv Cauldron according to Rundstedt dated August 27.

3 This plan is also described in the book: Filippi A. The Pripyat problem. M., 1959. S. - 126, 130.

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offensive across the Mirgorod-Lubny line. At the same time, General Kleist received orders to advance towards the Krasnograd-Poltava line.

Two days later, the OKH intervened in this plan and the tasks of Army Group South were changed. Now the 1st Panzer Group was to advance not on Poltava, but on Romny in order to establish contact with the 2nd Panzer Group advancing from the north. One corps of the 17th Army was ordered to participate in this process, while the rest of the army was to ensure the security of the eastern flank. General Halder, head of the Army General Staff, arrived at



Army Group Headquarters on 7 September to convey these instructions. The final decision was:

"... to defeat the enemy forces located on the middle Dnieper and in the lower reaches of the Desna through double coverage from Kremenchug, Nizhyn and the Konotop region" ...

"Major General Potapov, commander of the 5th Soviet Army, recognized the hopelessness of the situation for his army, which was already defeated in the east!, and requested permission to withdraw. However, Stalin categorically forbade doing so. A few days later, Marshal Budyonny also applied for permission to withdraw all army corps, for which the veteran of the Red Army was relieved of command and exiled to Siberia ...

..The collapse of the 5th Soviet army opened the way to Kyiv for the 6th non-German army (Field Marshal von Reichenau ...)3

..During the first days, the boiler around Kyiv had the shape of an isosceles triangle. Each side was equal to approximately 500 kilometers; the boiler covered an area of almost 135,500 square kilometers. On September 15, 1941, three German armies (2nd Weichs, 6th Reichenau and 17th Stulpna gel. - Auth.) and two armored groups (1st Kleist and 2nd Guderian. - Auth.) surrounded five Soviet armies!

This was the so-called encirclement battle of Kiev4, which became the largest, most important and, according to its

ra a

The troops of the eastern flank of the 5th Army unsuccessfully tried to throw the troops of the 2nd Army of Weichs into the Desna from the Vyblinsky bridgehead.

Some German books report that Budyonny escaped from the cauldron on an airplane. It is also reported that after the cauldron, Budyonny wanted to commit suicide right in Stalin's office.

s In addition, the collapse of the 5th Army "gave birth" to the idea of the Kyiv boiler.  
4 KEU ROSKEE BASHE.

23

probably the most decisive battle of the Eastern Campaign! Due to the events of the next two weeks, the decisive German attack on Moscow was ignored. This probably changed the outcome of the Eastern Campaign!

The commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, Guderian, also confirms the fact that the Kiev pocket was an operation planned already in the course of the unfolding offensive of the troops of Army Group Center into Ukraine:

"On September 2, I appeared at the headquarters of the tank group for negotiations

ditch Commander of the Air Fleet Field Marshal Kassel ring. He informed us that Army Group South had advanced, and that it had seized certain bridgeheads on the Dnieper. As for the direction of the further development of the operation, there is still uncertainty about it: whether to attack Kharkov or Kyiv ...

... On September 7, the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions managed to capture bridgeheads on the southern bank of the river. Seim. On this day, the headquarters of the army group gave the order to advance to the line of Nizhyn, Monastyrishche and deliver the main blow in the direction of Nezhin. On the morning of September 8 at 5 o'clock. 25 min. this order was canceled, and I received the following instructions: "The new direction is Borzna, Romny, the main attack is on the right flank"<sup>2</sup>.

Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, speaking about how, in the course of carrying out Hitler's order of August 21, the headquarters planned an attack on Moscow and at the same time planned "the greatest encirclement battle in world history", reports the following:

August 30, 1941. 70th day of the war.

"Conference with the Commander-in-Chief: He had a lengthy conversation with the Führer in private. During this conversation, apparently, certain issues were discussed, as a result of which very serious conclusions were drawn in the course of the fighting in recent ...

| Nairg no. Agtu Sgoir Zoshchi. Te Weigtasv: 11 Visa 1941-1945. Zsp eg tikagu Nogu. Ashep, RA. 1998. R. 48-76.

2 Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 283,

3 Halder F. Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces 1939-1942. M.: Military Publishing, 1968-1971. .

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... Only one business instruction was given, namely: the troops stationed at the front near the Desna (Army Group Center) are not intended for operations in the south, but, on the contrary, should be involved as soon as possible in operations against Timoshenko's troops (that is, in the Moscow direction) "...<sup>1</sup>

3 August 1941 (Sunday), 71st day of the war.

"17.00 - Colonel Heusinger. We discussed with him issues related to the further conduct of operations. In particular:

a) My telephone conversation with Jodl, in which he emphasized that the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group after they had carried out the present "intermezzo"? will be thrown into the offensive against Timoshenko's troops ...

September 5, 1941, 76th day of the war.

"Afternoon: 17.30 — meeting with the Fuhrer.

1. Leningrad. The goal has been reached. From now on, the Leningrad region will be a "secondary theater of military operations" ...

...2. Attack on Tymoshenko's troops. Seize the enemy tightly! The offensive should be started, if possible, in 8-10 days. (It's impossible!) The task is to "encircle and destroy live"... |

...3. Battle in the south. The most important thing is to send one division from the area west of the Desna to Chernigov to destroy the enemy troops sandwiched between the Dnieper and the Desnoy<sup>3</sup>.

17th Army (8 divisions) to advance in the direction of Poltava, Kharkov. The 1st Panzer Group to advance to the northwest, the 2nd Panzer Group - to the south to the Sula River. In the future, they will jointly strike at the rear of the enemy grouping, on

1 This entry suggests that the attack on Moscow could have begun immediately after the defeat of the 5th Army on the Desna, and without the encirclement of the rest of the armies of the Southwestern Front. Such a rapid attack on Moscow could have taken place as a result of the breakthrough of the Bryansk Front in its central sector.

2 Intermezzo is an independent episode in an opera or an intermediate section in an instrumental composition. However, the opera was not the Kiev cauldron, which had not yet been planned on August 3, but the offensive against Moscow, preparations for which were carried out despite Hitler's throwing and the contradictions between the OKW and OKH. Intermezzo is the neutralization of the 5th Army, which untied the hands of the GA "South" for the attack on Eastern Ukraine and ensured the security of the rear of the right wing of the GA "Center" before their attack on Moscow.

3 This refers to the location of the 5th Army - east of the Dnieper and west of the Desna - along which, towards Chernigov, the 98th Infantry Division advanced.

25

located on the ledge of the front between the Dnieper and the Desna!. After

how this battle ("the greatest battle in world history

rii "2) will be completed, the released forces should be re

throw to the north to strike at Timoshenko's troops "...3

September 7, 1941, the 78th day of the war.

Departure to Army Group South (Uman) to discuss plans for an operation to envelop the enemy in the bend of the Dnieper and Desna. Despite the fact that the command of the army group considers it wrong to withdraw most of the infantry divisions of the 17th Army from the Kharkov direction, our plans, in general, converge "...

September 9, 1941, the 80th day of the war.

"In the bands of the 6th and 2nd armies - complete confusion: three boilers" ... 4

A brief conclusion from the above will be some, and possibly a complete justification of I.V. Stalin, who is still accused of contributing to the encirclement of the troops of Kirponos, forbidding the withdrawal of the troops of the Southwestern Front from the Dnieper and leaving Kyiv. Serious talk about the role of Stalin and Stavka in the death of the South-Western Front is impossible until reports from the Red Chapel and other still unclassified Soviet intelligence organizations are published. After all, if the Germans themselves did not know until September 5-7 (Hitler's meeting, the signing of the D-35, the meeting in Uman and the order to Guderian) that they would have to create the Kiev pocket, if from the moment the troops of the GA "Center" turned to Ukraine, the Germans continued to develop plans to strike at Moscow, then it is logical to assume that on the table at Stalin, at least until September 6, were German plans for an attack on Moscow, and not on the encirclement of the Southwestern Front ...

1 This refers to the location of the remaining armies of the Southwestern Front - west of the Dnieper and south of the Desna. .

2 Halder quotes Hitler in quotation marks. From this entry it can be seen that on September 5, Hitler not only spoke seriously about the Kiev pocket for the first time, but also called it in advance "the greatest battle in world history."

} Now the attack on Moscow was to begin not after the destruction of the 5th Army, but after the destruction of the entire SWF.

4 At least two of them were surrounded by troops of the 15th and 31st Rifle Corps of the 5th Army on the Desna. Possibly, the 3rd pocket was the encirclement of units of the 40th Army near Konotop.

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Brian Fagate (Rigae), author of a book on strategy and tactics on the Eastern Front in 1941, describing the reasons for Stalin's conviction that the Germans would attack Moscow, writes:

"Red Chapel" - the Soviet intelligence network ... transmitted high-level information flows to Moscow. Most of this information was gathered from cipher clerks.

major department of the OKW, who had access to information relevant to military movements and plans at all levels. The penetration of Soviet agents into the headquarters of the Luftwaffe was especially valuable because, as we have seen, Göring's subordinates, such as Kesselring, not only knew about the strategy, but were actually active in its creators ...

... But first, the Red Army had to suffer because of Stalin's mistake, and this happened in Kyiv "...! |

Since in this period of time no one has information about the specific content of the "high-level information flows" that were transmitted to Moscow, it is obvious that the discussion about the motivation for making certain decisions at the level of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should be postponed for the future.

Today we can only speculate about how confused Stalin and Shaposhnikov were rushing around the office when the intelligence chief unexpectedly placed Directive No. 35 on their desk. . But the preamble to Directive No. 35 and three of its other paragraphs no less unambiguously spoke of an offensive against Moscow, Leningrad and the Crimea... Where exactly should the reserves be thrown? Gle take time for the transfer of troops?

It is possible that by September 8 or 1, Stalin already knew about the German plans for the D-35. In any case, it was on September 8 that he summoned Zhukov to him and ordered him to go to Leningrad. 1] September, Stalin informed Kirponos that "the enemy will attack you not only from the side of Konotop, that is, from the north, but also from the south, that is, Kremenchug, and also from the west, since when our troops are withdrawn from Dnieper, the enemy will immediately occupy the eastern bank of the Dnieper and begin attacks.

. Eivage V. Oregaiop Vagfagoza. Zimezu Apa Tasis\$ Op TVe Eachegp Egon, 1941. Mouato: Pres o Press, 1984. P. 284.

27

If the Konotop group of the enemy unites with the Kremen-Chug group, you will be surrounded "...

"I think that we are already very late with the withdrawal of troops across the Dnieper," said the first deputy chief of the General Staff for the South-Western direction A.M. Vasilevsky to G.K. Zhukov! Nua after the negotiations between Stalin and Kirponos, as A.M. Vasilevsky: "The leadership of the Southwestern Front had only to fulfill its duty to the end" ... 2

. Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 2 volumes - M .: Olma-Press, 2002. S. 373.

? Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. Minsk: Belarus, 1988, p. 130.

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## 98 PMEAMTEVTE-OTGUTZTOM

A Brief History of the 98th Infantry Division.  
Wehrmacht divisions were formed in waves. The 98th Infantry Division was formed in September 1939 as a division of the 5th wave. This meant that initially it was armed with Czechoslovak weapons, in the regiments of the division instead of infantry guns there were medium mortars, the anti-tank company was horse-drawn, instead of a horse platoon - a bicycle, reconnaissance also moved not on horses, but on bicycles, and a sapper battles they are rear divisions - not mechanically, but horse-drawn.

The 98th division included:

282nd, 289th and 290th infantry regiments, 198th artillery regiment, 198th engineer battalion, 198th anti-tank division, 198th communications battalion and 198th supply battalion. Stages of the division's combat path: 1940 - France, 1941 - France, Ukraine, Vyazma, Moscow; 1942 - Yukhnov, Gzhatsk; 1943 - Spas-Demyansk, Bryansk, Kuban, Crimea; 1944 - death in the Sevastopol region.

In the same year, in Croatia, from the surviving servicemen of the 98th division and the headquarters of the 387th division, the 98th division of the new formation was formed, which, having also fought in Italy, ended the war in American captivity.

29

Emblems of the  
98th Infantry Division.

In September 1941, and it is precisely this period of history that interests us most of all, the 98th Infantry Division was commanded by Lieutenant General Erich Schreck (EnsN ZsVgosk). According to the certificate of the head of the Intelligence Department of the headquarters of the South-West

of the front on the enemy grouping in front of the Southwestern Front on September 7, 1941: "98 infantry divisions half staffed by Sudeten Germans, losses: 30-35%".

In the 20s of August 1941, Hitler, realizing that the Blitz Krieg had failed, that the industrial, military and political power of the USSR in the development of the Barbarossa plan was incorrectly assessed, that the war would not stop with the capture of Moscow, decided to guarantee the continuation of the war. the capture of the industrial raw materials and food important southern regions of the USSR and made a competent decision in such conditions: to deploy significant forces of the troops of Army Group Center from Moscow to the Ukrainian direction. These troops—the 2nd Field Army and the 2nd Panzer Group—attacked from the north on the right flank of the Southwestern Front.

A frontal attack on the right wing of the Southwestern Front was inflicted by the famous (for its subsequent death in the Stalingrad cauldron) 6th Army of Army Group South. This army also included the 98th Infantry Division, which had to take part first in the bloody struggle for the Okuninovsky bridgehead on the Dnieper, and then, together with the divisions of the Army Group Center, surrounded and destroyed the formations of the famous Soviet 5th army. Geographically, all this took place on the territory of the Chernihiv region, between the Dnieper and Desna rivers.

R

August 19-23, 1941. The initial position of the troops before the start of the Kyiv operation. Capture of the Okuninovsky bridge. On the evening of August 19, 1941, the command of the Southwestern Front ordered Major General M.I. Potapov and the 27th Rifle Corps, Major General P.D. Artyemenko, who held back the Germans in the area of the Korosten-Kyiv railway, to leave the Dnieper and take up defense on its left bank. Part of its forces of the 5th Army was to be thrown out to the north of Chernigov - in case the Army Group Center, whose troops hung from the north over the South-Western Front, attacked the flank of the front.

On this day, August 19, in front of the front of the 5th Army were exhausted in previous battles and went on the defensive.

thirty

German 62nd, 79th, 56th, 113th and 262nd Infantry Divisions and the 8th SS Regiment. The main object of our research, the 98th Infantry Division (98 [pashepe-GUu1\$1up, or 98th 10), was also located here.

M.I. Potapov, whose army hung over all these formations of the Wehrmacht, hatched a daring plan in his head - to hit the Germans from north to south, cut them off from communications from the west, surround them, creating a kind of Kiev

cauldron, and destroy. But... "It didn't turn out like it was supposed to"... Neither Potapov, nor the command of the South-Western Front, nor the Headquarters assumed that the 5th Army, which Hitler mentioned in his directives more often than any other Soviet armies. is the No. 1 goal of the joint operation of Army Groups "Center" and "Ut" ...

"Mosquitoes, like little "things"!, pounced on the naked upper parts of the body during washing and showed no less importunity in special cases - at a "quiet" place<sup>2</sup>. We swallow quinine daily. They, mosquitoes and quinine, poison our lives, - narrates the chronicler of the 98th division Martin Garays (Magi Sage! \$) <sup>3</sup> about the events preceding the departure of the division to the Dnieper. - In any form of defense, the Bolshevik is a master. He has infected the area with mines, small mines in wooden boxes that the mine detector does not react to. Damaged Sturmgeschütz, trucks and ambulances that have lost their way are screaming for urgent intervention. The sappers work day and night, and in such tedious work they manage to remove 400 mines.

On August 20, the Bolshevik seemed particularly restless. From morning to evening we were deprived of rest by his artillery. Ready to retreat? The very next day, the divisional order clarified this situation: "The enemy begins to withdraw troops to the north from the KhUP of the army corps ... <sup>4</sup>

... The reconnaissance group sent forward went 5 km and came across only an empty "greenback". Apparently, the enemy has already withdrawn his troops.

<sup>1</sup> "Thing" - German dive bomber Yu-87.

? Upole toilets.

<sup>3</sup> During the days of the events described, Martin Garais commanded the 282nd infantry regiment of the 98th division, and later became the commander of this division.

<sup>4</sup>

In September 1941, this corps, commanded by General of Infantry \eteg Kepir, included the 298th, 44th and 296th Infantry Divisions Viyune; in August 1941, the corps operated on the left, north of the army corps, which included 111, 79, 262, 113 and "our" 98th Sh.

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Scheme of combat operations of the 98th division in the Kiev cauldron (according to Martin Garais).

33

From August 22, our movement to take up the initial position for the attack turned into the pursuit of the retreating enemy. And again a Bolshevik

turned out to be an excellent master of rest. The actions of a skillfully controlled strong rearguard with long-range, very mobile artillery ensured the safe withdrawal of a large number of their troops!

Field Marshal von Reichenau assessed the situation and gave instructions:

"Every commander must remember: tireless pursuit!"

What that meant,

The commander of the 282nd Regiment learned on his own

98th division, the author of the book hides the next

about the 98th division Martin Garais. day. At noon, reconnaissance advancing on Khabnoe confirmed the enemy's retreat to the voetok.

But with our transportation support we got so stuck in the shit that we had to give up the "relentless pursuit." The rain poured down like funeral music. At night, the 289th and 290th infantry regiments reached Nedashki and Sloboda, and the 282nd infantry regiment went to the Nedashki-Ksaverov area!

In the operation to withdraw his troops beyond the Dnieper, the commander of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov demonstrated a classic version of breaking away from the enemy. The difficulties that the Germans encountered while pursuing the Soviet troops retreating beyond the Dnieper were planned in the decision of the 5A command to withdraw:

"The first stage is the withdrawal of the army to the Dnieper River, the depth of the stage is 140-180 km, the duration is 5 days. Average daily

1 Sagey M. CatrRipa Ende deg EgapK15sV-Zideepacisswep 98. Peaschepe Omayuop. WayYav Napz-Neppipe. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 107.

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pace 30-35 km. The task is to secretly, with the least expenditure of time and effort, in an organized manner and without losses, withdraw army units from the line of Rudnitsa, Zherevtsy, Stepanovka, Obikhody, Guska, Yaltsovka, Zarudye to the left bank of the Dnieper River.

(...)

A. By misleading the enemy and masking the retreat:

Separate our units from the enemy at night.

2-3 hours before the start of the withdrawal, a fire attack is carried out on the entire front, which is periodically repeated until the moment of withdrawal!

After the retreat, light detachments of cover remain in the trenches, which all the time until the morning support rifle and machine-gun fire on the entire front of the withdrawn units. Reconnaissance groups and sabotage detachments are thrown into the enemy's position.

The rear guards are delayed at a distance of 15 km from the main forces and, when the enemy approaches, they resist him in order to create the impression that the retreat has stopped and the main forces have gone over to the defensive line.

A

B. For engineering support:

Obstacles and destruction devices to cover against the movement of troops are carried out by sapper units of formations<sup>2</sup>.

(...)

D. For artillery support:

To conceal the moment of detachment of units, 2-3 hours before the withdrawal of artillery, carry out a fire attack on enemy targets and, until the very beginning of the withdrawal, fire attacks periodically

wildly repeat.

Ensuring the withdrawal of units is carried out by small-caliber regimental artillery and horse-drawn light artillery regiments. Corps artillery, artillery regiments of divisions on a mechanized pull away in advance on the march

1 This fire attack, on August 20, the Germans immediately considered a possible sign of withdrawal, but it took time for additional reconnaissance and regrouping of forces, and only on August 22 did the pursuit begin. The Luftwaffe reported on the move of the 5th Army on August 19th.

2 The effectiveness of the minefields set by Potapov's sappers is confirmed by the Germans, they were blown up by assault guns - very dangerous Sturmgeschütz self-propelled guns.

. 3 The effectiveness is confirmed by the Germans: "The actions of a skillfully controlled strong rearguard, with long-range, very mobile artillery, ensured the safe withdrawal of a large number of troops."

35

rutam waste compounds. Move at night time. During daylight hours, artillery should be deployed in anti-tank areas in readiness for immediate deployment for battle!

August 23 did not bring anything new to the 98th division:

"Burned bridges and Russian roads slowed down the pace during prolonged rain ... Most of the division got stuck in the sand and mud near the Dnieper. The sand, soft and deep, gave way to a damp meadow cut by ditches with broken bridges... 10 to 12 horses. With the onset of dusk, the exhausted and deadly tired infantry reached some huts, which, however, were already occupied by more "frisky" detachments. I didn't even have enough energy to eat.

In three days, the distance from Ksaverov to the Dnieper, in the rain again intensifying heat, was overcome. One regiment of the 111th division, without any pause, was thrown into battle for a dangerous bridgehead near Gornostaipol.

The indescribable state of the road network is explained by the growing proximity of the Pripyat swamps. The bleak expanse and wasteland of flat, with only a few bushes, terrain makes it difficult to march. In front of many obliquely pitted trenches? transport vehicles, carts, and especially trucks of a motorized detachment accumulate in long rows ...

Low, leaning, hidden in the reeds and covered

reeds, small rural huts protrude barely perceptibly from the bushes and sunflowers. When we pass through the villages, a whole wall of old men, old women and heaps of children of all ages silently, with open mouths and an expression of curiosity, stand at the gates"3, writes M. Garais.

" The decision to withdraw is quoted from the book by A.V. Vladimirsky, who in 1941 was deputy chief of the operational department of headquarters 5A (Vladimirsky A.V. In the Kiev direction. Based on the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989 pp. 209-222).

? It is possible that the mentioned trenches were part of the Soviet engineering barriers.

3 Sage M. Katripa Ende deg EgapKl5sv-Zidaepanisswep 98. |patchepe Omya5yup. UePae Nap\$-Nepshe. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 107.

36

That day, August 23, which brought nothing new to the 98th Division but deadly fatigue, became a real tragedy for the Southwestern Front. On the move, with completely insignificant forces of the forward detachments of the 111th Infantry and, possibly, the 11th Panzer Division, the Germans managed to capture the strategically important bridge on the Dnieper in full integrity and safety and create a bridgehead on its left, Chernigov, bank, deadly dangerous for the Southwestern Front.

The bridge, which in different sources is called differently - Okuninovsky, Pechkinsky or Gornostaypolsky - was in the zone of responsibility of the 27th Rifle Corps, which retreated parallel to and south of the 5th Army. In the Combat Order of the Headquarters of the 27th Rifle Corps No. 46 dated August 20, 1941 on the preparation of roads and crossings across the river. Dnipro ska

but:

"To better ensure the supply of divisions, the corps commander ordered to cut lanes, roads and crossings across the river. Dnieper.

1. 87th Rifle Division: border on the right - (claim.) Kopti, Okuninovo, (claim.) Dityatki, (claim.) Vishevichi; border on the left - Oster, (claim.) Sukho Luche, Vakhovka, (claim.) Rudnya Talskaya, (suit.) Mircea Roads: Peskovka, Fire Tower, Blitch, Kolentsy, Spiers, Shpilevskaya Rudnya, Dubnyaki, Vakhovka, Richta, Bogdany, Gornostaypol, Strakholesye, Okuninovo, Oster, Kozelets. bridge and ferry near Okuninovo.

(...)

4. All corps units use the crossing over the river. Dnieper near Okuninovo...

(...)

All roads and crossings must be kept in good working order and ready for operation. At each crossing, have two barges and one steamer. Build wharfs and access roads to knim.

(...)

6. Deadline for the readiness of roads and crossings no later than the morning of 23.8.41.

Chief of Staff of the 27th Corps Major General Smirnov Corps  
Engineer Major Mikhailov.

In all likelihood, the blame for the capture of a strategically important bridge lies with the command of the Southwestern Front: 1. Acting together with 5A, performing common tasks with it

37

chi, the 27th rifle corps was subordinated not to Potapov, but not directly to the front, which always made it difficult to coordinate its actions with the 5th army. Moreover, in the midst of the successful withdrawal of Potapov's troops across the Dnieper, from 24:00 on August 21, the 27th Corps was still subordinate to the army, but not the 5th, but the 37th, which defended Kiev and was commanded by Major General A.A. Vlasov'. On August 22, when the 27th sk began to withdraw, units of the 111th infantry and 11th tank divisions hit butt between it and the 5th army, and a day later the bridge was captured.

2. The author of the book "On the Kiev direction" A.V. Vladi Mirsky, who in 1941 was deputy head of the operations department of the 5th Army, writes that the Germans discovered the withdrawal of 5A only on the afternoon of August 22?. But, as we see from a German source, already on August 20, the Germans, having suspected something was wrong, sent intelligence forward, which only confirmed the withdrawal of Soviet troops on August 22. Obviously, German intelligence also revealed that parts of Artemenko's 27th Rifle Corps remained in their previous positions (according to Combat Order No. 00242, the corps' withdrawal was planned only for the evening of August 22) and that the right flank of the corps was exposed as a result of the withdrawal of 5A. The reaction of the Germans to this miscalculation by the command of the South-Western Front was a strike on the right flank of the 27th sk and the launch of a special mobile group into the gap between it and 5A.

The description and interpretation of the capture of the Okuninovsky bridge in various sources looks different.

Commander 37A Major General A.A. Vlasov3:

"Under difficult conditions, my army coped with the defense of Kyiv and successfully defended the capital of Ukraine for two months. However, the incurable diseases of the Red Army did the trick. The front was broken through in the area of neighboring armies, Kyiv was surrounded. By order of the high command, I had to

build a fortified area."

"

Combat order of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front No. 00242 on the reassignment and regrouping of troops. SBD WWII. T. 40.

: Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 226.

3 Vlasov A.A. Why I took the path of fighting Bolshevism. open letter.

38

Here, of course, Vlasov could be reproached for the fact that the front was broken through and the bridge was captured just in the sector of his army. But it is obvious that such a reproach would not be entirely fair - after all, the 27th sk was subordinated to Vlasov only a day and a half before the tragedy.

Deputy Chief of the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the 5th Army A.V. Vladimirsky:

"On the morning of August 23, the enemy, introducing an additional number of tanks, destroyed this barrier at Bogdan!. Moving on, the 11th Panzer Division captured Gornostaypol, and in the afternoon of August 23, it reached the Okuninovo crossing over the Dnieper ... The protection and defense of the bridge was carried out by a company of the 56th NKVD regiment numbering 23 people ... Approaches to the bridge and the bridge itself were mined and prepared for the explosion "... th

Head of the Operations Department of the headquarters of the South-Western Front I.Kh. Bagramyan?:

"It happened completely differently (in comparison with the 5th Army. - Auth.) with the 27th Rifle Corps. General P.D. Artemenko and his headquarters poorly organized the retreat of their units. They clearly underestimated the real possibilities of the enemy to prevent this responsible and complex maneuver. Unfortunately, the front headquarters did not foresee this threat either. The commander of the German 6th Army immediately took advantage of our miscalculation. Having learned through his reconnaissance about the beginning of the movement of Soviet units, which was not distinguished by either secrecy or clarity, he ordered the commander of the 11th Panzer Division, General Shtapf, to get ahead of them with access to the Dnieper.

General Shtapf, named by Bagramyan, was in fact the commander of the 111th Infantry Division (Sepega! Until August 24, the 11th Panzer was commanded by Lieutenant-General Günther Angern (Cantern Apeern), then, after Angern was wounded, by General of the Panzer Troops Hans Karl Baron von Eisebeck (Nap\$-Kai Egeshegg wop EzefesK). Regarding the fact that "the headquarters of the front did not foresee this threat" AND WHAT "general P.D. Artemenko and his headquarters ... clearly underestimated

1 The barrier consisted of a detachment of border guards and a company of the 96th rifle regiment of the 87th rifle division of the 27th sk 37A.

I 2 Bagramyan I.LKh. Thus the war began. K .: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1988. . 259.

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the real capabilities of the enemy, "it should be said that the commander of the 27th Rifle Corps assessed the situation quite realistically, which he warned the headquarters of the South-Western Front:

"In accordance with Front Directive No. 280, units of the 5th Army are withdrawing from August 20, 1941, opening the right flank of the corps.

To counteract the possible envelopment of the flank, I used my reserve - the 96th Infantry Regiment, setting it the task of covering the Voroshilovka, Shpilikalentsy front. I took the reserve by weakening the main line of defense.

With the enemy reaching the Khabnoye, Vonyakovo, Germakhovka line, the front of the corps will be 100 km.

Further weakening of the main line Rudnya Peskovskaya, Rudnichenko, Migali farm, the northern bank of the Vably stream may affect the strength of the defense, since there are no reserves in the divisions.

With the further advance of the enemy to the east, he will have the possibility of direct access to the Chernobyl and Okuninovo crossings, since I have no opportunity to allocate additional forces and firepower at the expense of the corps.

I ask you to advance two rifle divisions to the line of Chernobyl, Veresnya, Rudnya, Karpilovka by the morning of August 21, or to delay the left-flank formations of the 5th Army at this line. Artemenko!

"Shtapf's strong mobile group," continues Bagramyan, "rushed along the only highway on the right flank of the corps. For some reason, General Artemenko instructed not the 28th Mountain Division of Colonel K.I. to cover this road. Novik, which relied on this important communication line with its right flank, and the 171st Rifle General A.E. Budykho, which was closer to Kyiv.

Here we break again. But really, what prevented General Artemenko from taking seemingly logical actions - entrusting the protection of an important road to the 28th Mountain Rifle Division? Perhaps the answer to this question is contained in the same Combat Order No. 00242, which was signed by M.P. Kirponos on August 21 in Brovary and in which he clearly and clearly ordered the 27th Rifle Corps

retreat beyond the Dnieper without the 28th division. In the same battle race

| Vladimírsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 223.

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The order no less specifically orders General Vlasov to withdraw the 28th Mountain Rifle Division to the KIUR:

"Commander of the 37th Army

Copy: Commander of the 5th Army

Commander 27sk

Commander 2, Zvdk

Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of YuZN

Head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft

BATTLE ORDER No. 00242.

HEADQUARTERS YUZF BROVARY. 21.8.41

Card 500 000

1. 27 sks 24.00 21.8.41 go under the control of the 37th army.

2. In connection with the withdrawal of the 5th Army beyond the river. I order the Dnieper: 27 sk (without 28 GSD) with the onset of darkness on 22.8, start a retreat for the river. Dnieper. Leave at night. When withdrawing, make extensive use of barriers of all kinds. The sequence of the exit of the main forces of the corps to the lines:

a) Ivankov, Fenevichi, Katyuzhanka, Litvinovka by the morning of August 23, 1941;

6) Bogdany, Sychevka, Yasnogorodka, Tarasovichi by the morning of 24.8.41;

c) east. bank of the river Dnieper by the morning of 25.8.41.

The units covering the retreat should be at least 10 km away from the main forces.

With exit to the east. bank of the river Dnepr 27 sk to occupy and firmly defend the front (suit.) Art. Glybov, Svaromye.

3. To the commander of the 37th Army, withdraw the 28th Guards Rifle Division to the KIUR location by the morning of 24.8.41!. Having changed all vdb no later than the morning of 25.8, concentrate them on the eastern bank of the river. Dnieper...



| Reporting on the 28th division, Bagramyan writes that it should have been transferred to KIUR after the 27th sk reached the left bank of the Dnieper (Bagramyan I.Kh. Decree. Op. P. 258). However, according to the report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on the withdrawal of troops beyond the Dnieper dated 08.20.41, it was said that the 27th sk should reach the eastern bank of the Dnieper by the evening of August 24 (Chernihiv region during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: Collection of Documents and Materials, Kiev: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1978, p. 41). The 28th division was ordered to withdraw to KIURkutra on August 24, that is, before the 27th corps went beyond the Dnieper. Combat Order No. 00242, which we have quoted, sets the date for the 27th Rifle Corps to reach the eastern bank of the Dnieper at an even later time - the kutra on August 25th.

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(...)

4. Commander of the Air Force of the front, at the request of the commander of the 37th army, to cover the crossing of units of the 27th brigade across the river. Dnieper.

5. The border with the 5th army - Radomyshl, (claim.) Dityatki, (claim.) Kopti, (claim.) Nizhyn.

Border with the 26th Army - Brusilov, Vasilkov, (suit.) Cherries, art. Yagotin.

6. Report on receipt and given orders.

Kirponos Burmistenko Tupikov".

"While the mobile detachment allocated by Budykho, consisting of a rifle regiment and one division from the 357th light artillery regiment, made its way through the wooded and swampy area clogged with rears, fascist tanks managed to slip far along the highway, which led to the only bridge crossing in the area across the Dnieper near the village Perch is new, - says I.Kh. Bagramyan. Only the 2nd Battalion of the 357th Artillery Regiment managed to turn around on the way of the tanks. The Nazis stumbled upon his batteries near the village of Ivankov. One of the batteries was attacked by about a dozen tanks. The gunners managed to destroy two of them, but almost all of them themselves died in a fiery whirlwind that the Nazis unleashed on them. Only the last gun, camouflaged with wattle, was left with a single fighter. When the tanks approached, the gun came to life. Two enemy vehicles burst into flames.

The rest stopped and opened heavy fire. At this time, a group of machine gunners bypassed the gun. It was still possible to leave, but the artilleryman did not. When the enemy tanks moved again, he knocked out a third vehicle. Behind the guns, a hut was on fire. Sparks rained down on the fighter, burned him. And he continued to shoot. Here is another tank puffed up. The gun fell silent - the shells ran out. The Nazis rushed to the gun. Artil-

the lerist got up, shook his fist at them, and, staggering—he was wounded—headed for the burning hut. Death preferred captivity. When ours arrived, at the site of a recent battle, they found a wounded soldier who had accidentally survived. From him we learned

Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00242 dated August 21, 1941 on the reassignment and regrouping of troops. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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what happened here. He also named the name of the gunner, who alone controlled the gun. I remember his last name - Brigade. Unfortunately, I could not find out anything more about this hero.

Here we need to digress a little again. The village of Ivankov, where the gunner Brigade from the 2nd Battalion of the 357th Light Artillery Regiment accomplished the feat, is actually located on the approaches to Gornostaipol (i.e., on the approaches to the Okuninovskaya ferry). However, in the Report of the head of the Political Directorate of the Southwestern Front to the head of the GPU of the Red Army on the exploits of the fighters and commanders of the 5th Army in the battles on the outskirts of Chernigov, dated September 4, it is said that the Red Army Brigade destroyed four tanks and rushed into a burning hut near the village Ivashkovka!, which is located to the north of Chernihiv, 130 km from the village of Ivankov. The same case, with reference to the village of Ivashkovka, is also described in the local history literature of Chernigov.

In this case, most likely, Bagramyan is right, because there were no German tanks in the Ivashkovka area, and the mention of the 2nd division of the 357th paws with reference to Ivankov is contained in Artemenko's order dated August 22:

"Fulfilling the special directive of the Yu.-3 headquarters. front, 27 SKS pm 22.8.4] departs in an easterly direction ...

..713sps2/357ap to cover the right flank of the corps by 0600 on 23/8/41 to occupy and stubbornly defend the prepared line of Karpilovka, Kovalevka, Dominovka, Kh. Stovninka, Priborsk.

Regiment headquarters - grove south. Stepanovka.

The route is Staraya Buda, Koblitsa, Leonovka, forest south. Spiers, Ivankov, Bolotnya, Fedorovka, Rusaks...

... Starting point - east. env. Old Buda pass at 6.00 22.8.41. h

Big halt until 18.00 22.8.41 - forest south. Spiers.

Commander of 27sk Major General Artemenko  
Military Commissar Division Commissar Malanin

Chief of Staff of the Corps, Major General Smirnov?

Chernihiv region during the Great Patriotic War (1941- t biennium): Collection of documents and materials. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 8. S. 51.

? Private combat order of the commander of the 27th rifle corps No. 06 dated August 22, 1941 to the commander of the 712th rifle regiment for cover from the corps. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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"Fascist tanks raced along the highway," we continue to read I.Kh. Bagramyan. - Near Gornostaipol, at the bridge over the Teterev River, a small detachment of border guards, led by Lieutenant Sergei Uglyarenko, entered into battle with them. A handful of fighters held the enemy back for several hours. Only in the morning the Nazis were able to move on. In the afternoon, having crushed a few units from the 4th division of the NKVD, they reached Okuninovo. At 18 o'clock the road bridge across the Dnieper was in the hands of the enemy. Upon learning of this, even Kirponos lost his characteristic composure. He angrily banged his fist on the map lying on the table: "How could this be allowed to happen!"

Unfortunately, the case of the capture of the Okunov bridge is so complicated that it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to sort it out. The main characters - Artemenko and Buda ho - were captured during the battle in the Kiev cauldron. And after being released from captivity, they were shot for treason to the Motherland ...

In all likelihood, Major Volodarsky, who already on August 24, 1941 was named the main culprit in the capture of the bridge, was also shot, if he did not die in the encirclement:

"The detachment of the 16th Infantry Regiment defending the bridge near Okuninovo! under the command of Major Volodarsky, he did not repel the enemy's offensive and, leaving the bridge unexploded, retreated to the north"?, - reported in the Report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Front and the head of the General Staff of the Red Army about the breakthrough of the Nazis near the village of Okuninovo and repelling the enemy's attack dated August 24, 1941 of the year.

What is said about the capture of the Okuninovsky bridge in the history of the 98th Infantry Division? According to the commander of the 282nd regiment of this division, Martin Garais:

"The forward detachment of the "Sturmgeschütz" under the command of Major Hofmann-Schönborn (Neupapp-SsbbpBogp) managed to capture in full integrity a 3-kilometer wooden bridge across the Dnieper near the Pristan, which in this place had

1 16th Rifle Regiment was part of the 87th Rifle Division of the 37th Army.

2 Chernihiv region during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945): Collection of documents and materials. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1978. S. 44.

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a width of 800 m. The 111th Infantry Division following this detachment struck across the bridge and, together with the buffaloes, created a bridgehead.

The Okuninov Bridge, according to Soviet data, had a length of 2500 m and consisted of a wooden deck on metal trusses and piles. The Buffaloes are the 191st Assault Gun Battalion. On the sides of these "Sturmgeschütze" was applied the emblem of the division - a red buffalo in the black square. "Sturmgeschütze" were made on the chassis of the P2 tank. They were officially designated - S 1 and S.Sh. In 1941, these self-propelled guns were armed with a short-barreled 75-mm cannon. The commander of Sigtzessni-AshcheNipya 191, from October 1940 to December 1941, was Major Ponter Hoffmann Schönborn (1905-1970). For the Balkans he was awarded the Knight's Cross. For the successful capture of the Okuninovsky bridge and the bridgehead, which was done as a result of a continuous 120-kilometer forced march, Günter Hofmann-Schönborn was awarded the Oak Leaves (12/31/1941). By the end of the war, he had become a major general and was in command of the 5th Panzer Division.

On August 24, Halder wrote in his diary: "The offensive of the 6th Army is developing rapidly. The 11th Panzer Division captured the bridge over the Dnieper at Gornostaipol (the division commander was seriously wounded in this battle) and broke through to the east to the crossing over the Desna near Ostra. This crossing was set on fire by the Russians. The rest of the bridges were later destroyed by Russian aviation"<sup>2</sup>.

In our literature, it is often written that the entire [1st Panzer Division. In fact, her participation was more modest. Actually, the tanks of the 11th division approached the bridge after its capture - their participation in the battles on the eastern bank of the Dnieper is not visible. The light tanks of the 11th Panzer Division, armed with 20 mm guns, crossed the Dnieper on pontoons. Obviously, medium tanks are

| Sageb M. KatrRipa Ende deg EgalK5sp-Zideepapizswep 98. 1paschepe OM 5jup. UePar Nap5-Nepppe. Rodgil. 1959.5.108.

. Halder F. Military diary. Daily notes of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces 1939-1942. M.: Military Publishing, 1968—

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If they were transported to the Okunovsky bridgehead, then only after the Germans managed to build a pontoon bridge in this place. In all likelihood, in those Soviet documents that mention German tanks in the Okuninovo area, they are talking about self-propelled guns 5shS.Sh and light tanks R2.P. However, our troops in the area of the parade ground could no longer oppose the Germans to the Germans at that time, except, perhaps, armored vehicles ... -th company Okuninovsky bridge of the detachment of the 1109th motorized field Hofian-Schönborn of the 11th tank division. This company, commanded by Sonnenberger, was subordinate to Hoffmann-Schoenborn and participated

voval in the capture of the bridge.

Vasily Stepanovich Petrov in his memoirs! "The Past Is With Us", telling about the combat operations of the 23rd Corps Artillery Regiment in the Chernigov region, describes a meeting with a wounded anti-aircraft gunner, a lieutenant, who served in one of the batteries of the anti-aircraft artillery battalion, covering the Okuninov bridge2?.

"The defense of the bridge was led by a sapper<sup>3</sup>, to whom, in addition to other units, the anti-aircraft division was subordinate," writes V.S. Petrov. - The sapper demanded to change positions, arguing that the guns were far "from the covered area

T V.S. Petrov. The past is with us. Book. 2. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1989. S. 107.

2? The bridge was covered by 155th 232nd separate anti-aircraft artillery divisions (nine 76-mm guns per division), one of which, on the eve of the capture of the bridge, was sent by General A.A. Vlasov to another sector of the front.

In the area of the bridge there were 90 sappers from the 4th reserve pontoon battalion and the 239th separate sapper battalion.

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ekta". The battery commander refused and sent a sapper to the command post of the division. But the firing positions still had to be changed. The bridge was bombed frequently. Uninterrupted-

machines and guns were moving in a stream. Our units retreated beyond the Dnieper. Several days have passed. On the dam during the raid, shooting unexpectedly began. One car caught fire, then another. The shooting spread to the bridge. A shell exploded at the OP of anti-aircraft gunners. Bullets whistled. A message was received from the NP about the appearance of German tanks. The barrels of the guns firing at the planes went down. There is a tank on the bridge. Anti-aircraft gunners opened fire. The shells pierced the wooden flooring from below, but the tank raced, clanging its tracks. The confusion intensified. Following the first tank, a second, a third appeared, along with our vehicles. The battery commander ordered to shift the fire, but the guns were too close to the dam. The sector of fire is limited. The lieutenant was wounded. He woke up already in the dark, among the thickets, where many people had gathered. The lieutenant was bandaged. He learned that the Germans had captured the bridge. The nurse who assisted the lieutenant did not know about the fate of the division. Then the lieutenant ended up in the medical battalion, which was evacuated. From there he was sent to Oster, but on the way the sanitary column for some reason turned towards Chernigov. In the morning she came under a bomb run. A lot of cars burned down...

So safely and unexpectedly, even for themselves, having captured the bridgehead, the Germans did not begin to think about military success for a long time, but immediately threw out a mobile detachment to Ostr (that is why the "ambulance column turned to Chernigov") with the task of capturing the bridge and on the Desna. The strike force of this detachment was 11 S. Shi assault guns, possibly R2 P light tanks. Meanwhile, M.P. Kirponos threw everything that was possible at that time to eliminate the breakthrough and destroy the bridge - aviation, ships, troops of the 5th and 37th armies. "After all, on the entire 1000-kilometer front along the Dnieper from Cape Loev to the confluence of the Dnieper into the Black Sea, on which the troops of the South-Western and Southern fronts had to create a solid defense, only at Okuninovo the enemy managed to force this water barrier and seize a bridgehead not far from Kiev," wrote A.V. Vladimirov. "Over a vast stretch of the middle course of the river, our troops firmly held

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the eastern coast, and only near Okuninovo a dangerous tumor slowly grew, "recalled Marshal I.Kh. Bagramyan.

During these days, a dangerous tumor has matured to the north of Chernigov. German infantry from the Gomel region and tanks from the Starodub region, having received, like the 6th Army, an order to destroy Potapov's army, rushed south ...

Here, perhaps, it should be emphasized once again that the Kiev pocket was an impromptu operation of the Germans, which was helped to carry out by the mistakes of the Soviet high command. The main task that Hitler set for Army Groups "South" and "Center" at this stage of the war was the task of destroying the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front.

The main document defining the actions of the group

armies "Center" at this stage of the war, was the order of the commander of this group of troops, von Bock, dated August 24, 1941:

Army Group Center

Operations Department No. 900/41

Top secret 24.5. 1941

#### ORDER FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS

1. The task set by the supreme command! is the destruction of the 5th Soviet army before it manages to withdraw beyond the line of Sula, Konotop, r. Desna, by striking the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "Center" and "South". With the fulfillment of this task, it is necessary to gain a foothold in the area east of the middle reaches of the river. Dnieper and continue the operation in the direction of Kharkov.

2. To accomplish this task, the Army Group "Center" advances through the Rechitsa, Starodub line in a southerly direction: a) the 2nd Army - as part of the 13th and 43rd Army Corps and

- The 35th temporary formation, with only seven infantry divisions and one cavalry division, advances on Chernigov on the right flank; 6) The 2nd Panzer Group (directly subordinate to the commander of the army group) operates as part of the 24th and 47th tank corps, since these corps will be combat-ready.

The immediate task of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group is to capture bridgeheads between Chernigov and

1 Here von Bock speaks of Hitler's order of August 21 about the need to destroy the 5th Army by the joint efforts of the Army Groups "Center" and "South".

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Novgorod-Seversky, so that from there, depending on the development of the situation, to advance further to the south or southeast.

3. Army Group "South" forces the 6th Army r. Dnieper and r. Gum. Its northern flank had already crossed the river. Desna Ostra!. The army was ordered to continue the offensive on Nizhyn, and part of the forces to launch an offensive from the south to Chernigov ... 2

Von Bock"3.

The immediate task of destroying the enemy that had broken through in the Okuninovo area was assigned to the 22nd Mechanized Corps of the 5th Army, which had no tanks.

and the 27th Rifle Corps of the 37th Army. From the west, to the bridge, to help the advance detachment of Major Hofmann-Schönborn and units of the 111th shashchepe-P! \ 1 \$ 1yup, the 98th, 62nd and 113th Wehrmacht infantry divisions hurried. Thus began one of the most bloody battles of the Second World War - the Kiev cauldron. The difference in the forces of the sides opposing Okunov was in a very important nuance. All the diverse forces of the Germans on the Okuninovsky bridgehead were commanded by one person - the commander of the 111th Infantry Division, Infantry General Otto Shtapf. The Soviet forces, trying to eliminate this bridgehead and the German breakthrough to Ostr, alas, were subordinated to different commanders ...

"It seems that our success could soon be consolidated by an offensive towards the Desna," the history of the 98th TO reports. But now the Bolshevik has woken up from a swoon and mercilessly brings fighter-bombers and long-range artillery into battle. Despite the losses, the enemy planes nevertheless soon took possession of the air. While their infantry attacked the 111th Division in the bridgehead, the bridge and the only road leading to it from Strakholesye were under roaring long-range fire and bomb attacks. One incendiary

1 From Ostra, where the Germans rushed immediately after the capture of the Okuninovsky bridge, they were soon driven back.

? This part of the force was the 98th Infantry Division.

? Von Bock's order is quoted from: Eremenko A.I. At the beginning of the war. M.: Nauka, 1965. S. 294.

A village on the western bank of the Dnieper.

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Okuninovsky (Gornostaipolsky) bridge before and after the attack by our ships and aircraft.

the bomb hit the wooden flooring, a strong wind fanned and drove the fire along the entire bridge and destroyed it before everything was entangled in the weight of the night ... A fleet of more than 30 armored river monitors kept the old bridge laying point, suitable for landing pe

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crossings on floating craft, and thus isolated the 111th Infantry Division located on the bridgehead from



completion".

The Germans do not have a direct reference to who destroyed the Okuninovsky bridge. The bridge was burned down, according to the original text, by a "brand bomb". The military German-Russian dictionary Taube, published in 1942, translates "brand bomb" as "incendiary (air) bomb". That is, most likely, the bridge was really destroyed by our aircraft. However, in the "Combat Route of the Soviet Navy" it is reported that "08/23/41, in the Gornostaipol area, a strong German mobile detachment, supported by 50 tanks and armored vehicles, reached the Dnieper. Our troops did not have time to blow up the Pechkinsky highway bridge near Okuninovo. The German units crossed over it and rushed kg. Oster. In order to prevent the rapid concentration of enemy troops on this bridgehead (between the Dnieper and the Desna), it was necessary to urgently destroy the bridge across the Dnieper. The aircraft that took off for this purpose could not destroy it. Then the command of the South-Western Front assigned the flotilla the task of destroying the Okuninovskaya ferry. Monitor "Smolensk" and 3 gunboats approached the bridge and opened intense artillery fire on it. The naval artillery also inflicted heavy losses on the German troops, who approached the crossing on marching

columns."

As can be seen from the above passage, the Smolensk monitor only fired at, but did not destroy the bridge. On the website "Pinsk military flotilla" in the material about the gunboat "Kremlin", with reference to the commander of the artillery warhead of this gunboat S.P. Snoring, contains the following data:

"08/24/1941, the Kremlin CL, with the support of the Trudovoy CL, launched a swift raiding operation on the Pechkinsky Bridge, captured by the enemy on 08/23/1941 (by the way, three hours after our ships went up to Chernobyl) . The appearance of the ships stunned the enemy. The bow gun fired direct fire at the bridge, while the stern guns (apparently, the aft 120-mm and anti-aircraft 76-mm guns) and machine guns fired at the enemy concentration near the bridge. Several successful

| 1 багаібе М. Катріпа Епде 4ер ЕгапК15сп-Зідчепайісвеп 98. Р{ашчепе Омзыуп. Wayaz Napz-Nepppe. Rodgip. 1959. 5. 109.

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hits under the truss of the upper part of the support ensured success. The bridge was destroyed. The crossing of the enemy troops was disrupted. Shortly after our shelling, our aircraft attacked the bridge. The bridge, with the exception of two navigable spans near the right bank, was completely burned down.

THEIR. Bagramyan describes the destruction of the Okuninovsky bridge in the following way:

"Measures were immediately taken to destroy the Okunovsky bridge. Aviation and sailors of the military flotilla were the first to try to do this. At night, the ships rushed to the bridge, but were driven back by heavy artillery fire. The sailors resorted to a trick: they began to float floating mines. If even one of them touched the bridge support, it would collapse. But the Nazis foresaw this danger. They watched the river and caught floating mines in time.

Even before the ships, our planes broke through to the bridge. But try to hit the thin thread of the bridge from a height! Many pilots, ignoring the danger, flew over the very target, but not a single bomb hit ...

Lieutenant Sergei Kolybin had just returned to the airfield when he was called by the commander of the aviation division. The general told him that the bridge had not yet been blown up.

I entrust this task to you. Do you understand how responsible she is?

— Everything is clear, comrade general.

Two planes took off and headed for Okunino. The leader was Kolybin. He was followed by junior lieutenant Vasily Oleinik. Having made his way through the fire barrier, Kolybin lowered the car to the limit and flew over the very bridge. Both bombs landed accurately. Steel trusses collapsed into the river.

Eyewitnesses said that it was at this time that the Il caught fire. The flaming plane, without turning, rushed over the highway, and then crashed into a column of enemy vehicles. (How glad I was to hear recently that this glorious pilot, whom we considered dead, somehow miraculously survived!)

On the day of the capture of the Okuninovsky bridge, on the instructions of General Kirponos, I called the commander! and conveyed the categorical order of the front commander: decisive

! Commander-37 - General A.A. Vlasov.

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by actions it is possible to destroy the enemy units that have crossed over as soon as possible, to prevent them from gaining a foothold on the banks of the Dnieper. The commander of the 37th Army assured that he would complete the task. However, the insignificant forces that he sent to the bridgehead could not improve the situation. And when, under pressure from the front headquarters, the army commander began more decisive actions, time was lost.

Unfortunately, the commander of the 5th Army, General Potapov, at first could not pay due attention to the liquidation of the bridgehead - in those days he withdrew his troops beyond the Dnieper, and this was a difficult task.

Now we took all measures to smoke out the opponent from the left bank. For this purpose, a lot of forces and means of both armies were involved, most of our aviation. Sometimes it seemed that all living things had been swept away from the bridgehead. But as soon as our units went on the attack, they were met by dense fire. The path of our fighters was blocked by impassable swamps, and the Nazis took refuge in dense copses.

So far, this has been our only failure in the battle for the Dnieper.

Meanwhile, units of the 5th Army, which had retreated to the Dnieper and, crossing it, immediately rushed into battle in two directions: to liquidate the Okuninovsky bridgehead and to Chernigov. From the north to Chernigov, on the right flank of the Southwestern Front, the divisions of Army Group Center had already begun to move. Moreover, the 5th Army was forced to occupy part of its forces

. defense on the eastern bank of the Dnieper above Okuninovo - here at any moment the 99th, 262nd, 62nd, 113th and 98th Wehrmacht infantry divisions located on the western bank could start crossing.

The "fresh" Germans, preparing to cross the Dnieper in the Okuninovo area using improvised means, were also concerned about the presence on "their" shore of units of Potapov's 5th Army and Arte's 27th Rifle Corps that had not yet crossed over.

Menko.

"To ensure the upcoming crossing of the 98th SHO, against the threat from the northeast, towards Domantovo, on August 25, a mixed detachment was sent, which consisted of the 3rd battalion of the 282nd regiment under the command of Hauptmann Haim (Nelt), several "Sturmgeschütze" from the 543rd division, 198th pro

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an anti-tank division under the command of Hauptmann Wegener (Uevepeg), two platoons of the 14th company of the 282nd regiment under the command of Lieutenant Dr. Emmert (Ettei) and a platoon of sappers of the division, writes Martin Garais !. - The overall command of the group was entrusted to Hauptmann Haim. Due to the fact that the bridge burned down, a completely new situation was created. The 98th Infantry Division, which is at the limit of its strength after a forced march, extra people and horses would be useful. Not all parts of the division, but only the 282nd regiment closest to the bridgehead, were alerted. This is the most ungrateful thing that happens in the war - "borrowing" into a foreign division when you yourself are in a difficult situation.

The introduction of the 3rd Battalion of the 282nd Regiment into the battle near the canal near Domantovo, immediately after the march, and the involvement of the II battalion of the 282nd Regiment in the protection of the airfield near Gubin set two-thirds of the regiment to restless work. After the 2nd battalion of the 282nd regiment was brought into battle on August 26 in the swamp between Pristan and Strakholesye, by the evening the entire

the regiment with all its companies stretched for 14 km. The infantry squatted in damp pits, knee-deep.

East of Domantovo, the anti-tank guns brought into action brought considerable success to the 1st Battalion of the 198th Artillery Regiment: five pesky 50-meter monitors were set on fire and two huge transport barges were destroyed. In a Wehrmacht message from | September, this success is mentioned!"

In the Combat Report of the Commander of the 37th Army, A.A. Vlasov, on August 26, 1941, the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front, on August 26, 1941, the following was reported on the results of hostilities in the Okun region:

"By 18.00, the 87th Rifle Division took possession of Okuninovo with a fight, the units went out 1 km high. 105.1, bridge 1 km north. high 100.1, unnamed high. 2 km east Wolf Mountains to the swamp Otter. In front of the division front, up to 3 infantry battalions, 15-20 tanks, up to 2 heavy artillery battalions, vr-not high. 103.9, 106.9 and one battery - 105.8. Along the western coast, the avenue accumulates in small groups west of Okuninovo and Oshitka.

1 Sagev M. Katrgipa Ende 4er EgapK15sp-Zidaepaniszsvpe 98. [pbashchepe Ormop. UePav Napz-Neppipe. Rod7ip. 1959. 5. 109.

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Parts of the division suffer heavy losses from mortar and artillery fire from the western coast!. Pr-k puts up stubborn resistance, incurring heavy losses. He does not surrender, leaving only the dead.

Sent out intelligence vr-n Art. Karpilovskaya Guta no information received. There is no communication with units of the 5th Army. Fire pr-ka from the western coast sunk 4 ships sowing. Okunovsky bridge. In this district, no attempt was made to transport small groups to the eastern coast in inflatable boats2.

(...)

According to the grouping, the avenue has two groups:

1. Vr-ne Okuninovo up to 3 infantry battalions, 15-20 tanks, two heavy divisions and one battery.
2. Vr-ne Koropye, Karpilovka, Vypolzovo up to 3 infantry battalions, 15-20 tanks, 2 batteries, minbattery and armored vehicles (number not established).

Between these groups there is a gap of 10-12 km, which is not illuminated. shen.

The Okuninovskaya grouping has been driven out of Okuninovo, retreats to the north, is not completely surrounded due to the absence from the north

ra support units of the 5th Army<sup>3</sup>. The second grouping was not driven out of the occupied district due to the indecisive actions of the commander of the 3rd airborne division, insufficient input of forces and means, as well as weak influence from the north of the 41st TD of the 5th Army.

It was ordered: the commander of the 27th division of the corps, continuing the offensive, together with units of the 5th Army, completely destroy okuninovskaya group pr-ka and prohibit the crossing to the eastern bank of the Dnieper.

Commander of the 3rd Airborne Command to fully introduce the 3rd Composite Regiment, 6th Airborne Regiment and partially 212th Airborne Regiment, in cooperation with the 27th Rifle Corps and units of the 5th Army, destroy the project in the Vypolzovo, Karpilovka, Koropye districts.

Commander of the 37th Army Vlasov  
Member of the Military Council Brigadier Commissar Lutai Chief  
of Staff of the Army Major General Dobroserdov.

1 The Germans, on the contrary, considered their fire across the river to be ineffective.

d Obviously, we are talking about attempts by the combined detachment of Hauptmann Geim to cross the Dnieper north of Okuninovo, or about imitation of such attempts. O;

3 In this and many other orders of Commander-37 one can feel an attempt to shift part of the responsibility for Okuninovo to Commander-5.

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Order of General A.A. Vlasov is quoted from the 40th volume of the 43-volume "Collection of combat documents of the Great Patriotic War", which was prepared and published by the Military Scientific Directorate of the General Staff and the Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR in 1960. Regarding the ships destroyed on August 26, it can be said that, obviously, these were the gunboats "Dimitrov" and "Kremlin", as well as the patrol ships "Reka" and "Paris Commune" - all from the group of ships of the so-called. "First Okuninovsky breakthrough". The ships that failed to break through were lost, partly in the Domantovo area, partly during the "second Okuninovsky breakthrough."

"On August 26 and 27, the situation in the bridgehead escalated," M. Garais continues his story about the 98th division. - Concentrated artillery fire from three sides completely covered his garrison. At the same time, it would be necessary to repulse the constant infantry attacks from the north, east and southeast more effectively. Stormtroopers, attacking in successive waves, thwarted all attempts to cross the river.

Gee! At dusk, August 27, the commander of the 282nd Infantry Regiment was summoned to General Reinhardt!.

On a motorcycle with a sidecar, in the rain, shaking from the cold and bouncing on potholes, he reached the command post and received an order: the 282nd Infantry Regiment was transferred to the 111th Infantry Division, located on the bridgehead. It is necessary to immediately cross the Dnieper and, together with the regiments of the 111th Infantry Division - 50th, 70th, 117th - attack the enemy and expand the bridgehead.

The way to the crossing was so long that by 10 p.m. the battalions were not yet able to reach the water. The approach to the river ran along a high three-kilometer dam through a marshy lowland.

· | The commander of the 282nd regiment was, as we know, M. Garais himself. General Infantry Hans-Wolfgang Reinhardt commanded the 51st Army Corps, which in September 1941 included: 111th, 79th, 262nd, 113th and 98th Infantry Divisions; the corps itself was part of the 6th Army of Army Group South.

? Sageb M. Catrgypa Epae 4er Emansn-bideepatsizsvep 98. amene Om op. UePav Napz-Neppipv. Rodtype. 1959. \$. 110.

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and was under long-range enemy sights. Everything was exactly the same as Malina, just as then, it was completely dark, it was raining and it was cold.

Shortly before the start of the crossing, at 02.15 on August 28, the commander of the 282nd regiment had already received the first order from the 111th division: having crossed to the other side, take up the starting position west of Okuninovo, south of the road, prepare for an attack to the north and, together with the 117th Infantry Regiment, take Staro-Glybov. This meant that it was planned to expand the bridgehead more than 5 km to the north. However, the enemy continued to compress the bridgehead with his constant attacks. The enemy positions were located in an arc: south of Staro-Glybovo - east and south of Okuninovo. It is necessary to cross and attack urgently, this decides

All".

At this time, the eastern and southern parts of the arc, which bordered and pressed the Germans defending on the Okuninovsky bridgehead to the Dnieper, were occupied by units of the 37th Army. In the same place, in the east and north, in the area of Staro-Glybov, there was part of the troops of the 5th Army.

The situation on the bridgehead before the 98th Infantry Division began crossing it was assessed by the Soviet side as follows:

"At 6 hours 35 minutes on August 24, the 22nd mechanized corps received an order with its 19th and 41st tank divisions from the Zhidinichi concentration area, a forest south of Gonchary Krug, to advance in the direction of Saponov Guta, Bondari, Oku-

ninovo with the task of destroying the enemy and the Okuninovo bridge. The 22nd mechanized corps later included the 131st motorized division (from the second echelon of the 31st rifle corps), as well as the 228th, 124th rifle divisions from the 1st airborne corps after they crossed to the left bank of the Dnieper. The 22nd mechanized corps was assigned the 1st division of the 458th artillery regiment, the 589th howitzer artillery regiment of the RGK, and the division of the 331st howitzer artillery regiment.

In connection with the departure of the commander of the 22nd mechanized corps, Major General Tamruchi, at the disposal of the front headquarters, the command of the corps was entrusted to the commander of the 1st Airborne Corps, Major General Usenko ...

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... On the left flank of the army, the 22nd mechanized corps, consisting of the 228th, 124th, 131st rifle divisions, the 19th and 41st tank divisions, fought fierce battles with the enemy's Okunin grouping. On August 25, parts of the corps, having gone on the offensive from the front of Stary Glybov, Kosachevka, Novokar Pilovka, Rudnya in the directions to Okuninovo, Staraya Karpilovskaya Guta and Korop, defeated the 111th Infantry and 11th Panzer divisions of the enemy and, throwing them back to the outcome On August 28, directly to Okuninovo, they bordered this point from the north, northeast, east and southeast. At the same time, the 87th Infantry Division was advancing on the Okunovsky bridgehead from the south along the left bank of the Dnieper. The enemy stubbornly held the Okuninovsky bridgehead, fortifying it with dug-in tanks and supporting the troops defending it with aircraft and artillery, firing from the right bank of the Dnieper. Reinforcements from the 98th and 113th Infantry Divisions were continuously transferred to the bridgehead. The impenetrable swamps surrounding Okuninovo, covered with coppice and thick bushes, made it difficult for our infantry to advance and for aimed artillery fire.

The absence of a unified leadership of the troops participating in them had an extremely negative effect on the course of the battles for Okuninovo. Both the 22nd mechanized corps of the 5th army, and the 27th rifle corps of the 37th army, and the Oster detachment of the front remained subordinate to their commanders, which led to inconsistency in the actions of the formations, and sometimes to their mixing on the battlefield.

The combination of these and other unfavorable factors led to an unforeseen delay in the fighting on the left flank of the 5th Army, where about 1/3 of her available forces!

A.V. Vladimirsky, in his study, writes about the transfer of troops of the 98th Infantry Division to the Okuninovsky bridgehead on August 28, 1941, as a fact that obviously became known to him after the war. And directly during the fighting, as of August 31:

"The 6th army of the enemy comes out kr. Dnieper at the Loev section,

b Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 231.

58

Dymer, forming two main groups. In the area of \u200b\u200bOkuninovo, Domantova, Gornostaypol, 11 td, 11] and 113 pd were installed. The possibility of the remaining divisions of the 51st Corps (98th and 262nd Infantry Division) entering this area is not ruled out, "reported in the Intelligence Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 1 That is, a week after the appearance of the 98th division in the region of Gornostaypol and Domantovo and three days after it crossed the Dnieper and included in the battles on the bridgehead, the presence of this division in the combat area of the operations of the South-Western Front was not yet recorded.

August 28. Forcing the Dnieper by the 98th Infantry Division. Expansion of the Okuninovsky bridgehead.

"If the 282nd Infantry Regiment imagined that after the Marne and the Loire it had sufficient experience in difficult crossings, then on this damned rainy night it became clear that there was still a lot to learn from it," writes M. Garais. — Several enemy monitors are hidden in the dense coastal bushes, which are silent during the day, in order to bring down their fire on the coast near the destroyed bridge at nightfall. The motor ferry, the regiment's main means of transportation, had already been put out of action. Only two large inflatable boats, controlled by sappers, in spite of everything, unshakably dragged on themselves the entire burden of the further crossing. Each soldier experienced this as it was recorded in the diary of the commander of the 282nd Infantry

shelf:

"On a bumpy road we hobble in the dark in the direction of a faint glow from burning houses across the river. Finally, we reached the bridge. Metal constructions approaching him stare at the dimly lit sky with their steel ends. Do we go to the touch among them in search of a crossing point? Only two large inflatable boats and almost exhausted sappers were waiting for us here, who hurried us on. Barely plunged, twelve people into the boat, as if on the shore

1 SBD WWII. T. 40.

2 batev M. Katrgipa Epde 4eg EgapKk15sv-Zideepacisswep 98. amshepe OM \$jup. Uepav Nap\$-Neppv. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 111.

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a shell hit next to us. "Row! - commanded by the sergeant major of sappers. - Simultaneously!"

Four sappers rowed as far as they could. They knew why they had to hurry. Then we heard another shot of arrows, and with a roar, showering us with water, next to the inflatable boat, a hissing projectile plopped into the waves. "Unfasten the collars, loosen the belts!" shouts the sergeant major. Upstream, in the dark, losing hope of salvation, our comrades drowning in the shelled boat screamed. We all have a deep respect for the sappers who performed their duty for long hours and in constant danger.

From the intrusive rain, everyone was soaked to the skin. But no one else notices. The closer to the other shore - the beginning of the further path! - the more confident swimming becomes. And yet, having crossed over to the other side, we had too little time for a respite. Both battalions that crossed, the 1st and 2nd, very soon found themselves under enemy artillery harassing fire from three sides.

The commander of the 282nd Infantry Regiment, who was in front of the group, accompanied by Lieutenant Dr. Emmert (Etei) and Lieutenant Vaal (la!) Arrived at the command post of the 111th Infantry Division east of Okuninovo and received an order from General Shtapf to attack north. The 282nd Infantry Regiment will attack along with the 117th Infantry Regiment of the Oberst of Herfurt (Ne NoipV).

With the first dawn, although it became easier to navigate in the swampy terrain overgrown with bushes, the enemy's harassing fire also intensified at the same time. The dead appeared everywhere. After heavy preparations, both commanders of the infantry regiments, the 117th and the 282nd, become more clear about the main goal of the offensive to the north. It should start at 12 noon. There is enough time for preparation if both battalions of the 282nd Infantry Regiment manage to reach their original positions by this time.

The defensive line [B 117] was more than thin. Great losses - and they are constantly growing! - made a hole in it. On the Okunin road running along the dam, which, the only one in this almost impassable terrain, could be used for movement, lay the dead of the 50th Infantry Regiment! The enemy launched an attack on the starting position

1 The 11th division included the 50th, 70th and 117th infantry regiments.

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Reisenstein's battalion (Keytepet) and approached the road at a distance of 400 m. Oberst Lieutenant White (uB), 50th Infantry Regiment, was able to stop the enemy only by bringing a reserve platoon into battle. The direction of the enemy strike became clear

nym - the Bolshevik wants to capture the weakest point on the bridgehead, the crossing itself. [./1B 282! and back echeloned P battalion Aberle (Abepe). The protection afforded by the dike to the north was completely useless against the intensifying enemy fire from the east. Lying in the starting position became a test of the nerves. Everyone dreamed of a change of position. Finally, exactly at 12 o'clock, freed from tense, patient waiting under fire, the companies emerge from their fox holes and rush at the enemy.

And when at a distance of 6 km, behind flat fields and meadows, among the tall old trees, the roofs of the houses of Staro-Glybov appeared, Hauptmann Stürmer (\$1armer), 6./1B 2822, said: "The enemy is sitting there. This time we must crack this hard nut!" As always, he was right. This nut was very strong. It took the whole of 1B 2823 three heavy, loss-filled days of combat to split it.

An offensive very well supported by 1./AB. 1174, with moderate losses, moved forward. The enemy artillery still continued to fire on the dam. The Bolsheviks, hidden in old bunkers, put up little resistance. Many of them, up to 350 people, were taken prisoner. A strong fight is coming neighbors on the right. You can still hear the firing of the Sturmgeschütz.

Our subunits are rapidly rushing towards the front line at Staro-Glybov in order to quickly pass the long, barren plain. Soon after 15.00 they invade the seloz. Meanwhile, P./1B 282, meandering between the sand dunes and the old riverbed, rushes further north. It is very tiring to move forward by roundabout roads while firing

1 1st battalion of the 282nd regiment.

2 6th company of the 282nd regiment.

TV (Chamepe Veritep!) - Infantry Regiment.

4 1st Battalion of the 117th Artillery Regiment was part of the 111th Civil Defense.

\$ Sagey M. Katrgipa Epae aer Egapk15sv-ZideepacissVep 98. sachepe Om5yup. UePav Nap5-Neppite. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 113.

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and deviating Bolsheviks. By evening [./1K 282 reaches the northern outskirts of the village; The second battalion is advancing through the area overgrown with sparse shrubs to the southwest of Staro Glybov.

Wide swampy ditches block the way here. Behind them, in the old bunkers, the enemy sat down with machine guns.

Result of the day: the bridgehead at Okuninovo was expanded by the 111th Infantry Division and part of the 282nd Regiment to the BKM to the north, and the danger of encirclement was eliminated wana."

The result of that day, August 28, through the eyes of the Soviet command looked like this:

"...5th Army. Defends the line B. Dyrchin, Burovka, Grabovo and east. bank of the river Dnieper along St. Glybov. The left flank is fighting with the enemy in the Okuninovo area ...

... 228th Rifle Division, according to unverified reports, was counterattacked by the enemy and driven back to the north. The enemy, with a force of up to a battalion for infantry with 15 tanks, occupied St. Glybov! Regulations 19 and 41 TD, 124 sdi 131 md by outcome 28.8 have not been established. (During August 28, conflicting reports were received from the army headquarters. According to the last report, all the indicated units were in the area of St. Karpilovskaya Guta.)

In the Okuninovo area, the enemy is dropping cargo parachutes and groups of paratroopers. Timber is brought to the western shore.

... 37th Army.

During the day, she continued to fight on the right flank in the Okuninovo area and defend the occupied line.

Oster group - pursuit units reached the line 2.5 km east. Okuninovo, settling the road Okuninovo, Oster.

87th Rifle Division conducts continuous battles in the Okuninovo area and the forest east. with the enemy with a force of up to two regiments of infantry with machine tools and armored vehicles. By the end of the day, parts of the division took up position, covering Okuninovo from the north-east, east and south sides, settling on the left flank of the highway near the bridge. 283 and 96 joint ventures are fighting on the highway east. Okuninovo. Enemy in

1 As can be seen from the history of the 98th Infantry Division, Staro-Glybov was attacked and taken by the forces of two battalions of the 282nd regiment of the 98th division and the 117th regiment of the 111th division; that is, the German forces in this direction were underestimated by the Soviet command by 5 times.

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17.15 ferried to the east. bank of the Dnieper river bridge at Okuni

new on boats and boats up to an infantry company, one tank and one armored non-vehicle ...!

Chief of Staff of the SWF Major General Tupikov

| Military Commissar of the SWF Headquarters

regimental commissar Solovyov

Beginning Operational department of the headquarters of the South-Western Front

Major General Baghramyan,

reported in the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 001172 on the combat operations of the troops of the front by 22 o'clock on August 28, 1941.

As it seems to us today, the main forces of the 37th and 5th armies, of those that were allocated to eliminate the bridgehead, were concentrated to the south and east of Okuninovo. In addition to the checkpoint of the bridgehead, they were faced with the task of not letting the enemy through to the Desna. Obviously, our command believed that the expansion and opening of the bridgehead would most likely occur in the direction of the Desna. Therefore, the northern direction, as unlikely for a breakthrough, was covered only by the 228th Rifle Division under the command of Colonel Viktor Georgievich Chernov, which occupied positions from Staro-Glybov to Kosachevka. The Germans took advantage of this miscalculation of the Soviet command.

Now it is already difficult to understand what Kirpo nos was guided by without subordinating the entire Okuninovskaya group of forces to one commander. Reading about the German misfortunes at Okuninovo, about their very small forces on this bridgehead, we see that to liquidate it, only one blow was not enough for us with the forces of one reinforced company or only one, but placed in the right direction, battery. Little hit. But "in the right place and at the right time." Three groups of Soviet troops, including the Oster group, having a large numerical and technical advantage, but subordinate to different commanders, proved incapable of delivering such a decisive blow.

1 Perhaps, according to Schrodeck, we are talking about the transfer of light tanks of the 15th Panzer Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division Owl. Mapped: ZsVia Uenaya, 1976).

2? SBD WWII. T. 40. 63

The command of the SWF began to get nervous:

"The military councils of the 5th and 37th armies

Copy: Commander-in-Chief YuZN

Head of the General Staff

Despite the great superiority of our forces and your personal assurances, the Okunin enemy group is still

not only has not been destroyed, but, according to available data, is even reinforced by new units crossing the Dnieper.

This situation is no longer tolerated. It should be understood not only by you, but also by the fighting troops, that we are talking about the eastern bank of the Dnieper, that the enemy is ready to sacrifice any forces in order to capture this point and gain a foothold on it for the development of further operations.

Time does not endure. I categorically demand that the most resolute measures be taken to eliminate the enemy before the outcome of 29.8.

Kirponos  
Burmistenko  
Tupikov!

August 29 - September 1. Battles for the expansion of the bridgehead. Russian counterattacks. In the "fiery cauldron of witches." Further events to the north of Okuninovo unfolded as follows:

"The kitchens, however, are not suitable, and a report has been received that a platoon of the 14th company suffered heavy losses during the crossing due to artillery fire. There has been no connection with our own division since the moment we were reassigned to the 111th division. The bulk of the 98th Infantry Division, located west of the river, was subjected to sustained attack by ground attack aircraft on 28 and 29 August. The division can provide us with artillery support across the Dnieper, but not quite effective. Until the monitors are neutralized, the division is doomed to wait. True, P1./AV 1982 had already received orders to cross the river "by ferry" early in the morning of 30 August. But nothing comes of it. The monitors don't move anymore, but they are definitely shooting!

1 Directive of the Military Council of the South-Western Front No. 00323 of August 28, 1941 to the Military Councils of the 5th and 37th Armies on the destruction of the Okuninov group of the enemy. SBD WWII. T. 40.

2 3rd division of the 198th artillery regiment.

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Sh./KV 2821 at 23 o'clock, after a successful crossing to the other side, immediately lies at the dam as a reserve of the 111th Infantry Division. He is greatly lacking in his own regiment, because the regiment does not have combat reserves. But this battalion was soon assigned to [B 702] and sent southeast of Okuninovo. On August 31, he replaced the battalion of the 117th regiment, located next to the 1B 282, in the forward positions. After the losses near Staro-Glybovo, the Bolshevik quickly got to his feet. And already on the night of August 29-30, both battalions were forced to repel counterattacks on the village. This was the prelude to prolo-

the fierce attempts of the enemy that lasted two days and two nights to prevent the expansion of the bridgehead on its northern flank, "says Martin Garais?.

Staro-Glybov was counterattacked by Chernov's 228th Rifle Division, which had been knocked out earlier. The danger of the northern, "old Glybov" prospect of opening up the Okuninovsky bridgehead has either not yet been noticed, or, most likely, there were no forces available to plug this hole. What could be removed from the eastern bank of the Dnieper (for example, the 45th Rifle Division) was hastily thrown into battle north of Chernigov against the divisions of Army Group Center.

The situation on August 29-30, in those areas that were or will soon be related to the 98th division, through the eyes of the Soviet command looked like this:

On August 29, the 5th Army dispersed its troops in three directions:

- along the eastern bank of the Dnieper, from Kamenka (near Loev) to Sorokoshichi (near Novo- and Staro-Glybov) - against the possible formation of the Dnieper in these areas;
- north of Chernigov - against the 17th, 134th and 260th divisions of the 2nd Weichs army advancing from the north;
- in the Okuninovo area.

On the eastern bank of the Dnieper, from Loev to Navozov, everything was relatively quiet. The Germans located on the opposite bank (reconnaissance recorded only one - the 79th infantry division of the Wehrmacht) were limited to attempts or demonstrations of attempts to force the Dnieper. Opposite the section from Sorokoshichi to Okuninov, also along the western bank, in

1 3rd battalion of the 282nd regiment of the 98th division.  
2 70th regiment of the 111th division.

. 3 Sageb M. Katregipa Epae 4eg Egapk15sv-Zidaepaispep 98. paschepe O 91op. Uepar Nap\$-Nepp:le. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 114.

65

mainly in the Domantovo area, the 99th, 111th, 113th, 62nd, 262nd infantry and 11th tank divisions were fixed. But on the right flank of this section, on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, the 17th Iashchepe Om 5yup from the 2nd Army of the GA "Center" has already demonstrated its dangerous teeth.

In the Okuninovo area, the 22nd Mechanized Corps, with the forces of its 19th and 41st Tank (without tanks), 124th Rifle and 131st Mechanized Divisions, by 1200, surrounded Okuninovo from the northeast, east and southeast. However, by the end of the day, the headquarters of the South-Western Front of information about the situation

did not have body parts. According to a report from the 37th Army, the 131st MD retreated south of Okuninovo to the Oshitka area.

On August 29, the 37th Army itself fought on the front line of the KIUR and in the Okuninovo area. But from Okunin, its units also had to retreat towards Oshitok (Operational summary of the headquarters of the South-Western Front by 22.00 on 29.08.1941 No. 00119!). Thus, neither the 5th nor the 37th armies demanded by Kirponos to eliminate the Okuninov group of the enemy on August 29 was not only not fulfilled, but a further expansion of the bridgehead was also allowed, this time in a southerly direction.

On the afternoon of August 30, the 5th Army continued to defend the Makishin, Gusinki, Repki, Grabov, Lyubech sector and further south along the eastern bank of the Dnieper to Staro-Glybov. Finally, those of its formations that fought for the Okuninovsky bridgehead were subordinated to a single command: the 22nd mechanized corps, 228th, 124th rifle and 131st mechanized divisions of the ZII "until the COMPLETE destruction of the Okuninovsky enemy grouping" were transferred to submission to A.A. Vlasov.

At the same time, on the afternoon of August 30, the 31st Rifle Corps of the 5th Army, consisting of the 193rd, 195th and 215th Rifle Divisions, was at the line: Grabov, Lyubech, St. Glybov. Here, in the area from Lyubech to Grabov, the 193rd Rifle Division was already fighting with the 17th Infantry Division of Army Group Center.

The 17th shashchepe-PO19 op attacked in this way: it struck from the north, from the Zadereevsky forests, but not in the direction of Chernigov, but in the direction of Lyubech. She, as it were, intended to squeeze along the eastern bank of the Dnieper to the south, to where the 98th Sh.

By 22.00 on August 30, as can be seen from the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0121 on the combat operations of the troops

1! SBDVOV.T. 40.66

front northeast of Kiev!, the 193rd division of the 31st corps of the 5th army, unable to withstand the blow of the 17th civil defense, and in order to avoid encirclement, retreated from Grabov to the Danychi-Kratyn-Lyubech line.

The same report reports that the troops of the 37th Army were putting themselves in order south of Okuninovo and preparing for an attack on the bridgehead, but "no information was received on the results of the offensive, organized and directed personally by the army commander." Nothing was reported in Opersvodka No. 0121 about the fighting in the Staro-Glybova area; the "northern" units closest to this place, in the face of 215 mdi of the 713th rifle regiment of the 171st rifle division, were at the line (claim.) Dung, (claim.) Nov. Glybov. It seems that to the north of Okuninovo the 98th and 111th Tashchepe-Om5yul are currently opposed by our only division - Colonel Chernov's 228th.

"Infantry near the outskirts and in the village falls into a real fiery cauldron of hell. Losses keep growing. Rifle cells no longer save! Only artillery could bring relief. However, the 3rd division? still hasn't crossed. Stormtrooper attacks and mortar fire slow down every crossing. Things are going much slower than the command expected. On August 30, Oberst Lieutenant Schniewind (Zsitshe \ 1t9), commander of the 3rd division, writes in the combat log: "Being on the other side [K 282, my division is looking forward to it!" In this he is absolutely right. Because after a successful attack, 1K 282 switched to the role of the defender and is in great need of any kind of replenishment and reunification with the division.

Staro-Glybov begins to burn. Soon the whole village is on fire. Four stories high, a beautiful wooden church towered over it all like a fiery beacon. On top of that, the day was getting hot and stuffy. Around noon, the enemy begins a new offensive. Artillery fire intensifies. In the only brick building in the village, in the school, the commander [KV 282 and Mayor Aberle. The command post is only 200 meters from the northern edge of the village. With the commander [B 117, Colonel Herfurt, located in the southeastern part of the settlement, there is a close relationship and exchange of information.

1 SBD VOV.T. 40.?

3rd Battalion, 198th Artillery Regiment, 98th Division.

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In the evening, the Bolshevik attacks two more times, accompanying his attacks with a hoarse "Hurray!". Attacks are fought back with bloody casualties and often only in hand-to-hand combat. A stronger detachment that had penetrated into the area was driven back in the course of a fierce struggle. Crackling with fires, the red-hot and charred village is suffocatingly hot and filled with fumes, but the struggle is not over yet. When it got dark, the expected artillery again failed to arrive. So is the field kitchen. Nothing to drink either!

Sending many of the wounded is more than difficult. During the crossing, these unfortunates once again fall into serious trouble.

The night finally brings joy: under the command of "Spear", the company haupt sergeant major?, cold food arrives, even mail and the news that the bridge will be built. The arrival of 13./1B 2823 is just as joyfully welcomed, which immediately begins to work. :

Sunday morning, August 31st, was immediately ruined. A heavy shelling began, which lasted almost the whole day. Hauptmann Stürmer (53(armer), 6./1B 282, writes in his diary: "I am observing the attack of the 'pieces' on Novo-Glybov." Immediately after that, a heavy fire on our part. We're on fire. We should get out of here. The underworld opened up. All over



do explosions. We must leave. This became possible at 2 p.m. Covered by collapsed houses. Expiring then, tired, we reach the command post of the battalion. Hope waiting for twilight. But Hobot comes again. Ober-ef reytor Huber's (Nifeg) notes complete the picture: "Burning houses, dug up gardens, plowed up roads. A horse with a torn right front hoof, hobbles in a circle. Nowhere is safe, grenades are exploding everywhere. We change position three times a day. But that doesn't help much. Lieutenant Delner (Oener), commander of the fifth brigade, who was next to me, was seriously wounded in the buttock. Kamrad Voight (\ oh) lost an eye. In the house where

1 bageb M. CatrHip4 Epae deg Egapksn-bideepacizswep 98. tgiepe Om op. Uepaz Nap\$-Neppiia. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 115.

2 "Zr1eBe" (spear) - a slang nickname for the foreman of the company. 3 13th company of the 282nd regiment.

4 The word "thing" (dive bomber Yu-87) is an abbreviation for "Sturzkampflugtsoyg" - "dive combat aircraft"; in Novo-Glybov was the 215th MD.

ÿ Possibly, the word Ka55e] - the trunk used in the original, is played up with the word Vize - Russian.

b Obviously, the commander of the 5th company.

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the command post of the company was located, non-commissioned officer of the medical service Kammel (Katite!). Many comrades were hurt." Heavy losses force the use of all available fighters. The commander of K 282 sends his last reserve into battle - a platoon of regimental sappers under the command of Lieutenant Geiger (Geiger), which is sent to the front line to the second battalion. The mobile radio station of the 198th communications battalion operating at the command post of the regiment in Staro-Glybove was riddled with grenade fragments. Radio operators squatting in earthen pits were repeatedly bombarded with clods of earth! To alleviate the situation of the desperately fighting [K 282, the "Schnedler group (SsppeFeg)" tried - the 2nd battalion of the 290th regiment with units of the 198th anti-tank division, and with the support of the 1st division of the 198th artillery regiment, repeatedly tried to force the river in in the Domantovo area in inflatable boats to hit the enemy flank north of Staro-Glybova. However, all these attempts ended unsuccessfully and with heavy losses. The same fate befell the attempt to cross the river on assault boats under the cover of a curtain of fire"2?.

The Soviet side, obviously, considered those sent to the hundred

The crown of the Domantov group of Heim and Schnedler was demonstrative: "In addition, the enemy, by his demonstrative actions on the right bank of the Dnieper in front of the front of the 5th Army, very convincingly created the appearance of preparations for forcing. So, on August 27, it was found that in the area Do mantovka, 5 km north-west. Stary Glybov, the enemy carried out enhanced reconnaissance of the river and brought up crossing facilities. There were also data on the movement of large parts of the enemy cavalry to the Dnieper," squeaks A.V. Vladimirsky?

One way or another, whether the Germans were going to force the Dnieper in one more place or only created the appearance of preparing for the crossing, this threat forced the 5th Army to keep along

1 bagee M. Katrgipa Epae deg EgapKl5sn-Zideepatsizswep 98. [pathepe Om5op. Wayayo Napz-Neppitre. Rodgip. 1959. 5. 116. | 2 Sageb M. KatrRipa Epae 4er EgapK5sv-ZideeptacisNep 98. sh#amepe Om51op. UePar Napz-Neppipe. Rodgilp. 1959. \$. 117. 3 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 240.

69

Dnieper, in the least dangerous direction, 45 percent of all their forces. At the same time, on the axes of real German strikes, 25 percent of the troops fought against the infantry divisions of the 2nd Army of the GA "Center" near Chernigov and 30 percent - against the divisions of the 6th Army of the GA "YuGg" in the Okuninovo area. Considering that the troops of the 5th Army at Okuninovo were transferred to Vlasov, and part of the troops that were supposed to meet the Germans north of Chernigov (135th SD, fresh 293rd SD, replenished with tanks 10th TDI 5th anti-tank brigade) - to the 40th South Army and transferred to Konotop, then we can come to the sad conclusion about the dissolution of Potapov's army in a gigantic, worthy of an entire front, 300-kilometer space ...

«On the night of August 31 on | | September, - continues M. Garays, - it is possible to strike back: 11 enemy monitors, which tried to break through from the Domantovo region to the south, were fired upon by tank destroyers and the 1st Battalion of the 198th Artillery Regiment. Six monitors were destroyed. For the results of this powerful fire duel, the anti-tank battalion paid with two guns, and the commander of 1./AK 198, Hauptmann Brehm (Vgeit), was mortally wounded!

According to the Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00328 by the commander of the 5th and 37th armies on ensuring the exit of the Pinsk flotilla ships to Kiev dated August 29, 1941 ?, this exit, known in history as the "second Okuninovsky breakthrough", was supposed to take place on the night of 30 to 31 August. A detachment of the flotilla, consisting of eight ships and five armored boats, was supposed to at 22.30 on August 30

start moving from Navozov down the Dnieper at a speed of 10 km / h.

"The front commander ordered units of the 5th and 37th armies within their borders to ensure the passage of ships with artillery fire, mortars and heavy machine guns by suppressing enemy fire weapons that could fire at ships," the combat order says. —

1 Sageb M. KatreRipa Epae deg Egapk5sv-Zidaepanizsvep 98. tashepe Om zyup. UeNaz Nap\$-Neppipv. Rodgtype. 1959. \$. 117.

2? SBDVOV. T. 40. 70

To this end, complete the reconnaissance of the enemy's fire system, the occupation of firing positions and the preparation of data for night firing before dark.

Air Force Front from dawn 31.8 to cover the movement of ships from Okuninovo to Kyiv.

Chief of Staff of the SWF Major General Tupikov Military  
Commissar of the Staff of the SWF  
Regimental Commissar Solovyov.

From the list of PVF ships! we chose those that on August 31 were or could be in the Okuninovo area.

On August 1, died:

1. Monitor "Bobruisk" - heavily damaged by tanks and blown up by the team from. Kozorovich.
2. Monitor "Zhytomyr" - evading the attacks of aviation, ran aground in the channel of the Dnieper and was defeated by coastal artillery in the area with. Swaromye.
3. The gunboat "Trudovoy" - during the second Okunino breakthrough, ran aground, was abandoned by the crew and then shot by German tanks ?.
4. Patrol ship SKR-5 "Bolshevik" - set on fire and sunk by the fire of German tanks above the Pechkinsky bridge.
5. Patrol ship SK-8 "Friedrich Engels" - during an attempt to refloat the Trudovoy CL was sunk by German tank fire above the Pechkinsky Bridge.
6. River patrol boat SKA No. 1 ("PT-1") - during the second Okuninovsky breakthrough, it sailed in the 2nd group, as a result of the battle with artillery and enemy tanks, the boat burned down.

7. River patrol boat SKA No. 5 ("S-5", "PT-5", "Pavlik Morozov") - during the second Okuninovsky breakthrough, it was in the 2nd group, as a result of a battle with enemy artillery and tanks, the boat burned down.

8. Self-propelled floating base "Drummer" - on the night of 08/31/1941, during the second Okuninovsky breakthrough, one of the first was set on fire and sunk (according to other sources: 08/27/1941 died in the Domantovo area in a battle with a group of enemy tanks).

' Website "Pinsk military flotilla". ? Obviously, the ships were shot at by the tanks of the 11th Panzer Division.

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On August 31 broke through:

9. Monitor "Vitebsk"

10. Armored boat No. 202

11. Armored boat No. 203 (lead in the first group) 12. River patrol boat SKA No. 2

On August 31, they participated in the second Okuninovsky breakthrough, but are not listed either among those who broke through or among the dead:

13. Armored boat number 43

14. Armored boat number 54

15. Armored boat No. 204

"Having finished covering the crossings, on the night of August 31, the remaining ships in two groups began the second Okuninovsky breakthrough. As a result of the battle with enemy artillery and tanks, the Trudovoy gunboat sank, patrol boats No. 1 and No. 5 burned down, the Bobruisk monitor, having received a direct hit, ran aground and was blown up by personnel, the Zhitomir monitor ran aground and was destroyed by artillery fire. During the battle, the artillery of the ships destroyed the crossing and the accumulation of enemy troops in the Domantovo area. The Vitebsk monitor, two armored boats and patrol boat No. 2 arrived in Kyiv, "the Combat Chronicle of the Navy of 1941-1942 reports.

Summarizing documents from various sources, it can be assumed that from 11 to 15 ships took part in the second Okuninovsky breakthrough, of which: 4 broke through, from 5 to 8 died and at least 3 went missing.

"The organization of traffic across the bridge completed on August 31 at 19 o'clock led to the fact that Sh. / AV 198! | September at 00.30 crossed to the other side, in order to finally alleviate

the position of the infantry at Staro-Gtybov," writes M. Garais, convincing us of the fallacy of his own statement that the breakthrough of the PVF ships took place on the night of August 31 to September 1 (they could not break through the already built bridge). - The evening of August 31 was the apogee of the enemy's efforts in his attempts to break through the front of the infantry of the 282nd regiment, which had been greatly thinned in battles, which had been lying in holes for four days near the outskirts of Staro Glybov, surrounded by the Bolsheviks who had fallen in close combat

1 3rd division of the 198th artillery regiment.

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mi, without supplies and without hot meals. Immediately, she was preoccupied with the order of the 98th division, whose command post was in Dityatki, 28 km west of the river: on September 2, together with the 289th infantry regiment, which was still on the way, to resume the offensive to the north.

The physical and mental stress of the infantry, after the pursuit march, with its highest tension, after being under heavy artillery fire for four days and repulsing many attacks, was enormous. The feeling that it was necessary to stand at the appointed place on someone else's order did not inspire. The number of companies, due to very high losses among junior commanders and fighters, has fallen significantly. Commander [K 282] ordered the adjutant, Lieutenant Vaal (Vyal), to go across the river and verbally report this to the division commander.

One got the impression that neither the 1st nor their own 98th division had the slightest idea about the reality of what was happening on the bridgehead and about the state of the regiments.  
representation.

The successful building of the bridge meanwhile was a great success for the 198th engineer battalion under the command of Major Mukke (MisKe), who skillfully placed 11 different pontoon structures, with different lengths and widths of the bridge roadway. The ferry way of mounting the bridge was carried out with the help of motor tugs and assault boats, under constant artillery fire and assault boats.

attacks.

The guild in Staro-Glybovo breathed a sigh when on September 1, in the afternoon, observers from the 3rd Artillery Battalion moved forward appeared at its location; they greeted each other like brothers. The division, after a difficult transition under fire and in swampy terrain, took up a position 2 km south of Staro-Glybov and by 19 o'clock was ready for battle. In his log there is an entry: "Amazingly strong harassing fire from heavy enemy artillery."

There was no question of German air superiority. A strange thing was observed by many: three "Messerschmitt" fighters met with three "rats", and, without turning to each other

no attention to each other, the planes peacefully dispersed to the sides. Slovak Messerschmitts?!

1 bage M. Katrippa Ende 4er Egapk15sv-Zideepanioswep 98. [aschepe Om op. Wayayo Napz-Nepplr8. Rodtype. 1959. \$. 118.

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"Rats", that is, "rats", the Germans, since the time of the Spanish war, called the Soviet I-16 fighters. From the point of view of Soviet pilots, it was more expedient to return to their airfield for a new portion of bombs and missiles to destroy the German crossing and attack the bridgehead, rather than get involved in a meaningless air carousel. As for the Messer Schmitts, maybe they ran out of ammunition and fuel. Nevertheless, the German suggestion of a "Slavic brotherhood" is quite interesting.

"With a divisional order for September 2 to attack Novo-Glybov, Oberst Geiger (Sereg) arrived at the command post of the 282nd regiment. After the 3rd Battalion of the 117th Regiment was replaced by the 3rd Battalion of the 282nd Regiment, the 282nd Regiment took up a position with all three of its battalions in the northern part of the bridgehead fortification of the 111th Division, continues M. Garais. - Among the losses of the 3rd battalion of the 282nd regiment, which returned after being used together with the 70th regiment, was Lieutenant Josef Bauer (TozeYo Vatseg), commander of the 10th company.

With the onset of darkness, all the commanders involved in the offensive gathered at the command post of the 282nd regiment to discuss the procedure for interaction. Assault guns and a division of Nebelwerfers promise excellent support.

Nebelwerfer - a thrower of chemical, gas or smoke shells - an ancient name, from the era of the First World War. However, in World War II, this name was not used by the German multiple launch rocket systems - six-barreled rocket launchers, which, in the old fashioned way and, perhaps, for the sake of secrecy, were still called "nebelwerfers". During the war, this rocket mortar, by analogy with its action with the "Katyusha", was nicknamed by our soldiers "vanyusha", and for the characteristic sounds made during firing - "skripun" and "donkey". The six-barreled "donkey" fired huge 34-kilogram 159.5-mm high-explosive fragmentation mines. In fact, these were turbojet shells with stabilization applied after the war in the Soviet Grad multiple launch rocket systems. The Nebelwerfer fired its 6 rocket mines in 5 seconds and fully reloaded in 1.5 minutes. Shooting was carried out by battery and by division. This weapon

1 bagey M. Katrgipa Epae deg EgapK! 5sV-Zideepdiizsvep 98. step-

Omzop. UePae Napz-Nepp! av. Rodtype. 1959. \$. 118.

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effective against large concentrations of troops, was actively used by the Germans in the Kiev pocket.

V.S. Petrov, who was lucky enough to get out of the Kiev pocket, described his first meeting with the "Nebel Werfers":

"Strange sounds were heard across the river. Something lingered in the air, and a cloud of white smoke rose behind the huts.

"I don't know what this thing is," replied the artillery captain, the senior commander, to the questions of those around him, "they shoot occasionally ... and you won't understand ... in my opinion, a mortar, but definitely not a gun ...

"The donkey hiccupped again," said the senior lieutenant.

The sounds that accompanied the shot are indeed somewhat reminiscent of the hiccups of an animal. Breaks closed. Heavy, acrid smoke slowly drifted along the ground in a thick layer. The howl of flying mines frightened people. So for the first time I observed the firing of this, in general, ineffective weapon in those days "(.

2 September. Opening of the Okuninovsky bridgehead. The parade darm is a voluntary environment. On land, everywhere, in front, on the left, on the right - the enemy. Behind is the river. There is nowhere to retreat. When, at the cost of heavy losses, under the blows of artillery, aircraft and ships of the enemy, a certain number of troops manages to cross over to the bridgehead, sufficient not only to hold a small piece of land, the bridgehead is opened. Opening a bridgehead means breaking through the front of the enemy troops blocking it, putting them to flight and going over to a general offensive.

From the history of the 98th Infantry Division, we see that the order to attack after opening the bridgehead came from the command of the 98th Division itself, although the units on the bridgehead were still subordinate to the commander of the 111th Division, Otto Stapf.

So, on the night of September 1-2, all the German commanders involved in opening the bridgehead in the northern direction gathered for a meeting: the Sturmgeschütze and the Nebel Werfer division promise excellent support. The offensive plan, built on the interaction of all branches of the military, should have fully justified itself on September 2.

with Petrov V.S. The past is with us. Book. 2. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1989.

But what about ours? What did they plan for September 2? As can be seen from the Combat Order of M.I. Potapov No. 0040 of September 1!, very decisive, active military operations were planned against the divisions of Army Group Center hanging over Chernigov from the north:

"(...)

3. 5A, firmly holding the line Dolzhik, Cape Lyubech and further south east. bank of the river The Dnieper, on the morning of September 2, with its right wing, goes over to a decisive offensive and destroys the Chernigov group of the enemy.

4. 15th Rifle Corps in cooperation with units of the 1st Airborne Quarters at 7.00 2.9, after an hour of artillery preparation, go on a decisive offensive with all your might and, delivering the main blow with your left flank in the general direction of Ryabtsy, Petrushin, seize the line of Brusilov, Stasy, Petrushin, Roishchensky Skitok, Khmel'nitsa.

Take control of the Brusilov, Terekhovka, Cherto Reika borders with your 62nd rifle division;

45 sd take possession of the border (suit.) Chertoreyka, Petrushin, Roishchensky Skitok, Khmel'nitsa.

5. 1 vdk with the forces of 1 vlbs 212 gapi 1/460 cap in cooperation with 15 sk to strike in the general direction of Pevtsy, Lopatino and by the end of the day to master the high line. 116.6, Stasy. In the future, advance in the general direction of Chernysh, where to get in touch with parts of the 75th rifle division.

204 vdb - reserve - stay in the occupied area ... "

As for those formations of the 5th Army, which, some already tomorrow, and some a day or two later, will have to face the 98th shashchepe-Om op, then on September 2 they were ordered:

"b. 31 sk firmly hold the former frontier?.

7. 215 sd continue, stubbornly defending the former line to the east. bank of the river Dnepr<sup>3</sup>, prevent crossings over the river. Dnieper.

(...)

Commander of the 5th Army Potapov  
Members of the Military Council Nikishev Serdyuk  
Chief of Staff of the Army Pisarevsky. SBD WWII.  
T.40.

2 Approximately: from Chernigov to the Dnieper against the 17th Infantry Division and along the Dnieper to the south - against a possible another German crossing.



} Approximately: Dung - Sivki - Sorokoshichi.

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Unfortunately, we do not have Vlasov's order of September 1, but the order of September 2 refers to the Oster group subordinate to Vlasov:

"BATTLE ORDER No. 011. START 37 Kyiv. 11.00 2.9.41

Map 100,000 and 200,000 In

order to better control the units operating in the Oster area and coordinate their actions, I order all units to be united into the Oster group under a single command. I appoint Captain Donchenko as the head of the combat section of the Oster group. The composition of the group: 30 pont battalions, the remnants of a company of the river flotilla, a platoon of the NKVD regiment, two companies of tanks, a company of 146 gunboats on the Desna River. Task: defend the eastern bank of the river. Desna in the Beliki, Evminka section, preventing the enemy from crossing the river. Gum. From the composition of the company of 146th Rifle Division, a mobile group of 40-45 people with two machine guns should be allocated (on Zavtomashinakh) to prevent possible attempts by the enemy to cross the river. Gum. Conduct continuous reconnaissance in a northern direction: Arohi, Bondarevka, Sokolovka. Maintain close contact with active units in the Okuninovo area. Commander of the 37th Army Vlasov Member of the Military Council Brigadier Commissar Lutai Chief of Staff Major General Dobroserdov.

More clearly, the location and actions of the troops of the 37th Army, which fought against the Germans on the Okuninovskiy bridgehead and to which parts of Potapov's 5th Army were subordinate, can be seen in the Operational Report of the SWF Headquarters dated September 1, 1941:

"To the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army

Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-West. directions

Copy: To the Chiefs of Staff of the Bryansk and Southern Fronts

To the Chiefs of Staff of the 40th, 5th, 26th, 37th, 38th, 21st armies

Chief of Staff of the KVO

OPERSVODKA No. 0125 K 22.00 1.9.41 HEADQUARTERS YUZF PRYLUKY

Map 500,000 and 200,000 troops of the South-Western Front, defending the eastern bank of the river. Dnieper with fortified

fief abroad KIUR, continue to fight in Chernihiv

1 SBD WWII. T. 40.

sk and Oster directions and from the morning of 31.8 on their left flank they are fighting with the enemy who crossed to the left bank of the river. Dnieper Derievka.

The enemy, while holding the Okuninovo area, tried to expand the bridgehead captured at Grigoro-Brigadirovka and develop an offensive from the north to Bakhmach and Chernigov.

(...)

2. 5th Army. In front of the front of the 5th Army, the enemy in the former grouping continues to develop an offensive against Cher NIGovV.

(...)

3. The 37th Army is fighting on the right flank in the Oshitka area, defending KIUR and east. bank of the river Dnieper at the front of Cherry, Zherebyatyn. By the end of the day, army units occupy the position:

The Oster group (30 pont. battalion, company of the 62nd joint venture of the NKVD, company of the river flotilla, 205 ap and two companies of tankettes) on the former line, has no contact with the enemy.

228th Rifle Division defends in the south. env. Nv. Glybov.

87 sds 131 mdv 17.40 went on the offensive. The enemy, stubbornly resisting, slowly retreats.

131 md moved north to the line of 1 km south. Mistakes. To the south env. Mistakes up to two enemy infantry battalions.

22 microns (41 and 19 TD) continues to occupy the line 2 km east. H-ra Volchiy Gory, saddle highway at the bend 3 km east. Okuninovo.

124 sd - reserve, in the forest 4 km south. Art. Karnilovskaya Guta.

171 sd defends the east. bank of the river Dnieper at the front Chernin, Svaromye.

Divisions defending KIUR (175, 206, 147, 284 and 295 rifle divisions), and 165 rifle divisions defending east. bank of the river Dnieper - the situation is the same.

(...)

Shtarm 37 - Kyiv.

Tupikov Solovyov  
Bagramyan!

The location of the parts of the 37th named in this operational summary

army and the units of the 5th army transferred to it speaks of the following:

1 SBD WWII. T. 40.

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- the main grouping of troops (22 MK I, 124 RD ? and the Oster group) covered the eastern and northeastern directions in relation to the bridgehead. Desna, the cities of Oster and Morovsk are located on these directions. If you cross the Desna at these settlements, then you can, without encountering any resistance, go straight to Nizhyn;

- a relatively strong group - 87th sdi 131 md3 - covered the direction to the south, to Kyiv;

- the direction to the north, along the Dnieper, was covered by only one 228th division.

To the north of the 228th Rifle Division, with a front to the Dnieper, was the 215th Division of the 5th Army. Even further north, between the Dnieper and Chernigov, and also north of Chernigov, were the remnants of the 5th Army: the 31st, 15th Rifle and 9th Mechanized Corps.

"Already at 4.50 in the morning, on September 2, the 289th regiment, which was to the right of the 282nd regiment, rose and attacked on a wide front," M. Garais begins the story of the opening of the bridgehead. - The first target, high and light dunes, located 2 km north of the starting point, the companies attacked with effective support from the "Sturmgeschütze" and captured this sandy hilly area faster than expected. Without delay, a blow is struck on Novo-Glybov. "Sturmgeschütze", as it was with Malin \, are pulling ahead. Hurrying after them, an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun stumbles upon a mine and is engulfed in flames °. However, in spite of everything, the offensive continues, and at 10 o'clock Novo-Glybov was taken by both regiments. The enemy completely retreated to Tuzhar and Sorokoshichib. Losses are insignificant.

Now, freed from the fetters of defense, to our troops

1 The 22nd MK, in addition to the 19th and 41st tank divisions, included the |-th division of the 458th artillery regiment, the 589th division of the RGK, the division of the 331st division.

2 Transferred to the 37th Army from the 1st Airborne Command of the 5th Army. 3 Transferred to the 37th army from the 3rd sk of the 5th army.

4 Settlement on the Irsha, where the 98th Infantry Division fought heavy battles before forcing the Dnieper.

Obviously, we are talking about an 88-mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on a tank chassis; the cumulative projectile of such a weapon pierced a 90-mm bro-

NU at a distance of 3 km, armor-piercing - 1.5 km; a very formidable weapon against tanks and fortifications.

th: Staro-Glybove was defended by the 228th Rifle Division, transferred by that time to the 37th Army of A.A. Vlasova: Sorokoshichi were in the zone of the 215th SD, the main task of the division remained the same - to prevent the enemy from crossing the Dnieper in the Sorokoshichi-Navozy section (Dneprovskoye village).

the former goal returns: to destroy the enemy before the Desna bends to the east! But first of all, it is necessary to drive out the enemy of this field positions, which are still held to the west of Staro- and Novo-Glybov?. On the other side of the Dnieper, after futile attempts at crossing, the 290th Regiment is finally ready to unite with kindred regiments for the offensive.

The enemy, taken in pincers, from the south by part of N./1B 282 and from the northeast by companies of Sh./1B 282, was, after strong resistance, defeated. The attack cost 10./1B 2823 painful losses; several non-commissioned officers and privates, as well as the company commander, Lieutenant Hoffman (Neupapp), were mortally wounded. Noi Bolshevik left many dead. About 50 people were taken

you are a prisoner.

The struggle for the Dnieper crossing was also the ultimate test for supply units. The condition of the overstressed horses was amazing. Despite the tireless pursuit, it was not possible to cut off the path of significant enemy forces to their crossing through the Dnieper. You should be lucky enough to do this when they flee for the Desna. But no pauses are allowed here.

The reconnaissance reports of the 98th Infantry Division say: "The enemy made every effort to cut off the bridge fortification and the German forces located east of Okuninovo. The offensive [In 282 from August 28 on Staro-Glybov thwarted the already planned success"]".

Pursuing the retreating enemy, [B 289 took Tuzhar and Sorokoshichi by 16 o'clock. A night is spent there, cold, rainy and again without a field kitchen. In the evening, the sanitary company set up two medical dressing stations in Staro Glybov. There, with considerable difficulties, the divisional artillery exchange office was also transferred.

' The gum curves sharply from south to east (if you look against the current, which is not customary in our country) near Chernigov. We are talking about the destruction of the troops of the 5th army of M.I. Potapov.

? Here could be the positions of the 228th and 215th rifle divisions.

3 10th company of the 282nd regiment.

4 According to the German version, the strike of units of the 98th division from the Okuninovskiy bridgehead to the north became the decisive factor in victory in the battles for holding

foothold.

\$ Sagev M. Katrgipa Epae deg EgapKl5sV-Zideepatsiosvep 98. [pashepe Om5op. UeNae Nap\$-Nepiter. Rod2ip. 1959. \$. 120.

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September 3-4. Regrouping and a new offensive. "The day of 3 September was essentially devoted to the regrouping of the division for the attack on 4 September and for rest. The division was given the task of covering the northern flank and establishing contact with the KhShAK," writes M. Garays.

The 13th Army Corps of the 2nd Field Army of the Army Group Center, consisting of the 17th, 134th and 260th Infantry Divisions, set foot on the right wing of the SWF from the north, from Belarus. His line of responsibility stretched (from west to east) from the Dnieper to the Snov, a tributary of the Desna. In the center of the battle order of the corps was the 134th Infantry Division, which went straight to Chernigov. To her left, closer to Snov, the 260th shashchepe was advancing- Oh! \$1op. To the right of the 134th, closer to the Dnieper, the 17th army attacked the troops of the 31st Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. The 98th and 17th Infantry Divisions marched towards each other. Probably, Potapov understood that the moment had long come when it was necessary to leave Chernigov and, having retreated to the left bank of the Desna, take up a strong defense along it. However, the high command took a different view:

"Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Shaposhnikov, on behalf of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army, transmitted:

"Chernigov must be kept behind us, at all costs," Stalin's order is quoted in Potapov's Combat Order for the troops of the 5th Army No. 0041 of September 3.

On the same day, September 3, while the 98th shashchepe-O!uzul was regrouping, preparing to continue the offensive, the Military Council of the 5th Army demanded "from all units decisive action and seizing the initiative in their own hands. Experience of military operations in the area of Podgornoe, Sands! showed that the Germans do not accept the bayonet attacks of our units and flee in panic, boldly attacked by even smaller forces "...

"While the bridgehead was expanding to the east and making its way up to the Desna," continues M. Garays, "the 98th division, concentrating on the Tuzhar-Gorodok line, prepared for an offensive in the eastern and northeastern

1 A village on the Desna near Chernigov, where heavy fighting was going on between the 5th Army and the 260th Infantry Division from the 13th Army Corps and the 131st Infantry Division from the 43rd Army Corps of the 2nd German Army.

board!. On the right will go [B 289, without the 1st battalion, on the left [B 290; [K 282 is assigned to the division reserve.

The territory between the Dnieper and the Desna has absorbed all the unpleasantness that can cause difficulties in pursuing the enemy: no paved roads, damp, swampy terrain, uncultivated roadless forest. To this must be added the rainy weather and the enemy, masters both in defense and in retreat.

At 8:00? the division set out and pushed the enemy, who was holding south of Gorodok, to the northeast. They took 1000 prisoners. This indicates a weakening of resistance. Now the battle moves into the depths of a wide forest strip, which protects the enemy retreating to the Desna from pursuers. This forest prevents a good view, makes it difficult to communicate with each other and, as a result, brings various surprises.

Hastily following 1B 290 northeast through Novy Zavod, PP./AB 1983 suddenly runs into the enemy. Thanks to the infantry brought into battle, the division pushes the enemy back and captures 55 people. Mining calls for caution. Very soon our progress is slowed down by the results of the night rains - the roads are washed out and filled with impassable puddles. But on the edges of them - only forest and swamp. Eyes fill with tears as horses pass by, barely on their feet, deadly tired and exhausted. Their appearance evokes sad thoughts.

The methods of enemy resistance and retreat can only command deep respect from us. Again and again the stubborn defense surprises; from the heights overgrown with bushes, in the middle of the forest, from the flanks, from the outskirts of the villages: again and again, rapid-fire artillery showers our infantry that have entered the territory considered clean with aimed fire. At the same time, the enemy is quick and skillful in disappearance.

In the Intelligence report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 72, prepared by Kb.00 on September 5, 1941, it is said about the actions of the enemy on September 4: "The enemy continued to hold the Okuninovsky bridgehead, trying to expand it in the southern and northern directions. According to the data required

1 Having entered the operational space, after opening the bridgehead, the 98th division turned towards the Desna in order to cut off the 31st rifle corps from it.

September 24th.

3 3rd division of the 198th artillery regiment of the 98th infantry division.

4 The Germans, from the regiment commander to Hitler, have always emphasized the fighting qualities of M.I. Potapov.

checks, up to two regiments of infantry with tanks, who apparently crossed from the western bank of the river. Dnieper near Nov. Glybov, by the end of 4.9 launched an offensive from the Sorokoshi chi area in a northeast direction, trying to reach the crossing over the river. Desna in the Maxim area.

Judging by the data and the map given in the history of the 98th shashchepe-R / u1ch1yuop, its 290th regiment crossed to the eastern bank of the Dnieper in the Novo Glybov area.

The 228th Rifle Division, the enemy of the 98th Rifle Division along Staro-Glybov, withdrew to the Maxim area and received orders to defend the crossing across the Desna. And in the areas of Gorodok and the New Plant tract, the 98th division already met with our 215th motorized division.

September 5th. The first hearths of the Kyiv boiler. "But what we are now talking about is understood by almost everyone, be it a friend or an enemy," M. Sage reports on the further actions of the 98th division! "It can, it must lead to the cauldron!" The 113th and 111th Infantry Divisions press on Oster; The 262nd, wedged between the 111th and 98th 1, on September 5 takes Bondari; The 98th division expands the arcuate bend to the east, to Novy Zavod, which was taken by the 290th regiment. In a few days, great success will be achieved in the direction of the strike of this regiment - the fruits of the largest harvest in all the battles that have taken place since the crossing of the Dnieper have been reaped.

Reports from the north, where the 17th Infantry Division is advancing south, also sound favorable.

As favorable as the situation was for the Germans, it was just as disastrous for our troops. The assessment of the situation that developed on September 5 by the Soviet command is contained in the Combat Order for the 5th Army No. 0042, which was issued at 5.00 5.9.41:

"1. The enemy, having crossed the small forces across the river. Desna in the area of Wibli, Peski, is trying to create a bridgehead in the south. shore, pulling its units to this area. In the area of Okuninovo, Sorokoshichi, the enemy has gone over to active operations and is striving to expand the bridgehead to the east. bank of the river Dnieper..."

1M. Garais listed the infantry divisions of the 51st Army Corps of the 6th Field Army, with the exception of the 79th Infantry Division.

, E Sageb M. Katripa Epae deg Egapk15sV-Zide (episvel 98. [aschepe Om151yup. UeNa; Nap\$-Nepppya. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 121.

The bridgehead at Vybleya, the attempt to create which is being discussed, was actually already created by the 260th division of the 13th army corps of the 2nd army. This corps, consisting of the 260th, 134th and 17th divisions, advanced on the right flank of the SWF from the north, going towards the divisions of the 51st AK of the 6th Army, including the 98th O. Indication of the expansion of the Okuninovskiy bridgehead was no longer relevant - in fact, the bridgehead was opened, and the Germans switched to fighting to encircle and destroy our troops in the interfluvium of the Desna and the Dnieper.

In the same Combat Order, the 31st Rifle Corps, which fought on two fronts, against the divisions of two German corps - the 13th and 51st, was ordered: "Firmly defending the occupied front, destroy the enemy in the Soroko Shichi area and position. Securely secure a junction with 15th corps in the area of Zhukovka, Lgovka, Kuibyshev, preventing enemy units from breaking through to Chernigov from the northwest and west. Subdue all crossings on the river. Desna in the area south of Slabino with all the crossing property, engineering units and guards, establishing the strictest order on them and ensuring them from sudden capture by the enemy.

The 31st Corps was no longer able to carry out such a task with available forces, and the last phrase of the 0042nd order sounded a real gesture of desperation:

"5. The military council of the army demands the most resolute actions, up to and including personal participation in the attacks of commanders and commissars of units in order to set an example and inspire the fighters. Passive waiting on the lines occupied makes it possible for the enemy to pump up forces for further offensive actions...

Commander of the 5th Army Potapov  
Members of the Military Council Nikishev, Serdyuk  
Chief of Staff of the Army Pisarevsky.

By 22.00 on September 5, the headquarters of the SWF stated!:

"The armies of the South-Western Front are fighting fierce battles in the Konotop, Chernigov and Kremenchug directions and are defending the east. bank Dnieper with a fortified border KIUR:.

(...)

| Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0133 by 22 hours on September 5, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD VOV.T. 40.

2. The 5th Army is engaged in combat with the enemy, who is directing his main efforts to bypass the left and right flanks of the army from



Gorbov and Sorokoshichi districts.

(...)

31 forces 200 and 193 hold back the line of Lgovka, Brekhuny.

195th Rifle Division is fighting the enemy!, who has captured Lyubech, and is defending the east. bank of the river Dnieper at the front (suit.) Lyubech, Rudnya.

215 md pushed back by the enemy? to the line of Sivki, Saponova Guta. Nv. Plant, Sukach are occupied by the enemy.

(...)

3. The 37th Army on the right flank is fighting the enemy in the south-east. and south of Oshitka. The enemy, expanding the bridgehead at Okuninovo, moved to the east. the coast of large forces of infantry with tanks and develops an offensive to the south in the direction of Novoselki, to the east in the direction of Karpilovka and to the north-east in the direction of Sorokoshichi.

228 sd pushed aside by pr-com vr-not Maxim; by the end of the day, the division defends the crossings across the Desna River near Maxim, having in front of the front up to an infantry regiment with tanks ...

Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Major-General  
Tupikov Military Commissar of the Front Headquarters Regimental Commissar  
Solovyov For the Chief of the Operations Department, Colonel Zakhvataev.

The Deputy Chief of the Operations Department of the 5th Army, A.  
Vladimirsky, in his study described the situation on September 5 as follows:

"By the end of September 5, the troops of the 5th Army were fighting, occupying the following provision:

215 MD, waging heavy battles with the enemy, who was trying to break through to the crossing on the Desna River near Maxim, with difficulty held the line of Sivka, Saponova Guta and part of the forces defended the left bank of the Dnieper in the section of Rudnya, Sivki. Four enemy tanks broke through to KP 215 MD, but were repulsed.

The remnants of the 228th Rifle Division, consisting of 500 people, thrown back by the enemy to the north, joined the 31st Rifle Division. They were ordered to defend the bridgehead position at Maxim on the line (claim)) Gnilusha, the southern outskirts of Sokolovka.

General Potapov considered the position of the 5th Army critical

TS 17th Infantry Division. ?  
Ottesnenai is divided into two parts of the 98th Sh.

skim. On its right flank, the troops of the 15th Rifle Corps, exhausted by incessant battles with superior enemy forces, with difficulty held the Chernigov region ...

(...)

On the left flank of the army, the enemy Okuninov grouping, having significantly increased in its composition, went on the offensive in the northern and northeastern directions.

For General Potapov, it was obvious that the enemy, using the advantages of his enveloping position, would seek to pinch the 5th Army between the Dnieper and Desna rivers with strikes from the Viblinsky and Okuninovsky bridgeheads. And only an immediate withdrawal of army troops from the Dnieper ledge to the line of the Desna can save them from encirclement and defeat.

With such a proposal, General Potapov again turned on the evening of September 5 via HF to the commander of the front, but received a categorical refusal from him!

6 September. Risky command. "Moreover, on September 6, two orders and a combat order were received from the headquarters of the front, the main content of which was as follows," continues Vladimirsky. - In view of the fact that the enemy, with forces of more than two divisions, is developing a strike from the Okuninovsky bridgehead to the crossing on the Desna Maxima River, and his advanced units have already reached this river in the Morovsk, Korop2 sector, there was a threat of the enemy entering the rear of the 5 Army. The front commander ordered on the morning of September 8 to strike at both flanks of the Okuninovskaya enemy grouping. An attack from the north should be made by the 5th Army in the direction of Okuninovo, and an attack from the south by the 37th Army. The purpose of the strike is to crush the Okuninovsky grouping of the enemy and throw it back beyond the Dnieper. In order to free up forces for this strike, the commander of the 5th Army is allowed to withdraw troops from the northwestern ledge 25-30 km to the south and straighten it along the line Selyanskaya Sloboda (14 km northwest of Chernigov), Karkhovka (20 km southwest of Chernigov), Rudnya (6 km north of Navozov). To reinforce the 5th Army, its composition is transferred to the 295th Rifle Division from the Kyiv

Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 256.

? Obviously, Koropye, a village on the Desna, south of Maxim.

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Hooray. It will be concentrated in the area of Nadinovka, Krasilovka (8-17 km east of Maksim).

The implementation of such a counterattack by the intended

forces (195, 215 and 295 rifle divisions) in the conditions of the continued strong pressure of the enemy on both flanks of the army seemed to General Potapov an extremely risky business. He correctly believed that the enemy would not passively wait for two days for our troops to go on the offensive and would himself strike before September 8.

And so it happened. "As soon as the morning of September 6 dawned, the offensive to the east and northeast was continued," M. Sage informs us!5. — All divisional units are loaded with work. On the right, TV 290 with Sh./AK 198 aims at Sukachi, Maksim and Gnilushcha; 1K 289 with P. / AK 198 presses north through the dense forest around Saponova Guta in the direction of Zhevedi. An anti-tank battalion follows here. For a person who has fallen behind his unit, this impenetrable forest is a dangerous enemy.

For this reason, non-commissioned officer Pfister (ÿÿ\$er) from the communications platoon died. Motorcyclist signalman Eder (E4eg) did not return to the company and is considered missing.

GV 282, together with [./AV 1982, is tasked with striking to the north and northeast to pin down and destroy the enemy, retreating south from the blows of the army corps' CL; but first, together with Sh./V 2893 given to them, it is necessary to take possession of Khatilova Guta and Sivki. The day was clear and dry. But the swampy terrain hindered progress. During the day, the northern flank of the division was so stretched out that from 12 o'clock the corps anti-tank battalion under the command of Major Prince Waldeck (Rpp2 \alesK) passed into submission to [K 282. Now the front stretches from Saponova Guta - Khatilovka to Sivoki .

Establishing a connection in this vast space, almost without roads, through the forest, swamp and mud, is hardly possible.

1 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M .: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 257.

An artillery battalion was attached to each infantry regiment of the 98th division.

3rd Battalion, 289th Regiment.

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solvable task for a liaison battalion. But radio operators and telephonists, taking risks, work beyond their full potential and strength. Lieutenant Eberle (Ezepe) from the 2nd radio company, who was at [B 290, was mortally wounded!

September 7th. "Doomed to a heavy defeat." According to the history of the 98th division, it went on the offensive on 6 September. Although, from what we have just read, it is clear that this was most likely a regrouping and reaching the initial lines, which coincided with the regrouping of the Soviet 5th Army. Nevertheless, the Germans were ahead of us by a day. "General Potapov's fears were confirmed: the enemy did not wait for the completion of the preparation of the 31st Rifle Corps for a counterattack and on September 7 resumed the offensive on both flanks of the 5th Army," writes A. Vladimirsky?

"As has often happened, again on Sunday, September 7, the climax of the struggle begins. The desperate resistance of the Bolshevik runs into the cruel determination of the infantry of the division to put an end to the enemy, - M. Garais describes the horrors of this day. - In the morning, reconnaissance discovered a further retreat of the enemy to the Desna. However, the situation in the very confusing area where [K 290 and TV 289] were located was not explained in any way.

GK 282, as soon as it reached Saponova Guta, was suddenly involved in a battle in a populated area and in a forest battle<sup>3</sup>. The enemy emerged from everywhere. Chief Corporal Huber (Niebeg) noted: "Along the middle of the road, we come across an enemy position. You arrows whip the forest. To the right of the road, a platoon of the 8th company of Lieutenant Utzschneider (Ts1275svpe! 4eg) is fighting; he dies. A deadly commotion begins. From both sides, screams and groans can be heard.

Unforgettable are the words of the seriously wounded comrade Schurer (Sspager), when he fell to the ground: "Only my wife and four of my children will continue me."

1 Sageb M. KatrRila Epae 4er EgapK15sn-Zideep@nissNep 98. [pamepe Om op. Wayayo Napz-Nepp/pv. Rod2ip. 1959. \$. 122.

2 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 259.

th: in the area of \u200b\u200bSaponova Guta there were parts of our 215th motor division  
ii.

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Suddenly the enemy disappeared. But before the Howler Circle, the regiment again encounters fierce resistance. In close combat, losses increase. The commander of the 9th company, Lieutenant Dell (Rey), falls ahead of his company. Together with him, more than 30 killed from the battalion will be lowered into the grave. Two infantry guns! undermined by mines and blown up into the air.

Who did the 98th Infantry Division run into under Reva new Krug? This is a very important point. According to the counterattack plan, by September 8, the entire space from the Dnieper to the Desna along the Navozy-Budishche-Maxim line was to be

captured by the 215th (closer to the Dnieper), 195th (in the center) and 295th (closer to the Desna) divisions. On the morning of September 8, after artillery and aviation preparation, these divisions were to strike south towards Okuninovo. However, by the morning of September 7, only the 215th motorized division managed to take up its starting positions, from Navozov (now the village of Dneprovskoe) to Budishcha, which the left-flank 282nd regiment of the 98th division O1 / 131op collided with. The rest of the space, from Budishch to the Desna, was not yet occupied by Soviet troops, except for the remnants of the 228th division (about 500 people) located at Maxim. The regiments of the 98th Guards poured into this gap. By the morning of September 7, the 195th Rifle Division, "leaving on the Dnieper River - in the Rudnya sector, (claim.) Protecting manure, with its main forces ... concentrated in the forest to the south Zhidinichi... The main forces of the 195th Infantry Division rested on September 7 after a night march in the woods south of Zhidinichi," writes A. Vladimirsky

Near Zhidinichi, a little to the south of them, is Revunov Krug Resting there, after a night march of the 195th Rifle Division, the Germans rushed into the open window between Budishche and Desna.

"... The regrouping of the 31st Rifle Corps in the northern sector of its front was carried out according to plan without interference from the enemy," continues A. Vladimirsky. - But on the left flank of the 31st Rifle Corps, the situation was unfavorable.

b Revolve option: two regimental mortars on wheeled carriages.

2 Sagey M. KatrRipa Yeleee 4er EgapK15sp-Zidaep@cissNel 98. pamshepe Om5yuop. Wayayo Nulz-Nepplie. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 122.

3 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 260.

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The 215th motorized division, having left cover on the Dnieper River - in the Navozy sector, (claim.) Sivki, by the morning of September 7, the main forces occupied the starting line indicated to it - Sivki, Budi Shche. The 228th Rifle Division, numbering about 500 people, took up a bridgehead position, covering the crossing across the Desna Maxima River in the area of the Chabany farm, Sokolovka.

But due to the fact that neither the 195th nor the 295th rifle divisions advanced their forward detachments to secure the starting lines for the counterattack indicated by them, the enemy passed these lines and began to move north ...

... The section from Budishche to Sokolovka (on the left flank of the 31st Corps), 20 km long, was not occupied by our troops. And the enemy took advantage of this by throwing the 98th Infantry Division into the gap.

Commander of the 31st Rifle Corps, Colonel Kalinin! ordered the commander of the 195th division to counterattack the enemy with one regiment and close the gap. But these forces were not enough, and the 98th Infantry Division, having covered itself with part of the forces from the west, advanced deeply in the northeast direction - behind the 31st Corps, occupying Smolin and Gnilushcha with its advanced units. The remnants of the 228th Rifle Division were pushed back by the enemy to the very crossing at Maxim. In such a critical situation, it was clearly inexpedient and even dangerous for the 31st Rifle Corps to launch a counterattack, scheduled for September 8th. The situation required the immediate withdrawal of the 31st Corps to the left bank of the Desna. And General Potapov again turned to the front commander via HF with a request to authorize the withdrawal of army troops on the night of September 8 across the Desna River. But General Potapov did not receive such a sanction, and he had no choice but to carry out the order, although he well understood that this would doom the 5th Army to a heavy defeat.

1 From 07/20/1941, the 31st Corps was commanded by N.V. Kalinin. 08/06/1941 he was awarded the rank of Major General.

? Private Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00378 dated September 6, 1941 for a counterattack by the troops of the 5th and 37th armies.

2 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 261.

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8 September. "Everything is at stake." "Suddenly, the night quickly falls, cold and dark in autumn. It is replaced by a gloomy, rainy morning. Ten, eight, less than kilometers separate the attackers from the Desna. Meanwhile, our compressed mass disperses and pushes the scattered enemy units. Both opponents now know for sure: everything is at stake.

At Maxim, one compact group of the enemy manages to cross the river and slip away to the east," M. Garais reports, apparently about our 228th division, which defended the 136-meter pontoon of 12 barges to the bridge of Maxim!. - But the core of their troops, with heavy weapons and materiel, is located further north, in the direction of Gnilusha, Smolino, Capricorn, Zheved. Here the fate of the remnants of the 31st Red Army Corps comes to an end. The concentrated fire of the 198th artillery regiment and the battalion of 6-barreled rocket launchers?, as will soon be established, had a devastating result.

The events that took place on September 8 were much more filled with events than M. Garais told us. In the morning, as ordered, the troops of the 5th Army attacked the enemy. However, the forces of the Germans were estimated incorrectly. Still on the eve, on the evening of September 7, the Military Council of the SWF, requesting

permission to withdraw the 5th Army and the right flank of the 37th Army beyond the Desna, informed the Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Direction S.M. Budyonny and Chief of the General Staff Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov that two enemy divisions are operating against 5A in the Chernigov direction, and three in the Ostersky direction. In fact, as it turned out later, there were four divisions operating in the Chernigov direction, and six in the Oster direction. This underestimation, together with the order to attack a stronger enemy, instead of the order to retreat behind the Desna, led to fatal consequences not only for the 5th Army, but, subsequently, for the entire Southwestern Front.

The attacks of the Soviet divisions were repulsed by the Germans with heavy losses for us. Moreover, the attacking divisions were surrounded. Thus, for example, the offensive of the 215th and 195th Rifle Divisions, which began at 06:20 on September 8, was repulsed. ace

' This bridge was repeatedly destroyed by the 54th bomber squadron. 2In the original:

MebemeNegame!ipv.

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in the evening, after the 98th Oguzyup squadron reached the rear of these formations, communication with these divisions completely ceased. Since September 8, when the opponents attacking each other at the same time mixed up, the historical sources that we used begin to contradict each other. So, according to Soviet data, it was on September 8 that "in the rear of the 31st Corps, units of the 17th Infantry Division, advancing from the north, and the 98th Infantry Division, advancing from the south, joined forces, as a result of which the main forces of this corps were cut off. on the right bank of the Desna River! But, according to German information, these divisions joined only by the evening of September 9th.

Perhaps some sinister role in the tragic events of September 8 was played by the Panwitz detachment, as A. Vladimirsky calls it: "West of Chernigov, on the right flank of the 31st Corps, the enemy's 17th Infantry Division and the Panwitz detachment (orb 45 and on 17 pd?) from the morning of September 8 went on the offensive and, crowding out parts of the 200th and 193rd rifle divisions, by the end of the day they captured Videltsy, Maly Osnyaki, Andreevka, Zhevedya, Smolin, Gnilyusha, and separate units the enemy broke through to the Zhidinichi. -

What kind of detachment this is, Vladimirsky does not explain. But we are talking clearly about ATSIYAY! -45 - reconnaissance battalion of the 45th Infantry Division. This is the same division that stormed Brest. According to the history of the 45th POZ, in September 1941, the reconnaissance detachment of this division was commanded by Oberst Lieutenant Helmut von Panwitz. The same German who turned out to be is Old Man von Panwitz, who was hanged in the Soviet Union in 1947. Among other things, Old Man Panvits was accused at trial of the fact that he "in 1941, being the commander of the head strike detachment of the 45th German

infantry division, actively contributed to the massacres and violence against Soviet residents in the territory of the Soviet Union, temporarily occupied by the Germans, by the Nazi soldiers. (Transcript of the meeting

} Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 264.

? A separate reconnaissance battalion of the 45th Infantry Division and a mobile, or advanced, detachment of the 17th Infantry Division.

3 p. Kiao!X Susvor'. Met Uevshi 4er 45. [tamepe-Ogmzyup, Obegomeges snow Eapdezueyav, [417 1955.

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Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of January 15-16, 1947.)

At the trial, Panvits himself admitted: "Moving from Brest Litovsk to Kursk, the shock and other detachments of the 45th Infantry Division subordinate to me destroyed a number of villages and villages, destroyed Soviet cities, killed a large number of Soviet citizens, and also robbed peaceful Soviet people. .

... I must admit that by participating in the formation of military units consisting of prisoners of war of the Red Army, and leading them in battles against the USSR and Yugoslavia, I committed an act that, according to international rules and customs of war, is considered a crime. I am ready to bear responsibility for this crime."

Neither Dr. Rudolf Shepf (Og. Vodo OzsNbr), nor Martin Garais write in their books about the actions of the 45th reconnaissance battalion of the 45th infantry division near Chernigov. M. Garais does not mention him at all, and R. Shepf only reports that The 45th reconnaissance battalion broke away from the 45th infantry division, which was part of the Army Group Center, at the end of August, somewhere near Gomel, as if Panvits "was left on the Dnieper for reconnaissance and protection."

But since the Panwitz detachment was nevertheless discovered in the combat zone of the 5th Army and its 31st Rifle Corps, it can be assumed that the tasks for AICHAYM-45 were set such:

1. Covertly penetrate into the rear of the Soviet units, cut communications, sow panic and create the appearance of encirclement (maybe it is precisely the actions of this detachment that explain the fact that the Soviet command decided that the 31st sk was surrounded a day earlier than it was surrounded in reality).

2. The same task, but with dressing up in a Soviet uniform and using traitors (this follows from Panwitz's subsequent activities).



"By 15-16 hours on September 8, it became clear to General Potapov that the troops of the 5th Army were in danger of catastrophe and they must be immediately withdrawn beyond the Desna. He believed that even now the water was very late and it would take place in incredibly difficult conditions. The troops will have to break through the first, inner belt of encirclement created by units of the 17th and 98th infantry divisions of the enemy west of the Desna River, approximately along the line Kuibyshevka, Andreevna, Zheved, Smolin, Gnilusha. In addition, the Gorbovskaya grouping attack from the north

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and the Morovskaya grouping, with a blow from the south, will undoubtedly try to create a second, outer belt - along the left bank of the Desna, "A. Vlalimirsky writes bitterly!

The departure of the 5th Army to the left bank of the Desna, and the South-Western Front had already given permission for this, was planned to begin on the evening of September 8: along permanent bridges in the Chernigov region - for divisions of the 15th Rifle Corps and along pontoon bridges in the Slabin and Ladinka regions and a floating bridge on barges near Maxim - for divisions of the 31st Rifle Corps.

Everything was at stake that day.

"With the onset of darkness on September 8, units of the 15th and 31st rifle corps began to make their way to the crossings on the Desna.

The 62nd and 45th rifle divisions of the 15th rifle corps, leaving the rear guards ... retreated through Chernigov, heading for the road and railway bridges, located 1-3 km south of the city. When approaching the crossing points, it turned out that the bridges had already been destroyed by our sappers on the orders of the commander of the 1st anti-tank artillery brigade, Colonel A.I. Eremenko in order to avoid their capture by units of the 260th infantry division of the enemy ... In view of the destruction of these Chernigov crossings, the commander of the 15th corps, General K.S. Moska Lenko ordered the 62nd and 45th rifle divisions to break through to the pontoon crossing set up by our sappers near Slabin (16 km southwest of Chernigov).

Moving along the right bank of the Desna to Slabin, the 45th Rifle Division in the area of Zaitsy, Kienka and the 62nd Rifle Division in the area of Shestovits were met by units of the enemy's 98th Infantry Division advancing from the south and blocking the way to the crossing. A heavy battle in the area of Shestovitsy, Kienka lasted for two days, "writes Vladimirsky. Novistories of the 98th division of Shestovitsy, Zaitsy and Kienka are not mentioned. Most likely, in this area, our divisions fought with the 21st 55th infantry regiments of the German 17th infantry division. And in the area of Capricorn - Slabin - Andreevka - Zheved, where the 31st Rifle Corps was surrounded - with the 98th Infantry Division, the 95th Regiment of the 17th Infantry Division and once the battalion of the 45th Infantry Division. Former commander of the 15th Rifle Corps K.S. Moskalenko in his memoirs

| Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 265.

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writes that Shestovitsy was occupied by the Germans advancing from the west - that is, the 98th shashchepe-Olm151on. But still, the version that under Shestovitsy was not the 98th, but the 17th Infantry Division, seems to us preferable.

Here, probably, a few more words should be said and why the bridges in Chernigov were blown up prematurely. It is quite obvious that this was done out of fear of repeating history with the capture of the Okuninovsky bridge. And the Okuninovsky bridge was not blown up not because the Germans struck too suddenly, but because it was mined according to the instructions - the electric detonators were not inserted into the charges. And when the Germans appeared at the bridge, then under their fire, simply no one could jump out onto the bridge and put detonators

in place.

"From the VOSO department we went to the head of the South-Western road, P.M. Nekrasov, - the commander of the 5th railway brigade P.A. told us. Kabanov. - ... At the end of the conversation, Nekrasov said bitterly: - We have had a hard time in recent days. The Germans are constantly bombing, and then the storm has done misfortunes.

And he spoke about the "self-explosion" of the bridge across the Dnieper near the Nedanchichi station, on the Chernihiv-Ovruch section. The miners prepared this bridge for destruction in advance, but did not fulfill all the requirements of the instructions for demolition. Electric detonators were placed in charges, and not hung near them. A few days ago there was a thunderstorm, and lightning struck the electric explosive network. There was an explosion, as a result of which the span structure of the bridge collapsed into the river ...

In an anxious mood, we left the office of the head of the road. Kyiv was evacuated. Residents loaded their belongings on carts, cars, bicycles, motorcycles. An endless stream of people stretched to the bridges across the Dnieper.

After the "self-explosion" of the bridge near Nedanchichi (50 km west of Chernigov), our troops obviously began to follow the instructions on mining - and as a result, the Germans got a landslide capture of intact bridges on the Dnieper, Desna, Seimas, and Sula ... The same cases when bridges exploded "on time", as in Chernigov, led to the death of entire buildings ...

On the outskirts of Okuninovo, on the western bank of the Dnieper, at first everything went well. In war as in war. First of all, the German aviation bombed the vanguard of their own troops. Then, trying to ram a Soviet truck on the bridge, the head Sturmgeschütz self-propelled gun fell into the water itself. And while the Germans, upset by the first failure, were preparing for a second attack on the bridge, if it had been mined not according to instructions, it could have been blown up a hundred times. But try to run under enemy fire along the three-kilometer bridge and insert all the detonators!

"The Russians tried to blow up the bridge with prepared explosives, but the ignition cables were severed," reports German military historian Werner Haupt.

"Ober-lieutenant Steinmann (S(ettapp)—who will soon be killed on the Desna—with sappers from his 3rd company of the 111th sapper battalion cut the ignition cable and frustrated Russian attempts to blow up the bridge," history 111 says. th Infantry Division about the second attack on the bridge?.

However, let us return to the history of the 98th Infantry Division, which, having rushed north from the Okuninovsky bridgehead, had already reached the rear of the 31st Rifle Corps. Events in the region of Capricorns - Slabin - Andreevka - Zhevel, where the 98th division, the 95th regiment of the 17th division and the Panwitz detachment were the main participants in the battle from the German side, developed, according to A.V. Vladimirsky, as follows:

"The main forces of the 31st Rifle Corps, 20-30 km away from the crossings across the Desna, found themselves in an equally difficult situation. The commander and headquarters of the 31st Corps, which were separated from the encircled troops, were unable to properly organize their breakthrough to the crossings. Only the 200th Rifle Division, led by the energetic Colonel Lyudnikov<sup>3</sup>, was able, albeit with heavy losses, to break through to

b Nairi I'. Agtu Sgoir Zosh. Tne Umeigtasye t Kizyaa 1941-1945. ZsmYer tikagu N1gogu. Afep, RA. 1998. R. 61.

2 Quoted from op. op. Haupt with reference to: Mizsy! from E. Nachogu oYo ne SHO 1papiu Om\$1yup. Habitugue. 1980.

unfortunately, I.I. Lyudnikov did not tell us anything about the Kiev pocket, except that "when I, seriously wounded, was taken to the headquarters of the Southwestern Front surrounded by Germans, Kirponos ordered me to be taken out of the encirclement on the last Po-2 plane."

pontoon bridge Slabina and on the night of September 9, crossing

to wind with all parts (with the exception of one artillery regiment) to the left bank of the Desna. The success of the breakthrough was facilitated by the fact that the commander and headquarters of the division were with the rear guard regiment, which covered the retreat of the division, which ensured firm control of the battle in these difficult conditions. By the morning of September 9, the 200th Rifle Division, by order of the commander, took up defensive positions along the left bank of the Desna ... The remaining three divisions of the 31st Rifle Corps, which were surrounded (195, 193 sdi 215 md), making their way to the Desna River, by the evening On September 8, they reached the forest south of Andreevka, where for several days they fought hard battles with the 17th and 98th infantry divisions of the enemy, without successfully trying to break through the enemy ring ... 1

9th of September. "Fate comes to an end here..." "On September 9, the ring around the encircled enemy, which could still break through to the east through the Desna, continued to narrow," continues M. Garais. - Having taken Smolin, the 290th regiment reached Capricorns by dusk and thus found itself in front of the center of the encircled. The 289th regiment, striking to the northeast through the Goncharov Circle, took up a position between Smolin and Zhevedya. The 282nd regiment moved north to Kovpyt, so that later, turning its front to the east, with all three of its battalions to strike in the direction of the Desna. In the evening twilight, he extended his hand to the 95th infantry regiment of the XIII army corps advancing from the north.

The 95th regiment was part of the 17th Infantry Division [3rd Army Corps of the 2nd Army. This division, together with the 134th and 260th, which were also part of the 13th AK, advanced from the north, towards the 98th TO. The 98th and 17th infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht took part in the encirclement and destruction of Soviet troops in the area of Shestovits (15th sk) and Capricorns - Zhevedi - Andreevka (31st sk). But, judging by the history of the 98th TO, on the right bank of the Desna, between Capricorns and Chernigov, by the evening of September 9 there were no Germans yet, and the way to the crossing at Slabin was still open for the Soviet troops.

In Soviet memoirs, the day of September 9 is shrouded in some kind of mystery. It is not clear why both A. Vladimirsky and Marshal A. Va

Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 269.

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Silevsky write that permission for the withdrawal of the 5th Army beyond the Desna took place only on September 9:

"And only on September 9, we were finally allowed to convey to the commander of the Southwestern Front: "The Supreme Commander authorized the withdrawal of the 5th Army and the right flank of the 37th Army to the Desna River on the Brusilo-Voropaev front with the obligatory retention of the Voropae-Vo-Tarasovich front and the Kiev bridgehead!"

"Even in the afternoon of September 9, General Potapov learned that permission had finally been received from the headquarters of the Supreme High Command to withdraw the 5th Army beyond the Desna2."

But after all, back on September 8, Kirponos (maybe at his own peril and risk?) Ordered Potapov:

"Of particular importance  
to the Commander of the 5th Army

BATTLE ORDER No. 00387.  
HEADQUARTERS YUZF PRYLUKY. 8.9.41

Card 500 000

The commander of the Southwestern Front ordered:

1. Restore the situation on your right flank with units of 135th rifle division, 1st airborne division, 244th joint venture with access to the river. Desna (we are talking about the Vyblin bridgehead on the left bank of the Desna. - Auth.).

2. The rest of the army is allowed to retreat to the left bank of the river. Desna and firmly defend it within its borders.

3. The 21st Army on 8.9 part of the forces of its left flank goes on the offensive in the general direction:

a) Kulikovka, Lukashevka;

6) Ukrainian, Anisovo;

c) Ukrainian, Gorbov.

4. Headquarters of the 5th Army to have in the forest 6-7 km south-west. Nizhyn.

Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Major General Tupikov  
Military Commissar of Staff Regimental Commissar Solovyov"3.

1 Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. Minsk: Belarus, 1988, p. 127.

L Vladimirsky A.V. In Kiev. direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 271.

3 SBD WWII. T. 40. 98

The next day, already on September 9, a new Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front - No. 00394 (to ensure the withdrawal of the troops of the 5th Army of the Desna district) followed:

"Especially important

Commander 21A

Commander 5A

Commander 37A

Copy: To the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the YuZN

Chief of opera Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army

BATTLE ORDER No. 00394.  
HEADQUARTERS YUZF PRYLUKY

9.9.41 13.30

Map 500000

The 5th Army is in a difficult position. The enemy occupied Anisovo, Kolichevka, Zheved, Capricorns, Smolino and, going to Maxim and Sokolovka, cut off the escape routes to the left bank of the river. Desna 62, 45, 195 and 215 sd.

To ensure the position of parts 5A, located on the right beret, and ensure their withdrawal to the left bank of the river. Des on the commander of the SWF ordered immediately:

1. 21A to confirm the task with part of the forces to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy occupying the Viblisky bridgehead in the direction of Kulikovka, Vibli.

2. 5A strike in the direction of Anisovo and capture Kolichevka, Anisovo.

3. 37A active actions of the Oster-Okuninov group in the direction of Morovsk and Oshitka to prevent the transfer of opposing enemy units against 5A.

Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front Major General Tupikov  
Military Commissar of the Staff of the South-  
Western Front Regimental Commissar Solovyov.

By the evening of September 9, the Soviet command assessed the situation as follows: "... the 5th Army, fighting fierce battles with the enemy,

1 SBD WWII. T. 40.

b Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0141 by 22 hours on September 9, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

hiding to cut off escape routes and intercept crossings across the river. Desna, departing...

45th and 62nd Rifle Divisions, conducting rearguard battles, withdraw along the western bank of the river. Gum. At 11.20 heads passed the line of St. Belous, since this time, contact with them has been lost. At 15.00 and 15.30, radio messages from the 45th Rifle Division addressed to the commander of the 15th Rifle Division were intercepted - requests for help.

200 sd, having suffered heavy losses, withdrew to the east. bank of the river Desna and occupies a line of 3 km north. Golden. To the south, in the Drutskoye district, there is one joint venture 193 sd.

215, 195 and the remnants of 193rd Rifle Division broke through to the crossings and fought in the Yakubovka area. Slabino, Smolino, Gnilusha are occupied by the enemy. At each point at least one battalion, presumably 98 infantry divisions.

228th Rifle Division withdrew to the east. bank of the river Desna, destroying the crossing, and took up defense at the turn of Nadinovka, Maxim. Before the front of the division up to paragraph 98 pd.

295th Rifle Division is fighting in the area of Guta Tumanskaya, Borsukov Khutor "...

Unfortunately, in the memoirs of the former commander of the 15th Rifle Corps, K.S. Moskalenko, little is said about the tragedy of the 45th and 62nd rifle divisions, which were part of the 15th Rifle Corps:

"The enemy, meanwhile, was rapidly advancing from the east to Kolichevka, trying to bypass Chernigov from the south. At the same time, he struck at Chernigov with the forces of infantry divisions advancing, as I have already mentioned, from the Okuninovsky bridgehead along the western bank of the Desna. In the afternoon of September 8, its main forces reached the Kolichevka area, and those advancing from the west captured the settlement of Shestovitsy and thereby cut off our escape routes beyond the river. Gum.

So the bulk of the forces of the 15th (45th and 62nd rifle divisions) and the 31st rifle corps, located in the Chernigov region and to the south-west of it, were surrounded. In this situation, permission was finally obtained to withdraw after dark beyond the Desna. It was exactly a day late, and now we had to not retreat, but to break through the encirclement at a high cost.

I briefly explained the situation to the commanders and informed them of my decision: the 45th and 62nd divisions would break through the enemy ring at all costs and cross the Desna.

Only the desperate courage of the fighters and commanders of the 15th Rifle Corps saved us then from defeat. Many of them fell in the unequal battle that soon ensued. The commander of the 45th Infantry Division, Major General G.I., was wounded. Sher stuk. In a heavy night battle, both divisions lost part of their artillery and transport, and yet, in small groups on improvised crossing means and by swimming, they reached the eastern bank of the Desna "...

In our opinion, on September 8, Shestovitsy had not yet been captured. And the 45th and 62nd divisions, which were part of the 15th Corps, could not cross the Desna not because of the capture of Shestovitsy, but because the bridges near Chernigov, along which it was planned to cross to the left bank, have already been blown up. The order to blow up the bridges had the right to give and gave the commander of the 1st anti-tank artillery brigade A.I. Eremenko. The commander of this brigade, until the death of the commander of the 15th Rifle Corps, Colonel M.I. Blanca, was K.S. Moskalenko. Where was he on September 9th? Vladimirsky accuses the command of the 31st sk that: "The commander and headquarters of the 31st corps, who were separated from the encircled troops, could not properly organize their breakthrough to the crossings." But the command of the 15th Rifle Corps, judging by the fact that "radio messages from the 45th Rifle Division addressed to the commander of the 15th Rifle Division were intercepted - requests for help", was in isolation from their right-bank divisions.

However, to blame the new commander of the 15th sk K.S. Moskalenko is not necessary. After all, the command of the front in those days considered the Germans as the main danger, going to connect with each other along the left bank of the Desna: from the northern, Vyblinsky, bridgehead, and from the south, which was formed on the left bank of the Desna between Ostrom and Morovsk, after opening Okuninovskiy foothold. And the location of Moskalenko's headquarters on the left bank, along with other units of the 15th sk, who were trying to drive the Germans out of the Vyblinsky bridgehead, was quite justified and expedient.

I.Kh. describes the battles of September 8-10 in sufficient detail. Bagramyan, but he is stingy in describing the fate of the 45th and 62nd divisions:

"Now let's get back to the events on the northern wing of the front.

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The troops of the 5th Army, who received belated permission to withdraw beyond the Desna, had to make their way out of the ring of enemy troops with heavy fighting. The enemy relentlessly pursued them, subjecting them to continuous attacks from all sides. In this most difficult situation, the fighters and commanders of the 15th and 31st rifle corps showed an unbending will. Subjected to continuous bombing and shelling, they stubbornly made their way to the Desna.



Fascist troops twice surrounded the 711th regiment of the 215th rifle division of Colonel P.A. Barabanov, but the fighters and commanders fought their way through with a decisive attack. Parts of the 193rd Infantry Division of Colonel A.K. Berestov, in fierce battles, 700 fascists were destroyed in just two days. There was no rear in the divisions of the 5th Army: there was a front everywhere. When the German infantry and tanks in the 200th Rifle Division broke through the battle formations to the division headquarters, staff officers, signalmen, and guards rushed to meet them. The battle was led by the division commander, Major A.P. Kolpachev. People died in an unequal battle, but the enemy also suffered heavy losses. Three tanks continued to move. Then the Red Army soldiers Kulakov, Osipov and Sergeev rushed to cut them off. From a distance of 10-15 meters they threw bottles of flammable liquid at enemy vehicles. The headquarters was saved.

One can imagine what the fighters and commanders went through when they made their way to the Desna and saw that the coast was already occupied by the Nazis. The 193rd, 195th and 215th divisions of the 31st Rifle Corps found themselves in this situation under the overall command of the commander of the 195th division, General V.N. Nesmelov. Being fired upon from the front and from the rear, they could not find a way out anywhere. It was decided: with one part of the forces to hold back the enemy troops attacking from the west, and with the other - to force the Desna with a fight. There were no transfer facilities. Artillery and motor vehicles had to be destroyed. Only the 200th rifle division of this corps was not able to be intercepted by the Nazis. Its commander managed not only to break away from the pursuit, but also to preempt the enemy in reaching the Desna. The division retained all artillery and rear.

The 45th and 62nd divisions of the 15th Rifle Corps reached the Desna south of Chernigov. Here, too, the coast was in the hands of the Nazis. Corps Commander Major General K.S. Moskalenko

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(who replaced the deceased Blank) skillfully organized the attack. With a friendly onslaught, our units crushed the enemy and broke out of the ring ...

"

It seems that with regard to the 45th and 62nd divisions, things were much more tragic. At 24:00 on September 9, a telephone conversation took place between Potapov and Kirponos, during which the commander of the Army-5 informed the commander of the South-Western Front:

"There is very alarming information about the 45th and 62nd rifle divisions, the situation there is very serious. The commander of the 45th Rifle Division, Major General Sherstyuk, was wounded, at about 5 p.m. he received the last radio message from him with the following content: "Help in any way you can." Nothing more came from him. There is heavy fighting going on in the area where they are believed to be. I think tonight some parts from there should return. After 17.00 communication by radio with no one

I have. He took all measures of artillery support. You sent all the ships (river flotilla) that I have, sent enhanced reconnaissance, the task of which you set - to show the way where you need to go, prepared the crossing ...

... Do I need to send aviation to cover units in the areas from Andreevka to Slavino? and from the river crossing to Maxim.

Communication with Tymoshenko (62th division) and Sherstyuk (45th division) was interrupted from 17.00 on September 9. A political instructor arrived from them a few hours ago and painted a very gloomy picture. I think he exaggerates a lot. One thing, of course, is beyond doubt, that the material part, apparently, in its absolute majority, has perished"... |

This document shows that the assessment of the situation with the 45th and 62nd rifle divisions of the 15th corps, which was given by Potapov, contradicts the statement that "corps commander Major General K.S. Moskalenko skillfully organized the attack. With a friendly onslaught, our units crushed the enemy and broke out of the RING "...

More plausible, although there is confusion about the dates, the story

1 Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1988. S. 285.

2 Obviously, Slabino is meant.

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the commander of the 31st Rifle Corps, General Kalinin, about the encirclement of his subordinate troops:

"Major General M.I. Potapov informed me that the Germans had crossed the Desna to the southeast of Chernigov (you are close. - Auth.). At the same time, the forces of the 6th Army from the left-bank bridgehead, north of Kyiv (Okuninovo. - Auth.), They tried to develop an offensive against Chernigov and encircle us between the Dnieper and the Desna. The threat of encirclement loomed over our corps.

Returning to my room, I gave the order to the divisions to withdraw beyond the Desna.

For the crossing of formations and units, two bridges were urgently built, and the ships of the Dnieper River Flotilla were also used. The 195th division, reinforced with tanks and artillery, covered the retreat. She could hardly hold back the onslaught of superior enemy forces. The fighting did not subside day or night.

By September 5, the Nazis made their way to the Desna in the area east of Chernigov. However, all their attempts to cross the river were frustrated. The front of our defense curved in a horseshoe. It became more and more difficult to beat enemy attacks. Connections

suffered significant losses, ammunition, especially shells, quickly melted away. The head of artillery of the corps, Colonel Kushnir, made incredible efforts to replenish ammunition. It was necessary to cross the Desna under continuous enemy fire. During the night, with the help of sailors, the 193rd and 200th divisions, some army and corps units, and two RS divisions were transferred to the left bank.

The 195th Infantry Division was the last to approach the river. Its commander, Major General Vitaly Nikolayevich Nesmelov, and Commissar Ivan Vlasovich Kuznetsov did everything possible to save the units. The crossings had already been put out of action, and under the divisions they had to overcome the Desna on improvised means.

The enemy hung literally on the shoulders. The rearguards fought fierce battles. Here, near the Desna, General Nesmelov was seriously wounded. The soldiers carried him out of the fire in their arms and sent him to the hospital with a nurse.

On the eastern bank of the river, our troops set about building a new line. I went to the 15th Corps to establish cooperation with him. But the commanding officer stunned me with a message:

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- Army received an order from the headquarters of the front to retreat to Nizhyn...

Our corps was left alone on the Desna. We stayed there until September 11th. There were only about 2,500 active fighters in the corps. Artillery was almost completely left without ammunition, tanks and tractors - without fuel. By this time there was no longer a continuous line of defense, and the enemy went behind us.

Communication with the headquarters of the 5th Army was interrupted. Attempts to restore it were not successful!

The three boilers that Halder spoke of on September 9, 1941 ("There is complete confusion in the bands of the 6th and 2nd armies: three boilers!"), These are obviously the boilers into which the 31st sk (Kose horns), 45th SD (Kienka) and 62nd SD (Shestovitsy) - the main forces of Potapov's 5th Army.

10 September. "On the night of September 10, many enemy units, leaving all the materiel, slip away across the river. The rest, the bulk, forms a square of wagons and guns dug into the ground, writes M. Garays about the last hours of the encircled 31st Corps. "They will fight to the bitter end. At night, a motorized column tried to reach the Desna through Capricorns. At the same time, she came across the 1st battalion of the 290th regiment of Lieutenant Scherzler (Speg2er) with several "Sturmgeschütze". It came down to hand-to-hand. 8 trucks, 4 cars and 15 prisoners were captured. This

was the first, small, idea of what the day would bring. At 7 o'clock the 290th regiment set out with its 1st battalion north of Capricorn. To the north of this settlement, the first company finds itself 700 meters from a huge concentration of infantry, vehicles, tanks and artillery. Quickly and decisively, the company, together with the third company following behind, launched an attack. The enemy is defending. In the chaos of the battle, firing guns and 8 light anti-tank guns were captured. Soon after, it comes to a fight over who will capture whom. Unter-officer Bosch (Vbzsp) covers with hand grenades the crews of two howitzers, which were just about to fire. Later, on October 25, he will die Kuzolevo (Kizo! e \ mo). And now, in

s Kalinin N.V. This is in my heart forever. M.: Military Publishing, 1967. . 29-30.

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lasting more than an hour of hand-to-hand combat, until the Sturmgeschütz intervened, he is one of the bravest. Lieutenant Schertzler (Sser2er), having received two wounds in a short time, is dragged away by the Bolsheviks. A platoon of the 1st company, led by an exemplary non-commissioned officer Bosch, rushes after and frees the lieutenant. The lieutenant will die on October 25 near Nara (Mage).

The success of the struggle is considerable: along with a large number of those killed, 500 prisoners were taken. In general, the battalion of Hauptmann Dr. Klotz (C1!012) reports the following results: 570 prisoners, 133 killed, 28 guns, 6 reconnaissance armored vehicles, 16 anti-tank guns, 5 mortars, 3 quadruple machine gun mounts, 31 heavy machine guns, 23 light machine gun and nearly 250 vehicles. Not least this was the result of successfully countering the enemy's attempt to escape that midnight.

On September 10, in the area of Slabino - Capricorn - Zheved, engulfed by the fire of the 198th artillery regiment and rocket launchers, the fate of those surrounded was decided!

By the morning of September 10, the situation with the encircled corps of Moskalenko and Kalinin was assessed by the headquarters of the SWF in the following way:

"... The 5th Army continued to withdraw its units to the east with fighting. bank of the river The Desna and with difficulty held back the offensive of the enemy on its right flank ...

62 and 45 rifle divisions (Moskalenko's divisions. - Auth.), Faulty breaking through cr. Desna, having lost all the materiel and convoys, which requires verification, are transported in small groups across the river. Desna swim vr-not Shestovits.

215, 195 and 193 sd (divisions of Kalinin. - Auth.) fought in the area of Smolino, Capricorns, making their way to the crossings. By 3.00

10.9, parts of the indicated divisions have not yet crossed"2.

By the evening the situation had not improved:

"... the 5th army is engaged in heavy fighting, being surrounded by part of the forces and part of the forces under the influence of superior enemy forces from the front ...

1 Sagev M. Katrgoipa Ende deg Egapk15sv-Zideept4isvep 98. [pbamepe Omzyulp. VeYa8 Napz-Nepplpv. Rodtop. 1959, p. 124.

: Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0142 by 10 o'clock on September 10, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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15 sk ... 45 and 62 sd continue in separate groups with the help of improvised crossing facilities and swim across to the east. bank of the river Gum. Artillery and tractor materiel were blown up and destroyed. Data on the losses of the divisions were not received.

Z1 sk ... 193, 195 and 215 divisions under the command of Major General Nesmelov continue to fight surrounded in the Slabino, Capricorn region, making their way to the crossing on the river. Gum"!).

"The forest and the encircled territory to the north and northwest of Zhevedi, the last hard-to-observe shelter of strong enemy units, were under fire at noon to destroy all 4 battalions," M. Garais continues the story of our tragedy. - The consumption of the regiment's ammunition required a double replenishment. By 17 o'clock the forest north of Zhevedi was passed by P./1V 289 and subunits [K 282. The enemy did not manage to escape across the river. The resistance is broken, the fight is over. The results of the division's battles after crossing the Dnieper: 4,600 prisoners, 58 guns, 27 anti-tank guns, one anti-aircraft gun, 147 heavy and light machine guns, 34 field kitchens, many trucks, tractors and teams fell into its hands.

Our sanitary facilities were on the way: the 1st company went to Saponova Guta, the 2nd to Sorokoshichi, and the field hospital followed there.

The depletion of combat units, as a result of their continuous use since July 31, was great. The losses were large and serious. The commanders of the infantry regiment are not silent about this ...

... With THIS "old men" in the companies, most often only 30-40 people remained. Is it possible, however, to think about replenishment and rest?

Already after the war, relying on the surviving documents, A. Vladimirsky, a participant in the last battles of the 5th Army, wrote about this tragic day:

: Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0143 by 22 o'clock in you 1941 on the hostilities and the situation of the troops of the front. SBD. T. 40.

: - Sageb M. KatrGop@ Ende deg EgapK5sp-bideeepdnizsNep 98. [agtsepe Om zp. UeNav Nap\$-Neppipv. Rodhop. 1959. \$. 125.

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Scheme of combat operations of the 31st Corps of the 5th Army in the Kiev Cauldron  
(according to A. Vladimirsky).

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"The next day, September 10, did not bring any improvement in the position of the 5th Army. From the encircled divisions of the 15th and 31st rifle corps, they made their way and

only individual units and groups of our fighters and commanders armed with light small arms crossed the Desna. By the end of September 10, it was already possible to sum up some preliminary results of the losses of the 5th Army in recent days.

Accurate information about the losses in the archive has not been preserved, and they could not have been due to the death of most of the personnel of the headquarters of the divisions. The main source for establishing the combat strength of the formations for this and subsequent periods of the fighting of the 5th Army is the operational reports of the army headquarters, compiled mainly on the basis of oral reports of the commanders of the formations and personal testimonies of staff commanders sent to the troops. It can be seen from them that by the end of September 10, 1941, the strength of the combat strength of rifle formations was as follows.

15th Rifle Corps - Commander Major General Mos Kalenko. In 135 sd, 1 airborne and 1 aptbr, there were a total of about 1000 people. From the composition of the 45th and 62nd rifle divisions, only about 500 people made their way or left the encirclement. General command

'over the remnants of the 45th and 62nd Rifle Division was entrusted to the commander of the 62nd Rifle Division, Colonel Timoshenko. The artillery regiments of these divisions, having lost their materiel, ceased to exist.

In total, the 15th Rifle Corps had no more than 1.5 thousand soldiers and commanders of rifle units and about 90 guns and mortars of various calibers.

31st Rifle Corps - Commander Colonel N.V. Kalin. They broke out of the encirclement: 193 rifle divisions - 300 people, 195 rifle divisions - about 300 people, 200 rifle divisions - 450 people, 215 rifle divisions - 300 people. But even in the divisions that were not surrounded, due to heavy losses, there were also few people left, namely: in the 295th rifle division - 300 people, in the 228th rifle division - 200 people. In total, the 31st Rifle Corps had about 2 thousand people and 100 guns of various systems.

From the entire 5th Army, there were about 4 thousand soldiers and commanders of rifle units, about 200 guns and mortars of various systems. Headquarters 195 sdi 215 ml ceased to exist, went out of order due to injury or death of the team

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dirs of divisions: 45 sd - Major General G.I. Sherstyuk, 193rd Rifle Division - Colonel A.K. Berestov, 195 sd - Major General V.N. Nesmelov, 215 MD - Colonel P.A. Drums.

The remnants of the formations that escaped from the encirclement lost their transport and means of communication.

In connection with the breakthrough of the enemy's mobile formations in the Konotop-Romny direction! the entire logistical support system fell into disarray. stopped

delivery of ammunition, fuel and food to the troops. It was not possible to evacuate the wounded to the rear. It was clear to General Potapov that the 5th Army, which had become weaker than one division in its numbers, was no longer capable of solving operational tasks. Subsequently, the former Wehrmacht General A. Filippi writes: "Here, the remnants of the brave Russian 5th Army, which fell under a two-sided attack, were finally crushed. It was fate that ... her lucky star for

rolled"...

The approximate losses of the 5th Army in the battles between the Dnieper and the Desna can be estimated from the following document:

"Command of the 2nd Army

Department [s / Abwehr

Army Headquarters

28.09.41

INTERROGATION OF RUSSIAN MAJOR GENERAL  
POTAPOV, COMMANDER OF THE 5TH SOVIET ARMY

Question: What was the size of the army around the middle of August?

Answer: In total, about 70,000 people, of which about 20,000 combat units.  
(This question could not be given a clear answer, since the general was not quite clear about the concept of "combat units". He used the concept of "ordinary infantry" and assumed that there were approximately 20,000 such people.)

Question: What explains the large difference between the two figures?

Answer: The difference arose due to large losses in

1 Rech'o of the 2nd tank group of Guderian from the GA "Center". 110

previous fights. The rear services basically did not suffer losses. There was no replenishment of the fighting!

Since both Vladimirsky and Potapov speak of active bayonets, it can be assumed that during the fighting between the Dnieper and the Desna, the 5th Army lost 16 thousand soldiers and commanders (excluding rear units) killed and captured. From the same data, deeper conclusions can be drawn:

- when the stories of German divisions talk about the capture of 50 people, then, most likely, they mean prisoners from



combat units;

- when it comes to capturing 1000 people, then, most likely, they mean the rear units;

- if at the time of leaving the Dnieper, the ratio of combat and rear units in the Soviet armies was approximately 1/3, then during the battle in the pocket this ratio continued to increase in favor of the rear units;

- the vast majority of Soviet soldiers taken prisoner in the Kiev encirclement were from the rear and from the wounded;

- the vast majority of military personnel from combat units - died.

To Moscow! After participating in the destruction of the main forces of the 5th Army, the 98th Infantry Division no longer took part in the battles of the Kyiv pocket. "Three days of respite, the fallen divisions, were really a gift from heaven," recalls M. Garais. — She's leaving the 6th Army. In a letter sent to the division on September 13, Field Marshal Reichenau? says: "In continuous heavy fighting, the division acted remarkably, and its military exploits were crowned by the battle for Andreevkuz, in which the remnants of the red XXXG army corps were destroyed."

A three-day vacation looks like this: it begins with a lingering rain. Gray hangs in the deep valley of the Desna in the morning,

1 Reshin L.E. Militant incompetence // VIZH. 1992, p. 53.

2 Commander of the 6th Army.

3 Battle of September 9-10 in the Andreevka - Zhidinichi - Zhoved - Smolin - Slabin area.

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damp, low fog, and one thinks with horror about the state of the roads. Maps have been dealt that lead far to the east.

There is talk of a "decisive strike", of taking over St. Petersburg and Moscow, and even the Donetsk Basin! On September 14, the rest should already come to an end.

A powerful forced march begins with new replenishment, with tanks and mechanized troops going ahead.

On September 13, 1941, the commander of one of the infantry regiments writes in his diary: "... But a simple infantryman sees this differently, not like motorized, half or completely, troops. Each kilometer traveled is his own, personal achievement. Others are helped by a motor that

transports them, and provides them with various little amenities. Comparison is hardly possible. Only those who follow the route on foot, weeks in the mud, through rain and cold, in infantry attacks under heavy artillery fire, tired and leathery - which determines the life and success of every infantry unit - know this. What has been accomplished in these weeks by the infantry of the division is worthy of admiration! The brilliance and lofty sound of public fame, extracted from a slightly visible single success, supported the pilot, tanker, submariner, equipped with all kinds of modern technology, and, perhaps, those who fought in the infantry under the cover of the steel shield of anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. |

But it is precisely the one who, with the motor of his will and heart, with the strength of his stubbornness, attacking under a flurry of machine-gun and artillery fire, uncovered and unprotected by anything, it is the infantryman who remains mostly nameless ....

"... Again on Sunday, September 14, a new advance to the northeast begins," continues M. Garais. - The farther, the closer the division will approach its destruction. Nuapoka, in a good mood, she moves to Chernigov, rejoicing that she manages to avoid the Desnyansk swamps and go out onto the "road", get the prospect of having a roof over her head at night and clearly feel what it means to stay alive. Some of the battalions are transported even by trucks. It gives a completely "Western" impression. For half a day. Then the road leading to Gomel is abandoned, and, through Zlynka and Novozybkov, on September 20, the division reaches Klintsy.

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The successes of the march, which fluctuate between 25 and 45 km a day, can only be truly appreciated in view of the condition of the roads, which are ridiculed in every description. Through the deep sand, now rising up the hill, now descending from the hill, with the loss of all strength, companies and batteries, men and horses, broke forward.

The shelter, reached by units only after dark, is always miserable, dirty and cramped, if it was not at all occupied by the rear parts of Guderian's group. The picture that horses represent touches the heart: exhausted, emaciated nags are tormented ahead. Increasingly, short peasant horses are used in teams, which can be fed with anything. The regiment already has almost 111 peasant carts. But in especially difficult places trophy tractors drag the guns.

A cold, piercing northwest wind, joined by rain, is a welcome to Central Russia, which will begin when Zlynka is reached.

Gradually, the simplest, self-evident things begin to be absent: needles, threads, means for caring for

shoes, safety razor blades, toothpaste, safety pins and more. Little reserves are used up.

By September 21, 1941, the 98th Infantry Division had been in existence for two years. Its units, which can be said without false modesty, fought, suffered hardships, died, as befits active units - without special weapons, without special equipment, without special food supplies ...!

| Baghey M. KatrRipd Epadé deg Egapklissp-Zideepaniswep 98. And (aschepe O1m1\$1up. VeYaya Nap\$-Nepipv. Rodgip. 1959. \$. 126-127.

260 PCHEAMTEETE-OGUTZ OM

A Brief History of the 260th Infantry Division. The 260th Infantry Division was formed in Baden-Württemberg in 1939 as a division of the 4th wave. In co

Deer horn - the emblem of the 260th becoming a division included: 460th, infantry division. 470th and 480th infantry regiments, 260th artillery regiment, 260th reconnaissance battalion, 260th anti-tank battalion, 653rd and 260th engineer battalions, 260th communications battalion, veterinary company, sanitary, transport and food divisions. The division numbered 15,019 men, including 491 officers and 2,165 non-commissioned officers. The division commander was appointed, and was in 1941, Lieutenant General Hans Schmilt (SepegaTseshpap: Napz Zept 0.

The combat path of the division: 1939-1940 - Upper Rhine, Belgium, Luxembourg, France; 1941 - Brest-Litovsk, Bobruisk, Zhlobin, Gomel, Chernigov, Yelnya, participation in the Gaifun, Kaluga, Moscow region; 1942 - Yukhnov, Ugra, the search for intelligence officers and the fight against partisans; 1943 - search for intelligence officers, cessation of keeping a log of military operations, retreat to Belarus, Mogilev; 1944 - Mogilev, Orsha, Berezina, death and captivity in the Minsk pocket on July 9.

The 260th Infantry Division began its movement towards death in railway trains on June 30, 1941. The division was part of the 13th Army Corps of the 2nd Weichs Army! Army Group Center 2. Corps commanded by Erich

1 Sepegaeatagswa! Mahiiyap In the spring there is no wop \Mesve. 2 Sepega! atagosnay Bedoguop Wax.

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Commander of the 260th Infantry Division General Schmidt

(Sepega Yeilape ZsppiChy.

Straube!. The 13th AK also included: the 134th and 17th infantry di VIZII.

Until the 20th of August, the 260th advanced as part of its army and corps across Belarus, crossed the Berezina and the Dnieper, managed to gain experience in fighting on bridgeheads, and on August 19 was in the Gomel region. Here and found her famous order? Hitler about the turn of the troops of Army Group Center to the Ukrainian direction Gomel - Dobryanka - Gorodnya - Dubrovnoye - Chernysh - Kiselevka - Desna. Here, participating in the battle at the junction of the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front and the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, the 260th Infantry Division managed, unexpectedly even for the German high command, to capture an advantageous bridgehead on the left bank of the Desna. The creation of this parade ground darma, 5 km from Chernigov, led to a premature explosion of bridges across the Desna, as a result of which, on the right bank of the Desna, they were surrounded and the troops of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army were destroyed, and the commander of the 260th division Neral Schmidt was awarded the Knight's Cross...

1 Sepega! Cheg p#atmene Epsp Zigatsie.

2 Official name of the order: Instruction \!E \$1. E. Mg. 44141/41 dated 08/21/41.

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The starting position of the 260th Infantry Division and the Soviet troops opposing it. The main reason that forced Hitler, who had reached Smolensk, to change the Barbarossa plan and, instead of turning the troops of Army Group Center to the north, to Leningrad, to deploy them to the south, to Chernigovshchina, was the heroic resistance of the 5th Army Major General of Tank Troops M.I. Pota pova. The underestimation of the "factor of the 5th Army", when considering the history of the initial period of the war, is so shocking that, obviously, it makes sense to touch on all the Directives of Hitler during this period. Thankfully there aren't too many of them.

Directive No. 32 "Actions after Barbarossa" (dated June 11, 1941).

The war with the USSR has not yet begun, but the Directive states that "After the destruction of the Soviet Armed Forces, Germany and Italy will be the military owners of the European continent, with the temporary exception of the Iberian Peninsula" and that "no serious threat in Europe on land then won't stay."

Appendix to Directive No. 32 (dated 14.07. 1941). We would call it "Dizzy with success." The war with the USSR has been going on for only three weeks, but the Annex to the Directive is not about war, but about the reduction of the German army after the victory over Russia "thanks to German military skill in the European

skom continent".

Directive No. 33 "Continuation of the war in the East" (dated July 19, 1941). Somehow abruptly, and quite unexpectedly, in the light of previous directives, Hitler moved from the reduction of his armed forces to the "enemy 5th Army": "The enemy 5th Army must be quickly and decisively defeated and destroyed by the joint efforts of the southern flank Army Group Center and the northern flank of Army Group South.

Directive No. 34 "Changing strategy in Russia" (dated July 30, 1941): "The 5th Red Army, fighting in the swamps northwest of Kiev, must be forced to fight west of the Dnieper and destroyed. To prevent the slightest danger of a breakthrough of this army through Pripjat to the north.

Addendum to Directive No. 34 (dated 12.08.1941): "Central part of the Eastern Front: The most important task here is to eliminate the danger on the flanks... To accomplish this task, actions coordinated in time and directions are especially important between the adjacent flanks of Army Group South and Army Group Center. The Russian 5th Army must be stripped of any further power

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and, with the interception of roads to Ovruch and Mozyr, from where it receives reinforcements, is finally destroyed.

And, finally, since the 5th Army clearly did not want to lose "any further power" or be destroyed, on August 21, Hitler's patience finally snapped, and he signed the Order of I / E \$ and. G. no. 44141/4P, ordering the troops of Army Group Center to turn to Ukraine and destroy the 5th Army. In these documents, Hitler once mentions some of the Soviet armies, including the 6th, 12th and 21st. But on the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov, for the same period, Hitler indicates six times.

Fulfilling the above order of Hitler, the 260th division of General Schmidt, together with other parts of Army Group Center, turned from Gomel to Chernigov, where she soon had to face this famous 5th Army. The meeting was bleak for both sides. On the left flank of Potov, the divisions of the 6th Army of Reichenau attacked, on the right - the divisions of the 2nd Army of Weichs, including the 260th ...

"Crossing the Desna by the 260th Infantry Division" is the title of a chapter written by Tim Gebhardt (No. Pg. Piet Sebwaga®) from a collection devoted to the history of the Baden-Württemberg divisions<sup>3</sup>.

"During the last August days of 1941, the Russians, in order to prevent the encirclement of their troops fighting near Kyiv on the Dnieper, tried in vain to delay the German divisions striking south at Gomel. For Russian mar-

Shala Budyonny? there was a threatening situation and the danger of encirclement of his army group.

To the right of the 260th division marched the 17th, to the left - the 1st

1' This number is indicated by the German military historian Werner Haupt in his book on the Army Group "Center" (Nairi I'. Agtu Sgoir Sesheg. Tne Ueppaswt Kaza 1941-1945.

2 SepegaNatagspai \UManegup VesNepai.

th VadeP-UMzgietegrsne Omzyupep it 2.VeKper. Hmmzattepae\$e! wop KidoE UYSN. Kaizgiye: UePar S. Vgaip, 1957. \$. 59.

4 The 3rd and 21st armies of the Central Front fought here. These days they were united into one army - the 21st and subordinated to the Bryansk Front Tu. The 21st Army was deployed with the front to the north and slowly retreated from the Gomel region to the Chernigov region.

b Marshal S.M. Budyonny was the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern direction, which included the Southwestern and Southern fronts.

6 divisions were deployed front to the south.

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cavalry division...! The closer the German divisions approached the Desna, the stronger the Russian resistance became, "says Dr. Tim Gebhardt, who in the days of the events he describes had the military rank of Hauptmann and served in the 2nd Battalion 470 th Regiment of the 260th Infantry Division. Later, Tim Gebhardt, already a major, will lead the fusilier (created on the basis of reconnaissance battalion) battalion of the division.

Was it expected that the divisions of the Army Group Center, including the 260th PMashchepe-000lm\$1op, would appear in the zone of the South-Western Front? Were the Soviet troops preparing for such a meeting?

"The enemy is threatening the right flank of the SWF from the side of Gomel. Commander-in-Chief? ordered on the night of August 20, the 5th Army to begin a retreat beyond the river. Dnieper, after which the right flank of the 5th Army should be turned away from Dung? to Chernihiv. To secure the right flank in the shortest possible time, the Chernigov region should be advanced from the 5th Army by two rifle divisions. There on request. The 293rd Rifle Division is heading from Sumy on the road," reads the Combat Order of the Headquarters of the High Command of the South-Western Direction to the Commander of the South-Western Front of August 19.

On the same day, Budyonny's order was specified by the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front for the 5th Army:

«|. The enemy threatens the right flank of the SWF from the side of Gomel.

2. I order: 5A to start retreat beyond the river. Dnieper. Withdrawal should be made by night crossings with the expectation of occupying a new defensive line along the river. Dnipro ir. Desna kutru 25.8.41.

(O

1 Following the 260th and 17th was the 134th Infantry Division, apparently in the second echelon. Then these three divisions of the 13th Army Corps will line up in one line: the 134th will take a place in the center and go straight to Chernigov. To the left of the 260th, i.e. to the east, the 131st Infantry Division will advance. | th cavalry will be transferred to Guderian.

? Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction S.M. Budyonny.

3 Dung - now the village of Dneprovskoe. Located 40 km west of Chernigov. .

% SBD WWII. T. 40.

: Operational directive of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00280 dated August 19, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the 5th Army to withdraw the troops of the army beyond the river. Dnieper.

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With a departure for the river. Dnieper right flankarmy to bend from Navoz to Chernigov.

The borders of the army are the same.

3. To ensure the right flank of the South-Western Front, no later than the morning of 22.8, transfer one SD by rail and one SD by road to the Chernigov region.

The transferred divisions, remaining subordinate to Commander-5, occupy and firmly defend the southern coast. Desna at the front Vladkovka, Chernigov.

For trucking, 900 vehicles arrive at the disposal of the army (of which 156 are ZIS, the rest are GAZ), which, following the route Chernigov, Chernobyl, will approach Khabnoe (15 km west of Martynovichi) at 12.00 20.8 in a column.

For the transportation of railway expensive planned 200 sd. Unloading area - st. Art. Ovruch, Radcha. The first echelons are served by Ovruch by the morning of 20.8. The pace of transportation is 6 echelons.

4. Commander of the Air Force of the front, at the request of the commander of the 5th army, cover the trucking, loading and unloading areas of the SD, transferred by the railway.

(...)

Kirponos!  
Tupikov?

As can be seen from these documents, the threat to the right flank of the SWF from Gomel was visible, and, just in case, rather decisive measures were taken. Joked - to allocate 900 cars in those conditions? Of course, the two rifle divisions being transferred to the Desna and Chernigov were really only good enough to "secure" the right flank of the South-Western Front. However, neither the South-Western Front, which is fighting back on the Dnieper and Kyiv from Army Group South, nor the South-Western Front could single out more. In any case, the Southwestern Front and Budyonny were 3 days ahead of Hitler's order - on August 19, no one in Army Group Center even suspected that they would soon have to turn towards Kiev.

, Commander of the South-Western Front, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos.

2 The chief of staff of the SWF, Major General Vasily Ivanovich Tupikov, being the Soviet military attache in Germany before the war, reported to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff about a possible German attack on the USSR in the 20th of June 1941. This information was transferred to Stalin.

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Unfortunately, the Headquarters, having incorrectly determined the depth of the strike of Army Group Center, sincerely believed that Smolensk was only an intermediate stage on the Germans' path to Moscow. This fatal mistake led to the fact that the reserves that the Headquarters possessed were given to the fronts of Zhukov and Eremenko and senselessly spent on strikes against the enemy who deliberately went over to the defensive.

On August 20, the Southwestern Front's plans for the defense of its right flank changed somewhat. The next day, after the order of the 5th Army to withdraw beyond the Dnieper and bend its right flank from the Dnieper (Navozy) to Chernigov, a new order followed! M.P. Kirponos:

"In addition and a partial change to the operational directive of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00280, I order:

1. With a retreat beyond the river. Do not bend the Dnieper of the right flank of the 5th Army from Navoza to Chernigov, but occupy and firmly defend the eastern bank of the river. Dnieper at the front (suit.) Loev, St. Glybov...»

The same order also indicated the units that were soon to engage in battle with the 2nd Army, including the 260th 4aschepe-0M1\$1op: 62nd and 200th rifle divisions of the VISII.

The 200th Rifle, being transferred to the Berezna-Leninovka-Morgulichi-Gusavka region, which is located east of Chernigov and east of the Snov River, was supposed to increase



personalized up to 9 railroad trains per day, unloaded in Chernigov. The 62nd Rifle Division, following to Chernigov by motor transport, was supposed to concentrate north of Chernigov in the area by the morning of August 22: Smyach, Rudnya, Tupichev, Lashuki. This area is located west of the Dream River. As it seems today, if in reality these divisions took up defensive positions on both sides of the Snov, then the breakthrough of the 260th Tamepe-P\151 up to the Desna along the Snov would be much more difficult.

In reality, to the east Again, and without elbow contact with the 5th Army, the 21st Army of V.I. will fight with the troops of Weichs and Guderian. Kuznetsova. Having as its main task to counter-attack Guderian on its right flank, in the direction of Semyonovka and Novgorod-Seversky, the 21st Army was unable to

1 Combat order of the Commander of the Southwestern Front No. 00283 dated 20.8.41 13.45 to the Commander of the 5th Army on a partial change in the tasks of the army set by Operational Directive No. 00280.

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pour due attention to their left flank - the junction with Potapov's 5th army.

By the same order, 00283, M.P. Kirponos ordered M.I. Potapov to send one corps administration to Chernigov! and the 5th anti-tank artillery brigade. At the same time, all units sent to Chernigov were withdrawn from Potapov's 5th Army and became a front-line reserve.

pom.

August 21 at 3 am M.I. Potapov gave the order? on the withdrawal of his army beyond the Dnieper and on the occupation of defense along the Dnieper in the area from Loev to Stary Glybov. In addition to those formations that were concentrated near Chernigov and transferred to the front reserve, Potapov ordered to send to Chernigov, in the area of Stary Belous: the 1st airborne corps, the 1st anti-tank artillery brigade, the 124th rifle division, 2nd division of the 368th and 3rd division of the 460th corps artillery regiments<sup>3</sup>. At the same time, the {th vdk 1st Ptabr Potapov brought to his personal reserve.

On the same day, the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front ordered that changes be made to his Combat Order No. 00283 of August 20. According to these changes, the 200th Rifle Division was no longer to concentrate on the eastern bank of the Again, but on the western, north of Chernigov, in the area: Velikaya Ves, Repki, Sulichivka. This area is located on the Gomel-Chernigov highway, along which the troops of the 2nd Army of Field Marshal von Weichs will soon move south.

At the same time, M.P. Kirponos ordered the 15th Rifle Corps (62nd Rifle Division, 200th Division and

5 Ptabr) with access to the concentration area north of Chernigov "to prepare a defensive line and anti-tank areas at the front: Makishin, Smychin, Tupichev, Repki, Grabov."

1 This was the headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps.

Combat order of the commander of the troops of the 5th Army No. 0037 dated August 21, 1941 to withdraw troops to the eastern bank of the river. Dnieper.

3 According to the pre-war states, the rifle corps was supposed to include two corps artillery regiments. Each cap was supposed to have 36 or 24 122-mm guns and 152-mm howitzer guns.

4 Combat order of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front No. 00288 of August 21, 1941

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And on the same day, as we already know, Hitler ordered the troops of Army Group Center to go on the offensive against the 5th Army. As of August 21, none of the above-named Soviet troops had yet arrived in the areas indicated by him, and the construction of defensive lines had not begun there. Only the 3rd and 21st Armies of the Central Front, retreating to the south, were between the troops of the GA "Center" and the lines outlined north of Chernigov for the 5th Army.

On August 23, an event occurred that significantly reduced the ability of the 5th Army to build a reliable defense north of Chernigov. True, such a duty was not originally assigned to 5A. Everything that was required these days from M.I. Potapov, is to leave the Dnieper by August 25 and take up a strong defense along its eastern bank.

To the south of the 5th Army, the retreat beyond the Dnieper was started by the 27th Rifle Corps of General P.D. Artyemenko'. This corps was subordinated directly to the front, and for 24 hours on August 21 - to the 37th Army defending Kyiv, Major General A.A. Vlasov<sup>2</sup>.

At the height of the withdrawal of Soviet troops across the Dnieper, on August 23, in the sector of the 27th Corps, the German mobile group of the 111th Infantry Division? together with the 191st Assault Gun Battalion", having made a continuous 120-km march, broke through to the bridge near Okuninovo, captured this bridge and created a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. With the creation of this bridgehead, the whole point of the withdrawal of Soviet troops across the Dnieper - to take a place convenient for defense, withdraw from the battlefield and resupply their heavily depleted divisions - could be completely lost. Therefore, the huge forces of the Southwestern Front, units of the 5th and 37th armies, the ships of the Pinsk flotilla and aviation were thrown into the liquidation of the Okuninovsky bridgehead.

| Major General Pavel Danilovich Artyemenko was captured on September 27, 1941. On April 10, 1942, he was sentenced in absentia to death by a military tribunal of the Southwestern Front. In 1945 he was released by the Americans, taken to the Smersh Main Directorate, accused of treason again and shot in 1950. Rehabilitated in 2004.

? The reassignment took place in accordance with the Combat Order of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front No. 00242 on the reassignment and regrouping of troops.

The commander of the 111th aschepe-01\1\$1op was General Otto Shtapf (Sepega] 4er amepe Otso Z4ary).

4 The commander of the 191st Zigteezsvi2-AMelipya was Major Günter Hofman-Schönborn (Neupapp-\$spbpbgp).

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Just at the moment when the 260th Infantry Division seizes the bridgehead near the village of Vybli, near Chernigov, the Okunin bridgehead will be broken through to the north by the 98th Infantry Division. While the 260th division will divert the forces of Potapov's army at the Vyblinsky bridgehead, the 98th infantry division, going north, will connect with the 17th infantry division to the south of the 17th infantry division of the Army Group Center, cut off from the Desna, surround and destroy the troops of 31 th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army. Troops of the 15th rifle corps of Potapov's army will also fall into the same trap, set by the joint actions of the 260th, 134th, 98th and 17th infantry divisions, as well as the reconnaissance battalion of the 45th infantry division. The proximity of the Vyblinsky bridgehead to bridges and crossings across the Desna in Chernigov (5-7 km) will lead to their premature undermining, as a result of which the 15th Rifle Corps will be forced out by the 134th Infantry Division, which took Chernigov, under attack by the 98th and 17th -th pd. |

On August 24, the day after the capture of the Okuninovsky Bridge by Army Group South, the commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, signed an order that determined the path of the 13th AK, which included the 260th Infantry Division of General Schmidt: at

Army Group Centre!

Operations Department No. 900/41.

Top secret 24.8. 1941

#### ORDER FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS

1. The task set by the supreme command is to destroy the 5th Soviet army before it manages to retreat beyond the line of Sula, Konotop, r. Desna, by striking the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "Center" and "South". With you-

To complete this task, it is necessary to gain a foothold in the area east of the middle reaches of the river. Dnieper and continue the operation in the direction of Kharkov.

2. To accomplish this task, Army Group Center advances through the line of Rechitsa, Starodub in a southerly direction: a) 2nd Army - as part of the 13th? and 43rd3 army corps and

1 Bock's chief of staff was Major-General von Greiffenberg (Sepegantadogu. Steinerv).

2 13th AK General Erich Struabe included: 17th, 134th and 260th infantry divisions.

3 The 43rd AK of Colonel-General Gotland Heinrichi (Sepega|oBeg\$ Sotspaga Netps!) consisted of the 131st and 293rd infantry divisions.

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35th! temporary formation, with only seven infantry divisions and one cavalry division, advances on Chernigov on the right flank ...

... The immediate task of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group is to capture the bridgeheads between Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversky, so that from there, depending on the development of the situation, to advance further to the south or southeast.

3. Army Group "South" forces the 6th Army r. Dnieper and r. Gum. Its northern flank crossed the river. Desnau Ostra2?. The army was ordered to continue the offensive on Nizhyn, and part of the forces to launch an offensive from the south to Chernigov ... 3

von Bock.

On the same day, the Military Council of the Southwestern Front proposed "to Commander M.I. Potapov to again subjugate the 15th Rifle Corps, which had previously been put into the reserve of the front. The corps at that time included: the 62nd and 200th rifle divisions, the 5th anti-tank artillery brigade and the 135th rifle division °, which was concentrated not to the north, but to the southeast of Chernigov in the Borzna area . However, the northern direction, which was considered to be covered by the troops of the 3rd and 21st armies of the Central Front, did not yet cause much concern. The main danger for the Southwestern Front at this point in time was the German bridgehead near Okuninovo.

Meanwhile, the commander of 5A, Major General M.I. Potapov, torn between the need to fulfill the main task assigned to his army by the Southwestern Front

1 Temporary connection 35 is the NöNeges Cottapado Corps Office 2.5.U. 1941, which, if necessary, was deployed to the army corps. In September 1941, the 35th AK included the 12th and 45th infantry divisions.

2 The Germans managed to capture and hold the foothold on the Dnieper near Okuninovo. On the Desna, in the Ostra area, their attempt to seize the crossing on the move was unsuccessful.

The offensive of the 98th Infantry Division from the Okuninovsky bridgehead to Chernigov began on the day the 260th Infantry Division captured the Vyblinsky bridgehead - September 2.

4 Combat order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00305 dated August 24, 1941 to the commander of the 5th Army for the defense of the Oster region. SBD WWII. T. 40.

The 55th brigade and the 135th division, as well as the 293rd rifle division mentioned earlier, will soon be transferred to the 40th Army. After cutting off 40A from the SWF by Guderian's troops, the 135th Rifle Division will be returned to the 5th Army and will take part in the battles at the Vyblisky bridgehead.

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volume - to take up a strong defense along the Dnieper - and the newly arisen task is to destroy the Germans who broke through on the site of General A.A. Vlasov! To Okuninovo and Ostr, began to build defenses to the north of Chernigov. The 9th mechanized corps was added to the number of troops stationed there, which was ordered: "to defend the line of defense with separate strong detachments: Hut. Alexandrovsky, high. 139.1, Lentyaevka, covering the roads to Chernigov from Khalyavin, Roishch ... To mine all the bridges near Chernigov. The same order also reported what was happening on the right flank of 5A, north of Chernigov:

"2. To the right - 21A is conducting stubborn battles on the Gordeevka, Ushcherpie, Dobrush, Sherebnoye fronts.

FOR is fighting at the line of Rechitsa, Gorvald, Selishche, Dombrovitsa, Novoselki and further along the river. Bird.

Border: Lgov, Shostka, (claim.) Mozyr "...

On August 25, when Bock's troops launched a decisive offensive, the Southwestern Front was completing the withdrawal of its right wing (5A and 27th sk) to the eastern bank of the Dnieper. At the same time, the front with the forces of the 5th and 37th armies (including the 27th sk) tried to throw the Germans off the Okuninovsky bridgehead. 30-40 kilometers north of Chernigov, troops of the 15th Rifle Corps of the 5th Army (200th Rifle Division, 62nd Rifle Division, 5th Tank Brigade) occupied a defensive line on the front Makishin, Smychin, Tupichev, Repki, Grabov . The troops of the 9th mechanized corps continued to prepare a defensive line 5-10 km from Chernigov along the line: x. Alexandrovsky, Lentyaevkaz.

On August 25, another dramatic event took place for the Southwestern Front. The High Command decided that the troops of the Central Front, the 3rd and 21st armies, which, retreating from the GA "Center" to the south, actually

' The main task of Vlasov is to defend Kyiv, Potapov is to move beyond the Dnieper. If the 27th Corps, as at the beginning of the war, had been subordinated to Potapov, then the Germans would have had less chance of capturing the Okuninovo bridge.

? Combat order of the commander of the troops of the 5th Army No. 0038 dated 21.00 08.24.1941 for defense along the eastern bank of the river. Dnieper. SBD WWII. T. 40.

) Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0111 by 22 hours on August 25, 1941 on the results of the withdrawal of the troops of the 5th Army and on the fighting near Okuninovo. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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skis covered the right flank of the South-Western Front, are being transferred to the Bryansk Front!. At the same time, the troops of the 3rd and 21st armies were transformed into the 21st army. The commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General V.I., was appointed commander of the 21st Army. Kuznetsov. The administration of the 3rd Army with means of communication and security, as well as the administration of the Central Front, were also transferred to the command of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko.

On August 26, the front was broken through on both flanks of the 21st Army. After Kuznetsov's army entered the Yeremenko front, it actually remained on its own - it was not so easy to establish contact with the Bryansk front located to the right and north. To control the units of the left flank of the Bryansk Front (i.e., the 21st Army), included in its composition after the liquidation of the Central Front, a special task force was created in the area of the Mikhailovsky farm<sup>2</sup>.

In the afternoon of the same day, Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group - the enemy of the Bryansk Front in the previous days of August - "with large forces (one tank and one motorized division) broke through the defense front and occupied Novgorod-Seversky, continuing to develop the offensive in a southerly direction"<sup>3</sup> .

As a result of the fact that a tank wedge was driven into the junction between the 21st and 13th armies, the 21st army never connected with its front. And as a result of the fact that this wedge went south, and the Stavka considered all directions of the German offensive, even towards the Moon, to be "Moscow", the South-Western Front was denied reserves, and he was forced to switch to life according to the principle "the cat abandoned the kittens" ...

In reality, this principle was embodied in the fire-fighting creation of the 40th Army by the South-Western Front itself and at the expense of the forces of the South-Western Front itself. This army was placed on the tracks of the 2nd Panzer Group, and the troops of the 5th Army and the troops of the front reserves, which were already lining up along the

Desna and north of Chernigov against the 2nd Weichs Army: fresh 293rd rifle division, 135th rifle division, 5th artillery anti-tank brigade, fresh 10th tank division and 3rd airborne corps.

1 The Bryansk Front was created on August 14, 1941.

d Operative report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 016 by 6 p.m. on August 26, 1941. On the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 43.

3 Operative report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 017 by the hours of August 27, 1941. On the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 43.

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On the same day, August 26, the 2nd Weichs Army attacked the left flank of the army of V.I. Kuznetsova. At this time, the 21st Army, having retreated from Belarus to the south, took up defense along the northern edge of the Chernigov region at the turn: Skitok - Dobryanka - Khorobichi - Moshchenko - Elino - Guta Studenetskaya. The army was facing north, and about 60 kilometers separated it from Chernigov. Approximately in the middle of this space, the 15th Rifle Corps of Potapov's 5th Army was building its focal defense.

In battle report! headquarters of the 21st army? On August 27, the headquarters of the Bryansk Front was informed that "24th Rifle Division together with Cavalry. group has the task of restoring the situation in the area of Verbovka, Dobryanka" and that "the commander decided: holding the common line of Gutka Studenetskaya, Elino, Moshchenko, Khorobichy, Aleksandrovka, Star. Yarylovichi, active actions cav. groups from 24th Rifle Division to destroy the enemy in the Vladimirovka and Dobryanka regions and strike with 277th and 42nd Rifle Divisions at the main enemy grouping advancing from the direction of Semenovka, Nov Gorod-Seversky. From this phrase about the restoration of the situation, it can be seen that simultaneously with the breakthrough of the Bryansk Front by the 2nd Panzer Group in the Novgorod-Seversky region, the Bryansk Front was also penetrated by the 2nd Field Army in sector 21A in the area of Dobryanka, which is located on the railway . way Gomel - Chernihiv.

Thus, both commanders, Potapov and Kuznenov, found themselves in a tragic situation:

Potapov had just crossed the Dnieper and started to carry out the main task assigned to his army by the command of the South-Western Front - to firmly hold the line of defense along the eastern bank of the Dnieper from Loev to Stary Glybov. At the same time, he was supposed to attack the enemy in the area of the Okuninovskiy bridgehead and build defenses north of Cher

nigov.

Kuznetsov, who had just changed the army and the front, also received a new main task - to counterattack the enemy,

Combat report of the headquarters of the 21st Army No. 031 dated 12.30 08.27.41 to the headquarters Bryansk Front on the situation of the army troops. SBD VOV.T. 43.

2 The commander of the 21A troops is Lieutenant General Vasily Ivanovich Kuznetsov (former tsarist officer), the chief of staff of 21A is Major General Vasily Nikolaevich Gordov.

? The commander of the 24th Rifle Division, Major General Terenty Kirillovich Batsanov, died in the Kiev pocket.

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broke through in the area of Novgorod-Seversky. At the same time, he had to firmly hold the old, "forced Chernigov" line of defense.

The need to wage a hard struggle in two or even three directions left neither the 5th nor the 21st Army any chances...

August 28. Breakthrough by the 260th and 134th infantry divisions of the defense of the 15th rifle corps. The retreat of the 21st Army, after its defense lines in the Dobryanka area had been broken through on August 26, proceeded rapidly. And already on August 28, the 260th Infantry Division came into combat contact with the troops of the 15th Rifle Corps.

"The enemy, pursuing the retreating units of the 21st and FOR the Bryansk Front, approached the front line of the defense of the 15th sk.

15 sk continues to defend the line:

62nd Rifle Division - B. Dyrchin, (suit) Burovka.

The enemy advances in the direction of Burovka with a force up to point 1. Up to two enemy battalions occupied Burovka and sowing. env. Tu pichev and to the battalion on the way. In the Zvenichev area? Parts of the 62nd Rifle Division surrounded the enemy motorcycle company.

The 200th Rifle Division is defending the Svinopukhiz3, Grabov front, having in front of the front up to an infantry regiment advancing in the direction of Pi Lipcha, Repki ...

9 microns defends sowing. Chernigov, has no contact with the enemy.

1 ptabr defends bridges across the river. Dnieper and Desna.

Armored train number 15 in the parking lot at the station. Drozdovka"4, states the Operational Report of the South-Western Front5.

"Fighting on the northern sector of the front of the 5th Army began on the night of August 28, when a detachment of the 260th Infantry Division, with forces of up to two companies with three tanks, departed at 2330 hours



the divisions of the 21st Army broke into the front line of defense of the 62nd Infantry Division on its left flank and captured

In the Burovka area there was a junction between the 62nd and 200th Soviet rifle divisions, the 134th and 260th German infantry divisions.

? The village of Zvenichev is located 9 km south of Burovka.

3 Today - the village of Vishnevoe, located less than 30 km north of Chernigov.

4 The Drozdovka station is located beyond the Desna River, 50 km south of Burovka and 20 km from the future Vyblin bridgehead.

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00117 by 10 p.m. on August 28, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front.

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he attacked Burovka, trying to develop success on Tupichev and Vykhvostov, but was stopped by a counterattack from parts of the division, "writes in his study! Deputy Chief of the Operations Department of the 5th Army Alexei Viktorovich Vladimirsky.

However, in the history of the 134th Infantry Division, which attacked Chernigov on the right (west) of the 260th Division, it is reported that Burovka was captured on the evening of August 29 by the 445th Regiment of the 134th Division?. According to the history of the same division, one can also clarify the question of German tanks. These were "Shurmgeschützes" from the 192nd assault gun battalion - self-propelled artillery mounts 5 # © ŷ Sh. With the capture of Burovka, that is, with the breakthrough of the defense of 15 sk, the path to Chernigov, to which there were about 30 km, became open. On the nearest approaches to the city, the 9th mechanized corps, consisting of the 20th and 35th tank divisions, took up the defense. At the beginning of the war, this corps was commanded by K.K. Rokossovsky. Then Rokossovsky was taken by the Headquarters, and all the tanks were knocked out in the corps. At Chernigov, the 9th mechanized corps was equal in number to one rifle regiment, and a few days later it was completely reorganized into a battalion ...

The 15th Rifle Corps was also beheaded. Back in mid-August, the Headquarters recalled the experienced chief of staff of the corps, Major General Rogozny, to its disposal. And at the moment of the beginning of the fighting with the 260th and 134th divisions of the enemy - and the corps commander, an experienced military commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky.

"But on August 19, in connection with the situation in the south of Ukraine, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command set the task for the troops of the Southwestern Front to withdraw to the line of the Dnieper River," recalled I.I. Fedyuninsky? - Frame

was on the march when the liaison officer delivered a package directly from the front headquarters. The order contained in the package subordinated several more units to me and made me responsible for the defense of Chernigov.

The defense had to be organized in the shortest possible time.

Enemy aircraft made frequent raids on Chernigov,

: Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction: According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. S. 243.

2? So I. Sezsisme money 134. shashchene-Rgu5yup. CategoryGadepkge1\$ er epet. 134. Fr. Boom op. 1973.

3 Fedyuninsky I.I. Raised on alert. M.: Military Publishing House, 1961. S. 37.

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dropping hundreds of firebombs and many leaflets. The Nazis sought to cause panic and confusion in the city.

When I arrived in Chernigov to clarify the situation, the city was on fire. The car moved along broken streets, between burning houses. None of the representatives of the local authorities could be found: they were engaged in the creation of partisan detachments.

The enemy was not long in coming. Less than a day later, after the march, we took up defensive positions, and the advanced units of the Nazis had already approached our defensive lines.

Stubborn battles began. During the day, the enemy launched several strong attacks, but was not successful. At night, rifle-machine-gun and artillery fire did not stop in the entire defense zone of the corps. Intelligence reported that the Nazis were concentrating to deliver new blows.

The night was exceptionally dark, in such cases they say: "at least gouge out your eye." In addition, the headquarters of the corps was located in a dense forest, where even during the day there was twilight. At night, it was generally difficult to pass from one staff car to another. It is also good that the commandant of the headquarters prudently ordered to put luminous rotten things along the paths.

And on that very night, when the battle did not stop for a minute, when we all knew that the enemy would inevitably intensify the onslaught, I unexpectedly received a telegram signed by the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army, Major General Pisarevsky. I was asked to immediately go to the headquarters of the front with my personal belongings. The reason for the call was not specified. The telegram worried me. It was felt that I would have to part with the corps, with my comrades in arms.

Instead of Fedyuninsky, Colonel Blank was appointed commander of the 15th Corps, a man who had established himself as a commander who knew how to act in extreme situations. Mikhail Ilyich Blank met the war on the border, in

In the bombed and burning Chernihiv, these days the surrounding collective farmers looted, the communists organized partisan detachments, and the "secular" authorities shamefully fled: the chairman of the city executive committee, I.Ya. Bron was caught and shot for cowardice only near Kharkov (Kuznetsov G.A. Chronicle of the city of Chernigov during the Second World War 1941-1945 according to documents, eyewitness accounts, journalism and memoirs. Chernigov: Desna, 1992. P. 16).

2 I.I. Fedyuninsky was summoned to Moscow, appointed commander of the 32nd Army and sent to Vyazma.

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as chief of staff of the 87th Infantry Division. The division commander, Major General Filipp Fedorovich Alyabushev, died on June 25, 1941. And the division that was surrounded was led by Blank to his own.

Blank's group also managed to disrupt the German attempt to capture Kyiv on the move, when their tanks broke through the front and rushed the fox to Zhitomir. The Southwestern Front panicked, because there were no troops left to scare the tanks to Zhitomir and further to Kyiv. And suddenly: "The first ray of hope came on the evening of July 9 for a report from General Potapov. He reported on the success of a small group of troops under the command of Colonel M.I. Blanca. Collected from various parts, she defended herself in the Novograd-Volynsky fortified region. On that day, these troops fiercely counterattacked units of the German 298th Infantry Division, inflicted serious losses on it and captured the Novograd-Volynsky-Zhitomir highway, thus cutting the main artery that fed the enemy tank columns that had broken through to Zhitomir!, - Baghramyany recalled.

According to Vladimirsky, Fedyuninsky left for Headquarters on August 15?. However, as we already know from the words of Fedyuninsky himself, he left the corps literally at the moment of the first combat contact with the enemy north of Chernigov. That is, Blank took command of the 15th Rifle Corps not earlier than the night of August 28-29.

What did Blank get near Chernigov, with what and with whom did the 260th army officer, Lieutenant General Hans Schmidt, encounter in the Chernigov region?

As of August 30, 1941, the 15th Rifle Corps included the 200th and 62nd Rifle Divisions, in which

there were 15,312 people and 92 guns and mortars of 76 mm caliber.

The 200th Rifle Division was commanded by Ivan Ilyich Lyud

a [6. Bagramyan I.L. Thus the war began. K.: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1988.

L Vladimirsky A.V. In the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 237.

3 Ibid. S. 238. 131

nikov (1902-1976), and after his injury - Major A.P. Kolpachev.

From October 9, 1940, the young and energetic Colonel Mikhail Pavlovich Timoshenko commanded the 62nd Infantry Division - the main enemy of the 260th Infantry Division from breaking through the front of the 15th SC to capturing the Vyblinsky bridgehead east of Chernigov - from October 9, 1940. His predecessor, S.I. Ventsov-Kranz, was arrested and shot in 1937. The 62nd Infantry Division took part in the Finnish war and the campaign in Bessarabia. By the beginning of the war, she, like the entire 5th Army, was stationed near the border itself and its composition included:

- 104th Infantry Regiment;
- 123rd Rifle Regiment (08/28/1941 was in the corps reserve in Kulikovka);
- 306th Red Banner Rifle Regiment;
- 89th Light Artillery Regiment;
- 150th howitzer artillery regiment;
- 126th separate artillery anti-tank division;
- 392nd separate anti-aircraft artillery division;
- 95th separate artillery battalion;
- 108th separate engineer battalion;
- 93rd separate communications battalion;
- 33rd medical battalion;
- 56th motor transport battalion.

By the time of the collision with the 260th and 134th infantry divisions of the Wehrmacht near Burovka, the state of the 62nd and 200th infantry divisions

divisions were evaluated as follows:

"The commanders of the 62nd Rifle Division, Colonel Timoshenko, and the 200th Rifle Division, Colonel Lyudnikov, were well-trained, energetic and experienced commanders who showed their high commanding qualities in previous battles. But the combat capabilities of the 62nd and especially the 200th divisions were reduced due to large losses in personnel and materiel. Although in August these divisions were reinforced by marching battalions, the personnel of this reinforcement were poorly trained and not fired upon. In addition, the continuous withdrawal from the north of scattered units of the 3rd Army and the cavalry group of General Gorodovikov through the battle formations of the 15th Corps

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significant influence on the morale and psychological state of the personnel!"

Assessing the enemy, Vladimirsky referred to the Trophy Fund of the archive in Podolsk:

"The most combat-ready was the 260th Infantry Division, which the commander of the 43rd Army Corps gave the following assessment: "... a very good, energetic division with excellent command, flawlessly fulfilling all the tasks assigned to it"<sup>2</sup>.

28-29 August. After the breakthrough at Burovka and Tupichev. Having broken through the defenses of the 15th sk at the junction of the 200th and 62nd rifle divisions, the Germans continued their offensive along divergent directions. The 134th Infantry Division, with a deviation to the west, along the Gomel-Chernigov highway, attacked the 200th Rifle Division.

And the 260th, with a deviation to the east, in the direction of the villages of Vy tails and Kulikovka, - the 62nd rifle division. On the right flank of the 62nd division, which was located in Bolshoy Dyrchin, near the Snov River, the 131st Infantry Division struck. Here, the troops of the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front, which were in front of the positions of the 15th Rifle Corps, left for Snov, having received orders to launch counterattacks to the northeast, in the direction of Semyonovka and Novgorod-Seversky.

After the war, front-line soldier Nikolai Pavlovich Taratyn returned to his homeland, in the village of Vykhostov, which is located 6 km south of Burovka and Tupichev, where the 260th Infantry Division broke through the defenses of the 62nd Infantry Division. He described what he saw and heard from his fellow villagers in the documentary story "Share in Malanchiny Khat"<sup>3</sup>:

"Already before dawn, as the first day of 1946 came, I finally stomped to Tupichev"<sup>4</sup>. Tupichev. Native Tupichev. Before

} Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 238.

? There. S. 239.

3 The manuscript of this unpublished book is in Chernigov, with the daughter of N.P. Taratyn.

r Tupichev - a village 7 km east of Burovka.

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he greeted me with devastation and silence, as if he had grown old ...

The buildings of the hospital were dilapidated, and next to them lay a cemetery, on which stood up to 30 stubby birch stumps - crosses. Some of them were still wearing helmets, and some were not. This means that the fascist zaid found their grave here too! Dobre! Oh good! The heart was filled with angry hatred, because their death is just, who asked them to our land? ... I thought, who mowed so many of them? .. And here is the road to Ivashkovka, with a fork in Kulikovka, I need to turn onto the first one ... And when I looked to my right, right behind the hut in which, it seems, teacher Shkilindey lived, he saw the German cemetery again ... Second. Same as near the hospital. And the same undersized birch crosses with helmets sitting on them, only tilted, as if dilapidated. The difference was that there were more crosses here than near the hospital. Maybe 50, maybe more. Here, it turns out, how the Germans were met in our forty-first year ...

But who and where are these heroes who put so many fascists here? It turned out that I did not need to look for an answer to this for a long time ... My mother was the first to tell me about this. She, before the Germans entered Vykhvostov, confused during the shooting, rushed along the street, back and forth, not knowing where to put herself, and fell under a cart on which our soldier was driving horses ... She fell and lost consciousness .. The next day, my brother Misha, who died in 1943, on the Dnieper, took a horse from the brigade, there was still a brigade, and took my mother to the hospital in Tupichev. And when they were driving in a cart, then, having driven up to Tupichev, they saw our soldier near one of the four hundred-year-old hollow willows. Dead. Punched with bayonets. Who is this? Although the mother felt very bad, she ordered her brother to stop and look - who is it? She also punished me - and look for documents. Brother got down from the cart, and did so. The soldier did not have any documents, but a torn Komsomol card was lying nearby, in which he read both the last name and the first name of that soldier. And the mother at first remembered it well, but then she forgot. All that remained in my memory was that his name was Nikolai. We are cola, our way. That's all. Nothing else.

Then the Tupichevites said that this soldier, short, 162-165 cm, black-haired and thin, as they escaped

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Germans from Tupichevo to Kulikovka On August 29, 1941, on a sunny summer day, he climbed with the "Degtyarev" on this willow, attached a machine gun and began to mow down the Nazis and put them on the whole cemetery. Then they were counted - there were as many as 55 people. But there were still some wounded who were treated by the German field hospital, which was located in the hospital in the center of the village. Some of them have already found their place in this cemetery.

Other Germans who were buried near the hospital were mowed down by our soldiers, whose remains were accidentally unearthed in linden alleys in 1966. 26 people led by Litruk Grigory Markovich Shevchuk. Well done!

... I visited here, near the body of the hero, and one cotton from Kuli forging. Mikhail Anishchenko. In 1968, he sent me a letter in which he told how he ran to that willow, where that soldier was lying in blood, stabbed with bayonets, and next to him were two German soldiers who said in broken Russian: "This is a bad soldier . He killed an officer and many sol dats." They supposedly passed Paris, Warsaw and your Russia. "No one killed them, but this one killed them. You can't bury. This is a bad soldier."

... In Vykhvostovo itself, both on the first and second fronts, there were no special battles. On the first front, on August 41, on the 28th, there was no battle because, as one villager told me, there was no one to fight that battle. Up to two dozen fighters retreated through the village, perhaps the remnants of a company or platoon of the 306th rifle regiment of the 62nd division, commanded by Colonel Timoshenko, which was part of the 5th Army. The remnants of this division retreated through Vykhvostov and through Tupichev. Perhaps a battalion passed through Tupichev, because the main battles took place there, both near the distillery, and in the center of the village, and on the outskirts, how to go to Kulikovka. And in Vykhvostovo there was no one to shoot back. These 20 fighters retreated. The Germans, on the contrary, had significant forces ... They spared neither shells nor mines, and their machine guns crackled all over the village. And they hit ours. 5 were killed on the spot, and one was wounded. It's hard in the stomach. His name remained known to the vykhvostchan. Because he stayed here and was treated with us, but he died with a cold. His name was Ivan Dmitrievich Paramonov. The rest of the dead remained unknown. Of our Vykhvostovites, 4 people died. This is Olena Misnyk, who, although she was then over 30 years old, she was very beautiful, stately. Kill

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for two sisters Ilchenko, daughters of Pyotr Ilchenko, Maria and Pa Rasochka, one of whom was born in the 23rd year, the other -

34th. Evdokia Potapenko, 24th year of birth, was also killed.

Then the Germans came. Tall, well-fed, in short green jackets with rolled up sleeves, like butchers. And they were shod in low, strong boots with wide freebies, they were a copy of those that had been here in the 18th year. They were even girded with the same belts with large buckles, on which the same words were written: "Got mit uns", which means "God is with us!" ...

... Somewhere in the afternoon, the shooting moved away in the direction of Kuli forging, and part of the Germans followed that shooting. But most of them, those who arrived in cars and motorcycles, camped near the school. On the run. Soon the camp kitchens began to smoke, the Anemians began to gather there chickens and geese, which they seized from the nearby yards.

To his misfortune, in order to look at such a spectacle that the Germans are doing it, the old-fashioned uncle Pavlo Nagorny came out of his yard ... He opened his mouth and began to look. They saw him and shouted: "Com, com!" Come on, please, come here! When he arrived, they harnessed him to a cart, put a collar on his head, and forced him to carry water from the well, urging him on with whips. And all with laughter, neighing, giggling: "Los, los, Ivan ! .."

... The revelry continued on and on. The turn came to the pigs and pigs. They also looted the collective farm apiary, which contained 450 pieces of evidence. The beekeeper was Ivan Grigoryevich Zheldak, a man respected throughout the world, a partisan of the Civil War and a man of great honesty. After the Germans robbed the apiary, they completed their work after them. But grandfather Ivan Grigorievich did not take a frame from that apiary (the year turned out to be rich in honey) and forbade his adult daughters from doing this. The Germans also robbed the collective-farm comor... Having met an old-fashioned uncle M. Cherepan with a bundle of grass on his shoulders, they lassoed him and unceremoniously drove the poor fellow in front of them. "Du Bist Soldat!" they told him. So they took him prisoner. They chased him, and even pushed him in the back with a machine gun ... Aunt Domka rushed after her Mykyta. Ikhsyn Vitaly, just this year he graduated from the Kiev Infantry School, and as he sent one letter, he was no longer heard of ...

... The robbery of the Germans lasted two days. On the third day they left the village.

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Soldiers of the 260th Infantry Division are hosting in the captured village.

... On the first day of the arrival of the Germans in the village, we found those who met them with bread and salt. This is grandfather Mikhailo, who had reasons for this. And Baba Masha came out with him to meet the Germans... But it must be said that the Germans paid attention to bread and salt, showed no interest in this. So grandfather Mikhailo and grandmother Masha somehow imperceptibly retreated, and then all their lives they regretted their weakness, embarrassed by their



deed. True, no one reproached them for this "...

One of the factors that led to the breakthrough of the 260th Infantry Division in the Burovka-Tupichev sector was the mixing of the troops of the Southwestern and Bryansk fronts in this sector.

In the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00119 by 10 p.m. on August 29, 1941, on the combat operations of the troops of the front northeast of Kiev, the disposition of the troops of the 62nd Infantry Division reports the following:

"...15 SC.

On the morning of August 29, the enemy with a force of up to two points with tanks and up to a squadron of cavalry! broke through the battle formations of units 21A (Bryansk Front) and went on the offensive in the directions

The 1st Cavalry Division participated in the breakthrough.

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Vykhvostovo and Svinopukhi!. By 10:00 the enemy had captured Smychin, Vykhvostovo, and Svinopukhi. Parts of the corps delay the further advance of the pr-ka, they are fighting at the front:

62nd Rifle Division - B. Dyrchin, Kulikovka, Rudki Settlement;

200 sd - Maslakovka, Glinyanka, Grabovo.

The enemy, having captured Pig-Puhi, organized a circular defense.

Shtakor 15 - Chertoreyka ... "2.

On the same day, the commander of the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front ordered:

"...66 sk (55, 266, 75, 232 sd, 20 motorized regiment, 65 ur, 46 and 50 bepo) to occupy and firmly defend the line of St. Borovichi, Kamka, Petrovka, Dubrovnoe, (claim) Burovka.

...Border on the left: Sednev, Tupichev, Vaganichi.

... Commander of the 21st Army, Lieutenant  
General Kuznetsov

Member of the Military Council Divisional Commissar Kolonin Chief of  
Staff of the 21st Army Major General Gordov Z.

Thus, the line of defense of the 62nd division: Bolshoy Dyrchin - Tupichev - Burovka was simultaneously included in the zone of the 66th rifle corps of the 21st army. However, the matter was not limited to mixing bands of responsibility. Another 27 Av-

thick, immediately after breaking through their defense lines in the Dobryanka area, the commander of the 21st Army V.I. Kuznetsov asked the command of the Bryansk Front "to speed up the advancement and reassignment of the 200th Rifle Division to Commander-21"4.

Apparently, after the German breakthrough and at Burovka, which is located 34 km south of Dobryanka, units of the 15th sk of the 21st army were subjugated by pistol.

"The 62nd Rifle Division, subordinated to the Commander-21 at its disposal, advanced to the line of Gorodnya, Nevklya," was reported in the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 023 of 08/30/1941. Again and Burovka. How and where could

1 Svinopukhi, now - Cherry.

2 Combat report of the headquarters of the 21st Army No. 031 dated August 27, 1941 to the headquarters of the Bryansk Front on the situation of the army troops. SBD VOV.T. 40.

Combat order of the commander of the troops of the 21st Army No. 014 dated August 29, 1941 to continue the offensive in the direction of Semenovka. SBD VOV.T. 43.

4 SBDVOV.T. 43.5  
Ibid.

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Timoshenko's division, which retreated even further south, to move towards Gorodnya is completely incomprehensible.

Meanwhile, in the area torn apart by the Germans and their own (between Kirponos and Eremenko) contradictions of the 15th Rifle Corps, the 260th Infantry Division rushed towards Desna ...

August 30 - September 1.  
Breakthrough to the Desna.  
Formation of the Vyblinsk bridgehead. "On the night of August 29/30," Tim Gebhardt informs us!, "the 470th regiment, marching at the head of the 260th division, received the command of the pro-Soldiers of the 260th Infantry Division. fight to the Desnyansky per-

rights on both sides of Kiselevka? and create a bridgehead at Vyblyah3.

In the early morning of August 30, being the vanguard of the division, the regiment went on the offensive under heavy Russian artillery fire at the heights of Chernysh. An unexpectedly quick strike right up to the Desna was a success for the 2nd battalion in front. On the opposite bank, only a few firing positions were occupied by the Russians. Since the promised inflatable boats had not yet been delivered to the place, the lieutenant jumped into the water to take advantage of the barge standing on the opposite shore. On this barge the very first company, the commander of the battalion and the commander of the division, crossed over to form the first small bridgehead. It was unusually quiet around ... Russian observation posts were, perhaps, occupied

1 Wadep- \ / zgietjegasve PUu15upep Fri 2. \ / eKpee. Khizattepweme! wop VidoR\Ulsn. Kaizgae: UePav S. Vgapp, 1957. \$5. 59.

? Having captured Kiselevka, it was possible not only to get access to the Desna, but also to saddle the only road on the right bank of the Desna, along which FOR the South-Western Front could contact 21A of the Bryansk Front.

3 The village of Vybli (in the documents of the war period - Vibli) is located opposite Kiselevka, on the opposite bank of the Desna.

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redeployment. Nevertheless, half an hour later, after [U\./ABK. 2601, enemy artillery fire resumed and its commander was immediately killed by a direct hit.

With the help of the inflatable boats of the sapper platoon, the entire regiment began to cross. The 1st battalion forded the Desna, knee-deep, without experiencing significant difficulties ?.

When the adjutant of the regiment reported by telephone to Kiselevka about the successful transition, the division was joyfully surprised by this first success of the regiment, which the corps did not even count on.

As can be seen from this passage, and its author, as we know, served in the 2nd battalion of the 470th vanguard regiment and had the rank of Hauptmann, already on August 30, the 260th Infantry Division captured Kiselevka and crossed the Desna.

On the site GehZhop deg Webgtas:3, in a brief history of the 470th regiment, the following is reported:

"On August 19, the fight against the encircled was over, and the regiment again marched south in the direction of Gomel. On August 23, an offensive was launched in the direction of Chernigov, with the aim of encircling the enemy armies near Kyiv. By August 30, division units reached the Desna. On September 1, the regiment launched an attack from the heights near Chernysh \* in the direction of Kiselevka. When the 5th

the company reached the banks of the Desna, the unit managed to cross the river in boats and form a bridgehead. The regiment extended this bridgehead to the villages of Peskiz, Vybli and Uborki. The next day, all this had to be defended against heavy counterattacks.

In all likelihood, the version of GekhZhop 4er \ eygtasv: that the Germans crossed the Desna on September 1, is more accurate, since the date of crossing on August 30 is not according to our combat

1 4th division of the 260th artillery regiment.

2 The desna in this place is very winding, has many sandy spits stretching to the opposite shore, and two or three islands. You can wade to one of the islands, but the crossing of the main channel of the Desna is very doubtful.

3 nir://milm Lehkop-deg-menttasni.4e

4 To the east of these heights is the Snov River, 10 km south of these heights, Snov flows into the Desnuu of the village of Brusilov. Chernigov is located 12 km west of Brusilov. And between Chernigov and Brusilov is the village of Kiselevka.

5 In the German original - Woz 1, but it can only be Sands.

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documents, nor according to the testimonies of local residents, is in any way visible or confirmed. Eyewitnesses tell the following about the first appearance of the 260th Infantry Division near the village of Vybli.

Andrei Petrovich Kuchinsky:

"In the morning, it must have been September 1, I went out into the street. I look - a soldier is running from the direction of the village, runs up to me and says: "The Germans are in the village!" He threw his overcoat into the yard and ran ... "

Anna Tikhonovna Revko: |

"September 1 is Sunday. A beautiful sunny day. There were our Soviet soldiers in the village... There is an army kitchen in my grandmother's yard. The cook cooks food. I went into the house, at this time a soldier comes in after me, carries a pood in a bag, it seems, pearls. And the grandmother looks out the window - another soldier grabs water, the well was in the yard, and floods the kitchen. The food had just begun to cook, not yet cooked, but for some reason he poured it. And the soldier who came to our house says: "We are leaving, the Germans are already very close." It was on the 1st, after dinner, maybe at four o'clock, by five o'clock... The kitchen had left. Cars are coming, trucks, with soldiers. They go, they go, they go. Go. And then - silence. There were a lot of troops on board, they left. Early in the morning, on the 2nd, the cows were sent

drove to the pasture, I went out into the street ... At this time, from behind the corner of the street, from the meadow, our tankette rides. Ahead, two trucks with soldiers drove past... And then, this tankette rides and shoots from a machine gun... Probably, the Germans took the Yenkov farm and went to Podgornoe. Those of us who left the day before left from Podgorny. And those with a wedge heel were already different, from the side of Kiselevka. Enkov is closer to Chernigov (4 km. - Auth.), And Kiselevka is further.

Mikhail Egorovich Pechenka:

"We came to Vybli, to Podil, before my mother's brother. Silence, peace, everything is in such a lowered state, in a spiritual shock. There are few men, there are children, old people, women. Two wagons with Red Army soldiers, bagged with flour, carried the flour around the yards and asked the housewives, it was September 1, to bake two loaves of bread in the peasant ovens... They returned in the evening, took the bread and said that in the morning they would call again. And we

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we ask, where is the front now? [Where are our troops? They answer that somewhere near Tupichev, near Brusilov. But Tupichev is farther away, and Brusilov is nearby. On the morning of September 2, grandfather Vasil and I drove out the cow. The cow has reached the fort, but does not go further. Grandfather urges, there is no cattle! He says to me: "Grandchild, go and see what is there?" I go out of the fort, to the right, to the left - under the eaves of the barn there is reconnaissance, 10 people, led by a sergeant major. Intelligence service. Branch. They stand under the shed, under the roof. Germans! I come back: "Grandfather, there are Germans under the shed!" He says: "Bach, brute, duck a stranger in spirit, I feel ..."

"At dawn on September 1, at 4.30, the battalions assigned to the first echelon of the attack on Vybli soon captured the territory – we continue to read Tim Gebhardt!. - The fortified Russian field positions were taken with a loud cry of "Hurrah!" and Vybli are busy. The territory was unfavorable for an attack. It was a flat, swampy and silty area, overgrown with low-growing shrubs. Since the destroyed bridge of Kiselevka had not yet been restored, there was no food supply and ammunition. Immediately after noon on September 1, the regiment came under heavy artillery fire, which caused significant losses in manpower and materials for us and the gunners. At about 4 p.m., our observation post detected the movement of the enemy about 2 km from our edge in front of him. With the onset of dusk, the enemy attacked. Although we fired continuously from machine guns, the Russians crept close to our positions through the fields. Around midnight, the enemy again attacked the outskirts of Vybley, having a numerical superiority and many tanks (T-342). Despite our fierce resistance, the Russians managed to penetrate into Vybli, where it came to a night street battle. Since we were running out of ammunition, we desperately defended ourselves in hand-to-hand combat with bayonets and rifle butts from the bursting Russians. Despite the confusion of the night, most of the village remained

was in our hands."

1 Vadeb-Uietjegasve Pum1yuoep ip 2.U\lekpev. Gizattepveye! wop KidoWeisn. Kapzgoye:  
Wenav S. Vgailp, 1957. \$. 60.

2 To destroy the German troops on the Vyblinsky bridgehead, the Southwestern Front allocated a battalion of the 10th Panzer Division, however, as Vladimírsky writes, the battalion did not reach the bridgehead. Local residents remember only "wedges".

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Unfortunately, according to the documents of the South-Western Front, we were never able to confirm the fact that the 260th Infantry Division crossed the Desna on September 1 and establish who was its first enemy on the Vyblinsky bridgehead. In the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0125 by 22 o'clock | September 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front it is reported that:

"In front of the front of the 5th Army, the enemy in the previous grouping continues to develop an offensive against Chernigov. At 16.00, units of 15 SKS 204 VDB went on the offensive. There are no data on results...

... Parts of the army occupied the position:

62 sd - Lopatino, (claim) Khalyavin;

45 sd! - Khalyavin, Khmel'nitsa;

200 sd - Dovzhik, Kuvechichi;

(...)

9 MK occupies the line of defense at the turn of Yatsevo, Selyanskaya Sl.

1 vdb - armreserve in the area of St. Belous.

204 vdb operates in conjunction with units of 15 sc.

Shtarm 5 - forest south of Andreevka"2.

All the settlements mentioned above are located on the right bank of the Desna. From the Combat Order of the Commander of the Troop Mi of the 5th Army No. 0040 dated 21.00 | September 1941 to destroy the enemy in the Chernigov region on September 2, one can only see that there was a gap between the 5th and 21st armies in the area from Kiselevka to Brusilov. And that the 5th Army set itself the task of closing this gap, first in Brusilov's area, and then in the Chernysh area. However, the main blow was planned to be carried out not on the right flank of the 5th Army in the direction of Kiselevka - Brusilov, but on the central, northern sector - in the direction of Pevtsy - Petrushin:

"1. The enemy, acting in the general direction of Kiselevka,

seeks to take possession of the Chernigov region bypassing it from the current and southeast.

2. On the right, 75th Rifle Division 21A, firmly holding the front of Leninovka, Begach, Brusilovo, part of the forces goes on the offensive in the general direction of Klochkov, Cape Sednev.

3. 5A, firmly holding the line Dolzhik, Cape Lyubech and further south east. bank of the river Dnieper, since morning 2.9 with its right wing

The 1st 45th Rifle Division was urgently withdrawn from the Dnieper and placed end to end between the 200th and 62nd divisions north of Chernigov.

2? SBD WWII. T. 40. 143

goes on a decisive offensive and destroys the Chernigov group of the enemy.

4. 15 sc in interaction with parts | Vdkv 7.00 2.9 after an hour of artillery preparation, go on a decisive offensive with all your might and, delivering the main blow with your left flank in the general direction of Ryabtsy, Petrushin, capture the border of Bru forces, Stasy, Petrushin, Roishchensky Skitok, Khmel'nitsa.

Take control of the borders of Brusilovo, Terekhovka, Chertoreyka with your 62nd Rifle Division;

45 sd take possession of the border (suit.) Chertoreyka, Petrushin, Roishchensky Skitok, Khmel'nitsa.

5. | VDK with the forces of 1 vdb 212 gapi 1/460 cap in cooperation with viis 15 sk strike in the general direction of Pevtsy, Lopatin and by the end of the day take possession of the high line. 116.6, Stasy.

In the future, advance in the general direction of Chernysh, where to get in touch with units of the 75th Rifle Division (Bryansk Front. - Auth.).

(...)

Commander of the 5th Army Potapov "...

Strange as it may seem, but the combat documents of the Bryansk Front are more accurate in assessing the situation on September 1 in the sector of the South-Western Front:

"1. During 31.8 and 1.9 the enemy carried out fierce attacks on the entire front of the army.

At 15.00 1.9 the enemy, supported by strong artillery with tanks, crossed the river. Dreams in the areas of Elino, Bezuglovka, Nov. Borovichi, Smyach, Mal. Dyrchin, Begach.

All efforts of the units to eliminate the crossed pro-

the enemy did not give positive results, in the mentioned points the enemy in the night | at 2.9 remains to the east. bank of the river Dreams.

(...)

4. Part 5A in response to repeated requests to hold the line and ensure the junction of the army also did not give positive results. 62 sd by the end of 1.9 moved beyond the river. Gum. By the end of 1.9, both flanks of the army remain open, 28th and 66th rifle divisions are pinned down by enemy attacks and are deprived of maneuver.

(...)

I ask you to demand vigorous action 13A on Semenovka, the elimination of 40A of the enemy in the Korop area and access to the river. Desna, stopping the withdrawal of 5A and pushing it to the north to connect the flanks.

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The absence of these measures and the further retreat of 5A may force 21A to withdraw beyond the river. Gum. I'm waiting for instructions. The commander of the troops of the 21st Army, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov ... "!

Based on this combat report, it can be assumed that the first enemy of the 260th Infantry Division at Vybley were units of Timoshenko's 62nd Division, who retreated behind the Desna and blew up the crossing near Kiselevka.

Andrey Petrovich Kuchinsky told us the following about the first day of fighting on the Vyblin bridgehead:

"In 1941, I moved to the 10th grade ... I lived in Chernigov, on Tolstoy Street, next to Boldina Gora, then it was called Trinity Hill ... It was already the month of August. All the time one could hear, especially at night and in the morning, somewhere beyond the Dnieper, an artillery cannonade. But nobody knew. We didn't know anything - where is the war going on? On August 22, I was walking near my school and heard the roar of planes. Turned around: the flame was higher than the school! Nine planes flew, and, probably, they poured "light the jackdaws." And I ran. When he ran home, they hit the center of the city with high-explosive bombs, at the post office, the NKVD and down the Strizhn, where there was a crossing on the Desna. That's where they hit with high-explosive bombs.

... The city is on fire. The city is on fire... Troops ran across the bridge, some of the soldiers I saw bundles of grenades, three, four grenades tied. The soldiers were with rifles with attached bayonets, mostly they fled without helmets, there were overcoats in rolls. They fled here, towards Chernigov... I crossed the bridge and turned towards Anisov, towards Vybli. I ran to Vybli, just on the outskirts of the village there was a hospital. I look - wounded, bandaged. I noticed the senior lieutenant, went up to him and said



what I heard on the radio: "Our troops left Gomel." He: "What Gomel?!" He scolded me severely. "Get out of here!" I went to my relatives. Came to uncle. He asks: "What's wrong with the city?" I say: "There is no city, the whole thing is on fire, it's on fire, everyone has already been bombed!"

1 Combat report of the commander of the 21st Army No. 035 dated | September 1941 to the commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front on the situation of the army troops and the necessary measures to ensure their successful offensive. SBD WWII. T. 43.

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I stayed in Vybyly, probably for a week. All the time I wanted to leave, but my relatives would not let me in: "Sit here, you won't go anywhere." In the morning, it probably already happened | September, I went outside. I look - a soldier is running from the side of the village, runs up to me and says: "The Germans are in the village!" He threw his overcoat into the yard and ran. I closed the window ... Then, I think, I'll look out into the street, where are those Germans? Just opened the window: they're coming! On the right and on the left side. In camouflage suits, in helmets, each one had machine guns and machine guns, ribbons. And they came up here, to the hospital, and immediately scattered. A cannon, a machine gun appeared, and they started firing from a machine gun in the direction of Muraveyka (south of Vybley. - Auth.). I'm up to my uncle. He dug a trench in his garden. He hid in a trench - his wife, children and he were sitting there. Then, when it calmed down, I think: I'll go and see - what are the Germans? I come, and there are five of them in the hut, probably sitting at the table, cleaning the machines. I sat down on a bench and listened; He threw these fragments out the window and began to say something to his people.

Then the shelling began from the side of Muraveyka, there, apparently, our batteries were stationed. And they began to hit the village. I ran back into the trench. And then he came back to the house. They calmly talk to themselves about something, clean their weapons. And I noticed that an orderly was sitting near the house, probably because he had a sanitary bag with a cross on it. Some German came from the front line, wounded, he sealed him up, bandaged him. Then he gave me a bucket and told me to bring water. I just started walking, our fighter appeared from somewhere, scribbling from a machine gun, I fell, and the Germans stood on the wattle fence with machine guns and started shooting at him. The fighter quickly flew towards the center of the village. I brought water and on the second night went to another hut across the street, lined the canopy with pillows and mattresses to protect myself from the shells, and fell into a terrible sleep. I haven't slept for several nights...

2 September. "We defended courageously, but we weren't from bad parents."

The Vyblin bridgehead on the Desna... What does it look like geographically? From the northern edge of the Chernigov region, the Desna, through Novgorod-Seversky, flows to the south-west, and in the place where the Seim flows into it at the Great Mouth, it turns west, towards Chernigov. From Chernigov the river turns again

to the southwest and near Zhiev itself, it flows into the Dnieper. Vyblin

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The bridgehead is located on the southern, left bank of the Desna, between Chernigov and the Snov, which flows into the Desna from the north. The northern line of the bridgehead was the Desna, the southern line was a 15-kilometer arc passing through the villages located on the left bank of the Desna: Podgornoye, Peski, Vybli, Uborki. The nearest village to Chernigov is Podgorny, to Chernigov itself - 5 km. In Chernigov, which is located on the right bank of the Desna, there were three pontoon crossings and two bridges - road and rail. On these bridges and crossings to the Vyblinsky bridgehead, our units removed from the northern front, from where the 134th and 17th German infantry divisions were advancing on Chernigov, could be transferred.

South of the Vyblinsk bridgehead, 3-10 km away, are the villages of Kolichevka, Anisov, Baklanova Muraveyka, Vershinova Muraveyka, and Kulikovka. From Kolichevka and Anisov to the east, through Muraveyki, a railway passes, which from Kuli forging turns south to Nizhyn, and from Nizhyn to Kiev, and east to the mainland. From Kolichevka, the Chernihiv-Kyiv road goes. Thus, the expansion or opening of the Vyblin bridgehead meant:

— suppression of very important communications;

- the capture of crossings and bridges across the Desna in Chernigov, which automatically led to the encirclement of the right-bank units of the 5th Army and the impossibility of saving heavy equipment.

"On the morning of September 2, just as it was getting light, the Russians, after heavy artillery preparation, launched their attacks again," continues Tim Gebhardt. - During the day, the enemy tried to squeeze us out of the bridgehead about 15 times, but, of course, to no avail. Our battalions resisted with amazing stamina, although in the course of numerous attacks, ammunition remained less and less. When the ammunition ran out, our riflemen and machine gunners threw empty magazines and ribbons towards the attackers.

Finally, in the evening, the long-awaited reinforcements arrived. The 480th Infantry Regiment took up positions on the right, and the 460th on the left of Vybley. After this hot day of fighting, the division commander arrived at the regiment and greeted his brave soldiers with the words: "The army has already surrendered you, but I told her confidently that my seams would hold the position."

For 6 days, the Russians tried in vain to push our division back beyond the Desna. Our tireless sappers

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Scheme of battles on the Vyblinsky bridgehead according to Tim Gebhardt  
(Og. Lt. Sebragay.

they built a bridge on the Desna within 48 hours, so that the supply of ammunition and food was now well established. The fighters, the "pieces" and the "Sturmgeschütz" put such pressure on the Russians that they retreated in a south-westerly direction!

On March 23, 1942, during a 13-hour battle with Fedorov's partisans, Hauptmann of the 703rd battalion Wilhelm Ulmke was killed. In 2000, his son, Johannes Ulmke, came to Chernihiv in search of his father's grave. At our request, Yoga Nes Ulmke contacted the veterans of the 260th Infantry Division and, together with other materials, including newspapers from the Southwestern Front, sent us the reminiscences of machine gunner Goetz about the battles at the Vyblin bridgehead.

1 Wadep-U/zgietegasve Omzyupep it 2.\eKpew. Hizattepwe\$e!And whoop Kido!Ulsv.  
Kaizgiye: Uepai S. Vgaip, 1957. \$. 61.

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Here is what machine gunner Goetz said about these battles:

"If anyone guessed this, I would feel like a leper. What I didn't know was that others already had these favorite pets too, but that was a small consolation. These animals, lice, loved warmth, and then, when we came to the warm scrap in October, then they became really lively, and an interesting occupation appeared for us. But for now it was still August, and we were moving in the direction of the south. We thought that we would finally come to Ukrainus as its capital, Kiev. Actually, the weather was not bad, here and there Ivan firmly clung to some village, so it was necessary to take it with a fight. Sometimes we had a "storm of teschütz" at the same time, and then we felt more confident. Everything was moving forward, the landscape was getting better, there was even a huge fruit plantation, but, unfortunately, apples are still

not in time.

On August 31, we had a wonderful stay in one village, with an overnight stay, and we rejoiced at this. How undemanding

We have become great!.. We have not yet heard anything about the Desna River lying in front of us, but our village was located near it. We dreamed of sleeping off, of course - we set up posts, but the order came - to get ready. Then I was very annoyed because of the change in our situation ... We did not know that here we would have to run away again. We soon found out...

Deftly using the terrain, we silently approached Desna, which, however, was not as large as the Berezina, but still wide enough. In inflatable boats, at night and under the cover of fog, we swam across the river. And not without being pestered by Ivan. As we later learned, our division commander, Lieutenant-General Hans Schmidtesche crossed over to the other side that evening. But we did not have such great ambition, and a Russian house for that night would have been nicer to us on this shore. But the command had other plans, and what it was doing now was the creation of a so-called bridgehead. Our sappers ferried us on boats to the other side.

In the meantime, I fired two shots from a machine gun. And we had to hand over our grenade launchers, and only later did we receive them again.

My first number was Corporal Schutzwakh, a veteran of our 2nd company. Having crossed over to the other side, we found ourselves in the area, which in colloquial military speech is called the place for kisses, and here, in this seemingly free space

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stnosti, we were forced to dig in. As an infantryman, I had a short shovel hanging from behind, and here it had to start working. The night was calm, all that could be heard all night was the humming of the heavy engines on the enemy side. Of course, it would be appropriate for us if it indicated the withdrawal of the enemy.

However, as it turned out, it was the other way around. Our counterparts were concentrating forces. To throw us across the river. In the morning the regiment had to start the attack, since the bridgehead had to be expanded. The first settlement was already occupied, and now the queue for the second one was approaching, which in my memory is "recorded" as Podgornoye! This name is the fate of the second company. In battle, from house to house, this settlement had to be occupied, so the nerves were as tense as never before.

And what is characteristic of people, I note it here - in trouble, people shrink, focus, reach for each other, which then is a good target for enemy shooters. Then I shouted to my friend: "Get away from me!" Because I didn't want to be a good target. It was also in his interests.

The commander of our detachment was a freshly minted non-commissioned officer N., he was a brave soldier and underwent an amputation, but he performed his duties to the end, despite the upcoming

not today, sending home tomorrow.

The German non-commissioned officer had no other choice but to go forward, and when a Russian officer ran out of the nearest house and did not take any measures to surrender, he raised his machine gun, but it misfired. Happiness for the Russian. So we took this village, but what happened next was, in fact, by our own will.

Probably, 300 meters from the village, the Russians hid several camouflaged trucks among the trees. Well, we wanted to capture them, but it turned out differently. As we approached, we received enemy fire from machine guns and machine guns from the flank. We did not know that this piece of territory was stuffed with Russians, and no one gave us an order to bring these trucks. We did not capture them, as our non-commissioned officer Gahan (NaNp) was already seriously wounded and called for the orderlies. Never in my life will I forget his screams.

We got a good science here - fell and jumped up,

1 Podgornoye, a village 5 km from Chernigov, was under the responsibility of the 480th regiment of the 260th infantry division.

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they left in short dashes and were extremely glad when they were again unharmed in the village. A short dash and you become a target again. The Russians immediately fired on everyone. Every hole was used, but no one could carry our non-commissioned officer Gaan (Khaan). It would have been different with the British or Americans, the orderlies could have taken him out, but here in the East the red cross bandage on the sleeve was worthless, and so our orderlies soon simply took it off.

This non-commissioned officer who was bleeding here was from Stuttgart and one of those who had not received any training. I felt very sorry for him.

It was only the beginning of September 2, 1941 - the last day of life for the 2nd company and for very many. Satisfied and unharmed by the truck scam, we were to return, and that day we remained in that disgusting, damned outback.

In the distance, a large city was visible from here, it was Chernigov ... Noah did not enter this city, others did it.

It would have been a rewarding task for our artillery if it had decently loosened half of the wood in front of us. Then, perhaps, it would be possible to go to the starting positions, go on the attack and defeat the enemy.

The evening came when we were attacked, and on a scale that I had not yet seen. For the first time I heard Russian

"Hurrah!", which penetrated right through to the marrow of the bones. They got up and fired on the run from their submachine guns and machine guns. As I later found out, they were graduates of the Kyiv Military School! We lay down with our machine guns behind the garden fence. My comrade Schutzbach fired, and I selflessly fed the machine-gun belt. Today I must say that we courageously defended ourselves, but those who attacked us were not from bad parents, they stormed our village, despite the losses. From the left came the cry of non-commissioned officer Muller, but I could not stop, as the Russians had invaded our position, and now there was a danger that they would bypass us from behind. Only now, when I got up, did I notice that I had received a slight wound in the thigh, but there was no time to be upset by this. Only later, at night, I examined it.

We were supposed to withdraw, but the Russians had already come out to meet us.

1 Interesting evidence not found anywhere in Soviet documents. E

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They walked in rows between the houses. For me, now the moment has come when the support of an angel is indispensable, and I had him here. He appeared to me in the form of tall cornfields, behind a garden which I wanted to cross and hide in these thickets in the hope that the attackers would not notice me. I'm lucky. After the blowing minutes were the most intense in my life and probably the most dangerous. I knelt among the corn, and my only weapon, as number two, was a pistol with two empty clips. Actually, I could throw them away. Today I shake my head, why didn't I? In front of me I saw the house to which this garden belonged, and now the Russians were approaching me, but, bending around the poles, deviated a little. They talked to each other, my tension intensified, will they see me or not? Perhaps it was my happiness that the evening twilight was coming, in any case, they passed me by, happiness also that no one else was following. As we later established, they did not take prisoners, which would mean death. Gradually it got darker and I dared to get out of my hiding place.

How glad I was when I found a few more of my comrades, and at the same time non-commissioned officer Brenner from the 4th company ...

With cries of "Don't shoot, we Germans have reached our own positions. But what awaited us was not gratitude at all. It was a German saying: "The gratitude of the Motherland is inevitable for you, it follows you, but it cannot overtake you."

Behind the headquarters, Major Shtrom (\$hgovt) was waiting for us with a pistol in his hand, he shouted, what is happening to you? I will never forget this for him. there were hardly 25 people left of our company, and this happened on September 2, 1941, when we were still victorious everywhere.

Only now did I have time to examine my aching thigh. It was a minor injury, but far from popular, and did not entitle him to the home leave that everyone desired. These days I still needed to see a doctor because of a rash on my body. When our doctor, Dr. Fritz, saw my injury, asked me: "What is it with you?", I replied that it was a slight injury. To which he expressed his opinion: "You will receive a badge for being wounded!" But when I faintly remarked, "It doesn't matter," he said, "Getz, you're a nice guy!" He knew me from the medical unit in France.

On the same night of our return we were to take up our positions again. Now it was raining, and we were lying under our raincoats and patches behind the machine guns.

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My comrade Schutibach was also lucky, he returned, but how much was missing! Three days later, another 9 people came, but two-thirds of the company died or went missing. It was a deadly river arm of the Desna, otherwise many would have joined the company. Our sergeant major Neumann tried to cross it in a boat and died in the process. Others hid in haystacks, but the Russians pierced them with bayonets. How many now there were no comrades. Here it would be necessary to say, like a water poem about the war in the 70s: "Here every second man remained lying!"

These days, the shooter Goetz became a corporal. Now we were in reserve, and the first reinforcements from the homeland arrived to fill our painful gap. My platoon commander Oberfeldwebel Wirth (UYip) and Sergeant Major Megerle (Mboepe) are missing. Our company commander, Lieutenant Munkle (MoYue), escaped this fate, because. at the time of the offensive was behind, at headquarters.

So, we were in the reserve, but this village was covered with fire by a Russian armored train, and now it seemed that we got off lightly ...

This was the Desnyansky bridgehead, which the Russians certainly wanted to take from the run, but they did not succeed. But many of the division died here, and the town of Vybli and Peski became a special concept in the history of our division.

Terrible, bloody attacks with the aim of throwing the 260th division into the Desna began on September 2 and continued for a whole week. The combat order of the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front No. 00347 dated September 2, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the 5th Army for the defense of Chernigov indicates that these battles were by no means of local significance. The instructions came personally from Stalin:

"Commander of the 5th Army

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army

Commander-in-Chief YuZN

BATTLE ORDER No. 00347. 2.9.41 20.45.  
SW HQ. PRILUKY

1. I am handing over a copy of the order of the Chief of the General Staff: "To the Commander of the South-Western Front. With the occupation of Wibli by the enemy, a clear threat is created to Chernigov and the junction of fronts. Report immediately on your activities in this direction.

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Chernigov must be kept by us at all costs.

On behalf of the Supreme High Command, Chief of the General Staff of the spacecraft B. Shaposhnikov.

September 2, 1941 number 001556.

2. You are reinforced with 135th Rifle Division (without one joint venture), one joint venture of 41st Rifle Division, one tank battalion, and a detachment of PF ships. Your actions are supported by the Front Air Force.

3. The Commander-in-Chief demands from you the exact execution of the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to keep Chernigov for us at all costs.

Enter a strong connection with 66 sk, which is ordered to advance on the left flank in the direction of Brusilovo.

Report your decision to complete the task.

Tupikov Solovyov.

A participant and researcher of the battles of the 5th Army A. Vladimirsky told us the following about the tragedy of the Vyblin bridgehead:

"An even greater setback befell the 5th Army at the junction with the 21st Army, where the enemy on the night of September 2, with forces up to a regiment of 260 infantry divisions, crossed the Desna south of Svinya and captured a bridgehead on its left bank in the area of Vibli?, Sands, Podgornoye .. .

... General Potapov believed that the capture by the enemy of the parade ground of the darma on the left bank of the Desna River in the Vibley area created a threat of his exit to the rear of our entire Chernigov group of troops. Based on this, he orders the commander of the 15th Rifle Corps to liquidate the bridgehead, using for this purpose part of the forces of the 62nd Rifle Division and the 204th Airborne Brigade transferred under his command. General Potapov entrusted the leadership of the liquidation of the bridgehead personally to the commander of the 15th Corps, Colonel Blank.



At 5 p.m. on September 2, as a result of a counterattack by one battalion of the 204th airborne brigade and one rifle battalion of the 62nd rifle division, the enemy was driven out of Peski and Podgornoye, but Wibli remained in enemy hands.

Commander of the 15th Rifle Corps, Colonel Blank,

1 SBD WWII. T. 40.

2 Pig - now Ulyanovsk. Right next to Ulyanovka is Kiselyovka, where the 260th Infantry Division crossed the Desna. Wibli, on modern maps - you are near.

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who personally led the counterattack, was hit by a burst of automatic weapons and, without regaining consciousness, died ...

... If the commander had deployed his reserve - 204th brigade not west of Chernigov, as was done, but east of this point on the left bank of the Desna, that is, opposite the junction with the 21st Army in the area of Vibley, Podgornoye, then the enemy would hardly have been so easy to cross over to the left bank of the river ...

... The commander of the 5th Army, in pursuance of this order (Stalin's order. - Author), over the next four days, counterattacked by the forces of the 15th Rifle and 1st Airborne Corps against the enemy's Chernigov grouping, but to no avail.

The 135th Rifle Division (without one regiment) and one regiment of the 41st Rifle Division, which had arrived in the 5th Army, he handed over to the commander of the 15th Corps to destroy the enemy in the bridgehead he had captured in the Vibli, Peski area. The promised tank battalion of the 10th Panzer Division never arrived. But neither the categorical demands of the Military Council of the 5th Army on the "final destruction of the enemy's Chernigov grouping", nor sharp reproaches against the command of the 15th Rifle Corps that it showed "criminally shameful inactivity and inability to liquidate the superior insignificant enemy forces", neither ordering the commanders and commissars of the units to personally participate in the attacks in order to set an example and inspire the fighters, nor participation in the attacks of the units with the commanders sent to them from the army headquarters — nothing helped.

Both in the Chernigov region and in the Vibla region, attacks on our units were repulsed by the enemy with heavy losses, and the situation on the right flank of the army worsened more and more!

Another survivor who escaped from the Kyiv pocket was the commander of the 1st anti-tank brigade of the 5th army, and after the death of Blank, the commander of the 15th rifle corps - K.S. Moskalenko.

“The situation on the front of the 15th Rifle Corps north of Chernigov was extremely difficult,”  
Moska Lenko recalled. - Acting corps commander Colonel M.I. Blank, acquainting me  
with the situation, called it

1 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the  
troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M .: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 255.

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Scheme of battles on the Vyblin bridgehead according to A. Vladimirsky.

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giving birth. And he didn't exaggerate. The enemy, with superior forces supported by tanks, exerted great pressure from the front. At the same time, the German 260th Infantry Division crossed the river. Desna on the right flank of the corps and seized a bridgehead in the Wibli area.

Having told about all this, Colonel Blank showed me a telegram from the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov, addressed to the commander of the Southwestern Front. It said: "With the capture of Wibli by the enemy, a clear threat is created to Chernigov and the junction of the front ... Chernigov must be kept behind us at all costs.

no matter."

"As you can see," said Colonel Blank, "the order passed through all instances—there is little left: to carry it out. But what forces? There are only 20-30 active bayonets in the companies, ammunition is running out ... - He took a deep breath, smiled. - But to order an order, to carry it out now to you and me.

This was my last meeting with M.I. Blank.

On September 1, fighting flared up with renewed vigor on the right flank of the corps, during which its units stubbornly tried to dislodge the 260th infantry division of the enemy from the bridgehead in the Wibli area, but were unsuccessful. The next day, General Potapov, following the order of the commander of the front, ordered M.I. Blanca at any cost to throw the enemy behind the Desna. The troops of the corps again entered into battle with the enemy. Colonel Blank personally led up to two battalions of the 62nd Infantry Division into the attack. In battle near the village of Sands! On September 2, he was mortally wounded.

The enemy's foothold near the village of Vibli was never liquidated, despite the maximum efforts made by our troops. However, the Nazis, who struggled to expand the bridgehead, did not achieve their goal.

Units of the 135th Rifle Division fought heroically. In repelling two attacks alone, they destroyed about 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers. The Nazis also suffered heavy losses in the sector of the 497th Rifle Regiment, where they undertook

Mali the same desperate attacks.

During one of them, about 200 Nazis leaked between two battalions. Not far away, senior political instructor Kruglyakov, who temporarily served as

1 Sands are located near Podgorny.

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Missar of the regiment, did not lose his head. The anti-aircraft machine-gun mount, deployed on his orders, met the attackers with point-blank fire and literally mowed them all down to one ...

... The threat of encirclement loomed over the main forces of the 5th Army. It was necessary to immediately withdraw them beyond the Desna and, by reducing the front and releasing reserves, improve the operational position of the army ...

... In this situation, General Potapov on September 3 ordered me to take command of the 15th rifle corps, and hand over the brigade to the commander of the 712th artillery regiment, Colonel A.P. Eremenko.

Having found the headquarters of the corps, I met the commissar of the corps, regimental commissar M.P. Bystrov, chief of staff lieutenant colonel M.G. Banny and officers of the operational department. Here I was informed that the divisions of the corps - the 45th, 62nd and 135th - together with the remnants of the 9th mechanized (without tanks) and the 1st airborne (up to 300 people) corps were fighting at that moment on the line of Vibli - Peski - Berezanka - Khalyavin - Ryabtsy!.

"The losses in people, military equipment and vehicles are very high," added the chief of staff of the corps gloomily. - Therefore, it is difficult to say how long it will be possible to hold back the onslaught of the enemy, who is constantly introducing more and more new forces into the battle ...

... September 4 and 5, the fighting in the positions of the corps was extremely fierce and did not stop day or night. The 135th Rifle Division with difficulty repelled the attacks of superior enemy forces in the area of Gorbovo, Vibli, Peski. The 62nd and 45th rifle divisions, the remnants of the 9th mechanized and 1st airborne corps, under the onslaught of fascist tanks and infantry, slowly, fighting, retreated south to Chernigov.

On September 6, the situation deteriorated sharply again. The Nazi command, which by that time had seized the bridgehead on the Desna, in order to encircle the troops of the 5th Army, struck from the Saltykov Devitsa area? in a western direction along the rear of the 15th Rifle Corps ...

... Therefore, the situation demanded immediately, while there was at least some opportunity to use the crossing-

<sup>1</sup> Berezanka, Khalyavin and Ryabtsy are located to the north and northeast of Chernigov.

? Saltykova Maiden is located 15 km southeast of the Vyblin bridgehead.

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mi, take both corps behind the Desna. Instead, the commander of the front troops ordered another desperate attempt to push the enemy back and, for this purpose, launch a series of counterattacks against the enemy advancing on the flanks.

The order for the 15th Rifle Corps to go over to the offensive was received by me at the moment when our troops were forced to retreat under the blows of superior enemy forces. According to this order, the 135th Rifle Division, together with units of the 244th Rifle Regiment, numbering 100-150 people, as well as a battalion of the 204th Airborne Brigade and a separate reconnaissance battalion of the 62nd Rifle Division (up to 100 people) the task was to push the enemy back, restore the previous position on the right flank of the 5th Army and go out. Gum.

On the left flank of the army, a similar task was assigned to the troops of the 31st Rifle Corps.

In the current situation, this order was not carried out due to lack of forces. It only led to a day's delay of the 15th and 31st Rifle Corps at their former lines, and this put us in an extremely difficult situation.

The enemy, meanwhile, was rapidly advancing from the east to Kolichevka, trying to bypass Chernigov from the south. At the same time, he attacked Chernigov with infantry divisions advancing, as I have already mentioned, from the Okuninovskiy bridgehead along the western bank of the Desna. In the afternoon of September 8, its main forces reached the Kolichevka region, and those advancing from the west captured the settlement of Shestovitsy and thereby cut off our escape routes beyond the river. Gum.

So the bulk of the forces of the 15th (45th and 62nd rifle divisions) and the 31st rifle corps, located in the Chernigov region and to the south-west of it, were surrounded. In this situation, permission was finally obtained to withdraw after dark beyond the Desna. It was exactly a day late, and now we had to not retreat, but to break through the encirclement at a high price!

New details of the battle for the Vyblin bridgehead were revealed to us by witnesses from the civilian population. Andrei Petrovich Kuchinsky recalls:

\* Moskalkenko K.S. On the South-West Direction: Memoirs of the Commander. Book. 1. M.: Nauka, 1969. S. 69-71.

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"I wake up at night - such a cannonade! Shells all around

torn, all around sparkles. I'm in the cellar! Then it turned out that it was an armored train coming from Nizhyn, and at 4 o'clock the shelling began, the strongest shelling of Vybley. One shell hit the corner of the house, where there were 5-6 Germans, and they were all killed. When I looked into the hut, there were intestines on the ceiling and the gun's blood was all over the walls... When the shelling began, I climbed into the cellar, there was a German sitting on a barrel, he illuminated with a flashlight - 4 hours - and said to me: "Panzerbombardier ". It turns out that this is an armored train. He fired somewhere until 6 in the morning and, probably, gorged on Nizhyn. Of course, a lot of Germans died... And suddenly some huts too. They simply slept in houses, did not dig trenches. There were Germans in all the huts.

The armored train thrashed anywhere. He fired mainly at the village. When our people wanted to recapture Vybli, the Germans immediately got dressed, everyone had gas masks and helmets. Machine guns hung on the wattle fences, they immediately put everything on themselves ...

The shells of the armored train fell through the village. I saw many dead cows in the yards, horses, shells hit houses and sheds. The fire on the village was conducted because all the Nemps were in the village. After the arrival of the armored train, they began to dig trenches near each house, and before that they had not dug trenches. Then sheaves of sheaves of corn and wheat were brought in.

"The Germans were all young, healthy guys, all so handsome, cleanly dressed. I also saw this, because in the last hut I was: that they would go to the front line, shoot, then they would come, clean their boots, they had brushes, ointment. For me it was such a surprise that it was a nightmare. I thought that they did not have a howl, but some kind of spree. When they are free, they preen themselves, everything is clean, neat. All were young, 20-23, up to 30 years old. There were no elderly people. This, apparently, was some kind of army they had - all young guys, healthy, handsome young cottonmen. Everyone had a helmet, a gas mask, a machine gun. Those who were with machine guns still had machine guns. And they are like this: they can leave a helmet, they can leave a machine gun, but they never left gas masks, they always had gas masks with them. They never threw away gas masks, it is not clear why, maybe they thought that they would use gases. Then there was a lot of talk that gases could be used. And no one knew who would use it, but the Germans never threw gas masks. Our troops dropped their gas masks, none of ours had gas masks. And the Germans went with them until the end of the war.

I also observed German balloons. To the left of Vybley under

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one balloon took off. I look - our fighters are flying, on the right, from Kolichevka. 2 fighters: I-16 and Chaika. Machine guns fired up the chili, and the balloon flared up like a torch. The planes would turn around and leave. Then, the next day, I look: balloons have appeared again. One and, further, the second. The planes have arrived again. The Germans began to wind up the cable to lower the balloons. And on them - from machine guns, apparently, with incendiary bullets! The balloon instantly turns into a fa-

kel, baskets are flying down. The balloons were shot down again, I saw it with my own eyes. Shot down twice.

Toward evening I again hid in the trench, and I saw that our soldiers were crawling right in front of me. Creep up, ask: "Where are the Germans?" I showed: there, there and there the Germans. They crawled on, I wanted to crawl after them, but one of them ordered me to hide in a trench. The next morning (3.09) I wake up, a German is standing, showing with a bayonet: "Century!" They brought us to the hut, set us up and led us to the church. And when they brought me to the church, there is such a hill there, I saw how our bombers flew in, white SBs, probably duralumin, beautiful white bombers. And to Desna! The Germans opened fire from anti-aircraft guns, with such black bursts. We were taken to church. And there were maybe a thousand soldiers in the church. And captains, and senior lieutenants, and soldiers. I asked: "Where are you from?" They say: "We came from Dimitrov, we were surrounded, we never even fired a shot, and we were taken prisoner, and now we are all HERE."

It was a nightmare, I never thought that it could be that so many soldiers were taken away at once, and they say that they did not shoot!

I stayed in the church for several days, they didn't let us out, they didn't give us water. Then we started shouting... And when they brought us to the church, I saw that there were wounded soldiers lying near the church, about 15 people, and they said, bloodied: "Brothers, finish them off!" And these words will stay with me for the rest of my life. At first, when I had not yet seen the wounded and killed, I had no such fear of death. But when I saw those who said: "Brothers, finish off!", Then such fear attacked me ... And when they started to let go, the church was surrounded, they stood with machine guns at the ready, a whole ring of these Germans, with badges on their chests. Later I found out that it was a field gendarmerie, Ilya re-

!' Obviously, it was a marching battalion, which never reached the destination division.

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I thought that I would be the last to go in to get away, but anyway I already planned to get away... The Germans slammed the doors, I stayed on the street, and I ran. I decided this for myself: I will run to the hospital, cross the front line and get to ours. I ran to the middle of the village, the German caught up with me on horseback, grabbed me, and - again 10 of our men were led - I was in this column and again led to the church.

Then they lined up all the soldiers, and the Germans shouted: "Come out - communist, jude and commissar." Several people came out, I saw the captain came out, the senior lieutenant and a few more soldiers. And it seems to me that they were immediately shot. I didn't see it, but when we were led back to the church, I heard machine gun fire. After that, the artillery from the side of Anisov hit the village heavily. Everything calmed down at night ... All the soldiers were taken away

and they took us somewhere, but we civilians were left in the church. They didn't let me go anywhere. Then 2 or 3 Germans came and said in broken Russian: "Home, to the uterus, century! Run home, work." And we were released. And I went towards Chernigov. The whole meadow was riddled with shells. Heavily armed columns of Germans marched along the roads, with machine guns, machine guns, and machine-gun belts. But I had a Komsomol ticket in my cap, I cut a hole and hid it. And lo and behold, I was walking, and one German grabbed me by the cap, looked at me, then gave me back and showed me: go! It turns out that if I were tonsured in the military mat - that's it! Because all the soldiers of our army had their wives shorn. And if I had a haircut, then, not taking into account civilian clothes, I would have been taken away as a prisoner of war. He handed over the cap, and I, holding it in my hands, reached the crossing. Their crossing was where our pier is now. In Chernigov. They were just transporting artillery when they ordered me to sit. I sat out while they passed and went home. Before me, we, grandfathers, grandmothers ... Everyone cried, because they thought that I was already gone.

Then I went to the city, looked: from the square I could see the beer factory, Koty, everything was destroyed, from Komsomolskaya Street to Strizhnya, everything burned down. Only the skeletons stood. I looked at the regional executive committee, it was clear that the roof had burned down and the upper floor, but the lower floor was intact. The whole central part, right up to Strizhn, not a single house! Only ruins, ruins... I saw all this, my first impression was so terrible that I would never see it again, I would not see my native city, there was no one anywhere, emptiness, I myself... Alone...

In Chernigov, I ran to the highway. I see the convoy is coming.

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I'm closer. I lay down near the highway, near the silicate plant. From behind the Desna led a column of prisoners. The head of the column was near Chernigov, and the tail was near the bridge. They all walked with their heads bowed. For me it was fear and horror. Such a mass of soldiers walked ... They were brought to the hay station, where the tank is now! costs. And opposite, where there were 2-storey houses, lay the wounded and seriously wounded. They said they were tankers. I brought them sunflower seeds and corn seeds from home. And started throwing over the fence. The Germans began to shoot, and our soldiers began to wave their hands for me to leave ... They were not fed anything.

Those people with whom I spoke were shocked by what had happened. Nobody knew anything. It was very painful that the Germans captured us...

Later, they began to talk that it could not be that the Germans defeated us, that the Germans would be defeated ...

Opposite the music factory, the Germans organized a cemetery. And from the spring of 42, they began to bring their dead there ...

... In 1943, when our troops arrived, I was drafted into the army, to the front, and until the end of the war I was in battle. At dawn



On May 8, 1945, our division united behind Berlin with Sanglian troops, and for me the war was over"...

Mikhail Egorovich Pechenka:

"I just graduated from the 6th grade.... And we lived to see the days when the German aviation began an intensive bombing of Chernigov. The city is already on fire, and on August 24 or 25, the father makes a decision: "You know, mother, probably take your son and go to Vybli to see your brother. It's far from the railway, and from the highway, and from everything in the world, but I'll stay here - at home.

My mother and I went. We reach the Desna - here, opposite the sawmills, three crossings have been built. Like in a parade. They were made from rafts, from wood - on the pier, in the harbor, there was a lot of driftwood. The crossings were about 50 meters from each other, or maybe even less... Two hours later, German aircraft flew in and smashed those crossings. From Pesok to Vybley they walked along the masonry. Then, using these masonry, ours tried to drive the Germans out of Vyblei2.

We come to Vybli, to Podol, to the mother's brother. Tee

1 Monument near the railway station in Chernihiv.

2 k

Obviously, from this side - Sands, Podgornoye - on September 2, the Germans were attacked by units of the 15th sk, led by the corps commander Blank.

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bus, peace, all people are in a lowered state, in a state of mental shock, there are few men, there are children, old people, women left ... September 2, early in the morning - the Germans, intelligence, go to the middle of the village. Ayav studied German in the 5th or 6th grade and did not understand much of their squealing. The sergeant-major returned to the house and gave the command that half of this section should reach the middle of the village and fire two green rockets.

... The cow did not go to the pasture, the geese remained to walk in the meadow. And then - they give two green rockets. As soon as these two green rockets appeared, from the meadow, from the Desna, the Germans were like goosebumps, both on foot and on bicycles (afterwards the villagers said that the Germans swam up in inflatable boats and landed). And from the side of the Harvesting came their equipment, and cars, and tractors, and 6 guns. The sergeant-major went into the hut, opened the window, and from this hut the outlook was good. They are installing these 6 guns, and at this time, out of nowhere, our artillery opens fire. Who says that from Muraveyka, who from Anisov. As I understand it - caliber 152 mm, no less. The German set up binoculars, and I look in the same direction - right in their armored personnel carrier - our projectile, under the front right ramp! Like a sergeant-major yells: "Raus mensch sacramento! Verflucht! .... And then there was a break between the technique. In Vybyly, in front of the school, there is a moat. And a few with lu-

ha - into this ditch, and equipment and motorcyclists, and this rovchak was drawn into Vybli. They thought that since our artillery was hitting the meadow, they would not hit the village. And they all hid in the village.

When the binoculars lay free, I took it, I looked - our soldier, in an overcoat, was running after the levada. He must have been on guard or a secret. 15-20 minutes past seven. If only the sergeant didn't see the linen, but he didn't shoot from the machine gun! ..

The German map lies. I looked at this map, I was surprised myself: where the geese walked, there was a goose path, where there was a stump, there was a stump on the map. Where the cattle walked, too. Kilometer. Everything is known to the penny - everything is on the table.

It seems that on the 3rd, and maybe also on the 2nd, after dinner, when they installed a battery of 6 guns, they hung out an observation balloon nearby. The balloon was raised by 100 meters, no more. They didn't need to go higher. 50 meters from the battery. After dinner, whoever says the 3rd, and I would say the 2nd, unexpectedly, unexpectedly, in full combat order, 9 aircraft fly at low level. In the middle are three bombers, on the right are three attack aircraft, and on the left side are three fighters. Drop bombs on the battery. But the bombs were of small caliber. Several horses were killed. They didn't destroy the battery. One of the

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I turned the consumers up to the balloon, I was at least 80 meters from it, and it was its left wing, which means it knocked it down. And two Germans fall and are killed. And the Germans: "Achtung, ah tung!" - and they hit from all types of weapons in the direction of the aircraft, the aon was at an altitude of 200 meters. And, between Sands, Malyavkin farm and Vybyly, this fighter was shot down. When the German troops advanced to Muraveyka and Chernigov, sure enough, they had already been taken, we, the children, ran there, to this plane, it was the "Seagull" or I-16. There was nothing on it anymore, or the Germans, or someone tore it off, only wooden ribs. The weapon was removed. The pilot's cockpit had a finger-thick armored back. And we noticed a bullet hole in the back. The pilot may have been injured, but the residents of Pesok, who were watching this case, said that the pilot survived. He went to Peski, then they were not yet occupied by the Germans.

I liked that the planes were flying in combat formation... If our aircraft had made a call from the direction of Gorbovo and walked across a clear meadow to the battery, then the outcome would have been certain. And so she walked from behind the village and did not see the battery. Bombed randomly. Bom would be small caliber ...

Then there was a big artillery duel...

These scouts were shot by our tankette, somewhere to the left of the hospital ...

The next day, on the 3rd, they bring ours, 5 people. Bloodied, battered. Colonel, lieutenant colonel, major and female captain. And they are placed in the Kharchenok hut.

We, the residents, helped put them in order. I draw the conclusion openly: it was the commander of the 62nd division Timoshenko, his two deputies, the female captain - such a swarthy, black-haired one, and a small foreman - the driver. We asked: "Where are you?" The Germans have been here since yesterday. "It was somewhere that we were either shot at, or we hit a mine, and we were blown up." They were periodically taken somewhere from the Kharchenok hut, a German paramedic came, the prisoners were processed, bandaged. The Germans did not feed them. They were taken periodically to the church. Or to headquarters. Or to the front line, so that they agitate our troops!. According to that, somewhere around the 5-6th, they were completely taken away and taken beyond the Desna. The Germans took them not to the toilet, but to the chamber, and they apparently had banners, tablets and maps. Somewhere under the souls. And they hid it all in the chamber. In the 43rd year, when ours, it seems,

1

Perhaps they were taken to the church for identification.

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The 148th division was in Vybli, 25 German planes were flying in to bomb. Burning Kharchenok hut, burning my uncle, many. And all these relics burned down, only traces were found ...

They say that in Piryatin the commander of the 62nd division was buried burned. It is not true...

Watched another flight. It was the last flight where our bomber was shot down. I just forgot how many there were. Two bombers with cover. Again on this battery, on a sudden flight. As they appeared over Vyby, the Germans were in full swing: "Achtung! Akhtung! And in front of the artillery battery was already a quadruple Oerlikon. And now, apparently, it was he, no one else, who shot down the bomber. Because it was already on fire over the battery. And while he was turning to go out to ours, the pilot tore off both his gloves and his headset. Everything was lying on the meadow. The navigator was below, the pilot was in the cockpit, and the gunner-radio operator, apparently, managed to jump out and remained alive!

These days, when a strong artillery duel was going on, our troops from the direction of Pesok tried to free Vybli. "Hurray!", "Forward!", Russian swearing. And there was communication from the German battery to the observation post. And uncle Yevdak, a participant in the First World War, was wounded by buckshot, says: "Here comes the water, take the juice and cut the wire. And give the ends of the stream, let them think that a fragment. That's exactly what I did.

Uncle Evdak had 4 numbers of machine gunners in the hut, from the 2nd to the 6th, while the fighting was in Vyby. Two of them went to the front line, and two rested, washed, shaved, and my cousin and I were forced to stuff machine-gun belts. And it occurred to me that I once read the book "Gavroche" by Gogo ... I take a bullet, pull it out, pour out the gunpowder, insert the bullet back, and the tape, and the tape. And gunpowder - I go out into the barn and you throw it into the manure. After the first or second such incident, the Germans were at first so loyal, and then they come into the house - such

angry, angry, swearing, no rescue...

On a motorcycle with a machine gun - across the meadow, geese stuffed ... So

'  
It was a SB bomber of the 48th bap 17th hell. He fell on Brekkel Island. In 2000, the expedition of Gerard Kuznetsov, an honorary citizen of Chernigov, found this aircraft and the remains of the crew: the pilot, Lieutenant M.P. Komochkov and a gunner-radio operator - Kosyanovsky (possibly Kostanovskiy Alexander Iosifovich or Kostanevsky). Both were re-buried at the cemetery in Chernihiv. Navigator, ml. Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Zherlitsyn jumped out with a parachute. In his personal file it says: "Missing", then it is added that he was dismissed from the army in 1968.

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people said that in 6 days of fighting all the chickens were beaten and ate...

The whole meadow between Vybley and Peski was like a chessboard, and from Vybley to Uborki it was like a chessboard too. Ours thrashed in an empty place. And the armored train locked the German units between Vybly and Gorbov.

Residents of Ul'yanovka said that the Germans did not cross over there, but higher up, in Brusilov. From Brusilov there was a direct route to Veresoch, where units of the 62nd division were retreating. Ours and the Germans were in direct contact, and the German artillery was hitting ours, and our artillery was hitting theirs. As a result, there are two graves of our Red Army soldiers in Gorbov - 150 people. When the Germans crossed the Desna, something prevented them from going to Veresoch. And they went along the eastern bank of the Desna opposite Vybley. It was the closest way to encircle Chernigov.

During these battles, in relation to the dead and wounded of the Germans, this was very hidden. They had nurses scurrying back and forth. And the wounded or killed are being carried, it is not known.

We have observed such a case. One German soldier was wounded in the head, he was bandaged. After breakfast, 60-70 people lined up. And then the colonel and, apparently, the general announced an award to him and attached a cross. They write that the Vyblis were from the bat and were with ours for 10 days. Were not repulsed. The Germans were already in Repki, near Tupichev, and in the Bolshevik newspaper everyone writes about the battles in the Gomel direction. They could even swim in a gas mask... Some are fighting, others are near the kitchen, resting, eating, shaving. In the kitchen they always gave chocolate, a pack of cigarettes, the supply was perfect. The soldiers were supplied, fed, watered and moved forward.

... We learned that Ant, one and the second! , you, Kulikovka is busy, Chernihiv is busy. busy  
On September 11 we went home to Chernigov. We went to Peski, we see that everything is beaten up there too. Many funnels under the sandy mound, many huts collapsed, battered, we pass Podgornoye, we walked along the meadow, and we go out to the place where our crossings were. Gee! A German crossing, pontoons, fencing, boats have been built!

And the Germans are marching in formation to the meadow. Like prisoners in Stalingrad. They walked along the meadow in the direction of Anisov in a long winding column ...

1 Baklanova and Vershinova Muraveyka.

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Anna Tikhonovna Revko:

"After a very short time, we were sent from the village and, probably, from all over the region to the Desna, to dig anti-tank ditches. Children 14-15 years old, both boys and girls. We ended up in the village of Drutskoye, beyond Ladinka. It is impossible to say how many people were there, maybe the whole region. There were a lot of people. We dig trenches. Planes fly German. And there are no men among us, except for the military, who are in charge of this work. Alone old men, women and children.

And at the end of August, the Germans began to bomb, and we, teenagers, 14-16 years old, were sent home. The rest stayed to sleep... And at home it's even worse. Horror - German planes keep flying, flying, flying, and in recent days no one can figure out how it will all end. Because German planes fly endlessly in large batches.

On September 1, after dinner, maybe at 4 o'clock, when the soldiers said that the Germans were close, my grandmother said to me: "Run and go to my place. You need to be with your mom." Early in the morning, on the 2nd, the cows were sent to pasture, I went out into the street, I saw that the carcasses were already grazing people to let the cows out, and suddenly my mother said: "Let the calf out, let the calf go there." I look, and other women let out calves. ... We sent this cattle from the village and everyone ran to the trenches.

Trenches were dug for several families, the state allocated thick logs to cover these trenches. We dug them according to all the rules, as we were told, covered them and did everything. We are sitting. There are no Germans. Ours are not. No one anywhere. Silence.

Suddenly we hear someone say: "Germans! But we are sitting. That's when the shooting started! From that armored train, from the side of Vershinova Muraveyka, one shell fell literally under the logs of our trench. The logs jumped, the earth was on us, everyone jumped out of the trench, I was left alone, like a fool. Consisting

shock.

Suddenly I heard German speech and was terribly frightened, I thought: "Well, this is the end of me, that's it." I leaned out of the trench, I couldn't see anyone in the gardens anywhere, but I had to cross the yard and the street - to the Lukashes in the cellar. I just enter the yard, and an apple tree grows near the gate, and next to that apple tree are the Germans! I must have been white as chalk, terribly frightened. But they don't touch me. I went out into the street, and there was darkness, darkness, of those Germans - with carts, and on motorcycles, and in cars ... A stream! She ran across the road, climbed over the wattle fence, and to Luka-

sham. The cellar there is not so big, and there is no place for me there.

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At this time, Tatyana Lukashova says: "And your uncle has already been wounded." Our plane was two-winged, "Seagull", and fired from a machine gun. And so, when my uncle ran into the trench, he was wounded. There were no German planes yet. The German brought schnapps, bandage, cotton wool. I gave my uncle some two pills. He asked if there was a temperature. And we are afraid, maybe he brought some kind of poison. He said, do not be afraid, wash the wound with schnapps and give a pill one immediately, and the other later. The German was in black clothes and spoke a few words in Russian...

Until evening, from the direction of Vershinova Muraveyka, there was endless shooting, such that it is impossible to even say.

The commander of the 260th Infantry Division, General Schmilt, rewards his subordinates.

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The next day it started to rain! There are no airplanes anywhere. Nobody is flying. And from Muraveyka there is shooting, our units dug in there with guns, and there was an armored train. And the shooting is such that you can't stick your nose out.

At night we moved to our cellar. There was a patrol on the street, but he sees that a woman with children, and will not touch her. They came home, and the whole village was in the cellar! We have no place. All our neighbors are sitting in our cellar. Naver

Soldiers of the 260th Infantry Division, on the third day, our salts near the cellar. and the garden was bombed. And in the garden there was non-German artillery, two German guns and 4 such terrible horses. And here is one shell, and there are 7 of them in our garden fell, falls and killed

one horse, and one of their guns. So a few ran to our cellar. And they shout: "Up, up!" So, you choose, and we will hide here. Some started to leave. The Germans came in, and there are a lot of children, women. So they stopped in this aisle, sat for a while and left. The shot ba moved somewhere further. We sat like this until the 8th. Under that rain The men were taken to church. The only thing, my grandfather saved our entire horde of people - he brought us water. Let him boil potatoes in their uniforms, the cast iron is large, they will give the children a potato each, but adults don't even have enough of that. Finally, grandfather comes and says: "A shell hit our house, ruined the stove, there's nowhere to cook, I'll cook here in your stove" ... And grandfather says that many Germans are carrying the wounded on stretchers, from there, from Vershinova Muraveyka to the village. There, the hospital is on the very edge, and everything in the hospital is littered with those wounded, and, he says, they bury and put a cross on each grave, everywhere in the yards they cut birch trees, and they put crosses from birch trees. On the morning of the 8th there was still shooting from the direction of Vershinova Muraveyka, and then silence. Grandfather says: "For some reason, the Germans are already leaving the village" ... And we went to look for our cows in the meadow. And we're the only ones out

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we leave the street, turn to the river, at this time two planes are flying, we hear by the sound that these are our planes, bombers. Behind the rowing there was a small stream, and the Germans were sitting there, guarded from the side of Chernigov. From the side of Mura, the veiks fight off ours, and from the side of Chernigov they protect their front. So here, across the river, they had four guns and 7 horses. They hid the horses in the barn. One plane flew to the church, bombed there, and another bombed here. The Germans from the 100th courtyard, where their anti-aircraft guns were, came running. We were 15 children and 5 adults. So the German pushed my sister and shouted: "Fall!" And they themselves fell. And then we got there. But the plane is so

flew low, that he saw that we were in white scarves, in blouses, he sees that these are not Germans, although there are 5 Germans among us, too. And so he bombs, it's close at all, and here is the yard, where 7 horses, on the barn, like a bomb hit, all 7 horses were beaten. Well, the weapon is damaged. We were so horrified...

And when we left the street, two balls hung. The children called them observers. And when we stood up after the bombing, there were no more balloons. They were shot by planes from Kolichevka!. There was a Gorbov resident on one of the fighters, I later learned this when I worked in Gorbov. It was Oleinik Vasily Yakov

Levich...

... Bombed-bombed, shot-shot, in the end everything calmed down. Some of the cattle were beaten when they were bombed. When the cattle

260th Infantry Division at the Vyblin bridgehead.

, The airfield in Kolichevka is located 15 km from Vybley.

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I was in the sludge - not a single cow was lost, and when the cattle came to Kselu and there was this bombardment, then the cattle disappeared. Ver zero we back.

What did the Germans do all these days while people were hiding in houses? Everything they liked was taken away, pigs were slaughtered, chickens were slaughtered, what kind of grain was taken from where. My sister grew allspice at school, so she collected it, and it hung in a bag. The pepper was taken. The broken earring from sunduk was taken away. The things they wanted were taken away. The boar was slaughtered at dawn. Everyone rowed... Sokolik Ivan Andreevich moved his bees to my grandfather's garden. The Germans got there. And Lukasha had an apiary nearby. But Lukash hid it somewhere. And this one is right in the back. So they climbed right there, and the bees attacked them. So they poured water into those hives, and what they didn't do. And bees, the more you brush them off, the more they attack. Well, they row the same honeycomb, with honey, but the grandfather does not give it. And now the Germans are fighting off the bees, fighting off the grandfather, but the grandfather nevertheless took the honey and brought it to us in the cellar ...

The Germans buried their dead. I know more than 200 graves. The ones that are close to us. And I did not go to other parts of the village. They say there are plenty of them everywhere under the village. And they buried a lot of them under the river. Then, when they bombed, 5 soldiers were killed in the yard. They were then dragged across the river and buried there with others.

Not a single German was buried in the cemetery. They buried them anywhere, where they were stuffed, they dug holes there, but not deep ones. They were probably going to pick them up later, which is why they dug shallowly. The winter of 1942 was very snowy, and in the spring there was a big flood. And now the graves under the river were washed away, and they floated on the water. And then, as that water departed, there was such a stench that it was impossible to approach any river. And those who were buried at a height, there were 50 graves in front of our courtyard, and maybe 80 graves near the hospital - you dug them in the summer of 1943 and transported them. We then walked from the field, we approached the village: some kind of incomprehensible stench, we came closer, the graves near the pain



threads have been excavated. Neighbor, grandmother, we ask. She says the Germans dug it up, loaded it onto trucks and took it away somewhere. We approached the house, and in front of our yard there were 52 or 53 graves. All dug up! The Germans dug up their own, placed them in coffins, sent them by car to Muraveyka, loaded them onto trains and took them somewhere. Somewhere in one place they were buried. They could not take everyone to Germany. There were so many of them that they were probably reburied in a mass grave...

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Our downed plane fell on Brekkel Island. This is in the direction of the Desna, Kiselevka, Ulyanovka ... Brekkel is such an island, it floods in the spring. And in late autumn, when the water is already freezing, they go there for the vine. And now my late husband, then he was a boy, with his friend took sleds, axes and went to this island to chop vines. They crossed over the ice and were just about to stop when they suddenly saw a man's elbow sticking out of the ice. They began to look further - the head, the nose is a little visible, the pilot's helmet. They were so frightened that they ran away from there ... And this pilot was seen by many from our village, who went there for the vine. On this plane, on this pilot, they talked endlessly among themselves, but the Germans were in the village all the time, and they were afraid to cut the body of the pilots out of the ice and bury them. And in the spring there was a terrible leash ...

My sister and I hid all the documents, books, notebooks in a wooden chest and buried them in the garden. So the Germans went and dug. We both had letters of commendation, with portraits of Lenin and Stalin. So Lenin was not touched, but Stalin's eyes were gouged out and fixed on the branches of trees with their eyes. They threw out all the books, they took the notebooks for themselves, but they didn't read German books. They dug everything out on the very first day, when they installed their gun. They had to dig a tunnel, so they got into our chest. We noticed then that Lenin's eyes had not been gouged out.

That battery, which had 4 guns, remained in the village. The guns must have been damaged. When people gathered to bury the horses, the old man, the owner of the barn where the horses were killed, said: "Well, the barn is gone ... But on the other hand, 7 horses were beaten, and their shooters are standing with me. Like a symbol."

September 2-3. Armored train. As can be seen from the German memoirs and testimonies of the inhabitants of the village of Vybli, the 260th Infantry Division was very much annoyed by the Soviet armored train. A curious document has been preserved about the activity of this armored train. Yes at the beginning of the battles against the Vyblin bridgehead:

"From the journal of military operations of the armored train No. 15 on the territory of the Chernigov and Kulikovskiy regions!.

| Chernihiv region during the Great Patriotic War (1941-m): Collection of documents and materials. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 8. S. 50.

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September 3, 1941

The raid at 15.00 was carried out at the call of the commander [of the 5th Rifle Corps. The fire was fired on the southern outskirts: Sands and Vybli. At 16.00, the advance of our motorized jota along the road from Kulikovka to Gorbov was noted. To communicate with her, a delegate was sent - Lieutenant Prostakov, who received an order to appear at the division headquarters at 2.00 on September 4, 1941. As it turned out, the 135th Rifle Division was approaching to liquidate the breakthrough.

As a result, for two days the enemy did not advance a single step in a southerly direction, the armored train fettered all his actions and did not let him out of the village of Vybli. In two days, 700 shells were fired at the enemy. The enemy suffered heavy losses from the artillery of the armored train, as evidenced by the mass of corpses on the outskirts of the village of Vybli. In the history of the armored train business, this operation near the village of Vybli should be reflected as an operation of an exceptional nature for an armored train operating independently and performing the task of destroying the advancing enemy and holding down his actions before the approach of his units.

It should be noted the skillful management of all actions of the armored train in this operation by the commander of the armored train and the political leadership ... "

Perhaps, in early September 1941, Captain T.B. was the commander of light armored train No. 15. Simberg. Some information about this armored train is on the site of Yevgeny Drig "Mechanized Corps of the Red Army"!, and it must be said that the data on the losses inflicted on the Germans correspond to the data of the Germans themselves and the testimony of the inhabitants of the village of Vybli:

"In September 1941, the enemy crossed the river. Desna in paradise one Pig. Encountering no resistance, since there were no our troops in the crossing area, the enemy sought to develop his advance to the south. The commander of the 15th armored train operating in the Chernigov-Gomel sector, having no connection with our units, decided to detain the enemy, prevent him from advancing southward and cut the railway. Having advanced to the Muraveyka junction and organized reconnaissance, the commander of the bepo? established the location of the Germans in the area of \u200b\u200bVibli and Peski. Near successive og-

| Wir://tespsogrz.gkka.gpl ? Bepo is an armored train.

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New air raids destroyed more than two companies of infantry, 4 anti-tank missiles, up to 10 mortars and held back the advance of the enemy until the units of the 135th Infantry Division approached. Bepo No. 15 escaped from the Kyiv pocket and in the fall of 1941 was in Voronezh.

As you can see, on September 3, the 135th Rifle Division was brought up to the Vyblin bridgehead. This division, commanded by Major General F.N. Smekhotvorov, shortly before the capture of the bridgehead, was transferred from the 5th to the 40th Army. It is interesting that in the order of the headquarters of the South-Western Front to the commander of the 40th Army on the destruction of the enemy troops who crossed the Desna River, which was issued on September 2, more than one, but three German crossings appear:

"The enemy, having broken through the inner flanks of the 21st and 5th armies, in the morning began to force the Desna Brusilov River. At 13.00 aircraft strafing established German crossings across the Desna River at the points of Goritsa, Brusilov, Svin.

The front commander ordered you, under your personal responsibility, as quickly as possible, but no later than by 1200 on September 3, to advance one tank battalion of the 10th tank division with one division of the 5th anti-tank brigade to the Kulikovka area at the disposal of the commander of the 5th for the face vision of the enemy who crossed to the south bank of the river.

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Southwestern  
Front, Major General Bagramyan, Military Commissar of Staff,  
Regimental Commissar Solovyov.

Goritsa, mentioned in this order, is located 10 km west of Brusilov. Apparently, the German 131st Infantry Division was crossing the Desna here, and on September 5th it would strike at the rear of Smekhotvorov's attacking Vybli division. Unfortunately, the 21st Army of the Bryansk Front, located in the area of both bridgeheads, delivered strikes to the northeast, in the direction of Semenovka and Novgorod-Seversky, where Guderian's troops advanced south. The headquarters stubbornly did not see the encirclement of the Southwestern Front being prepared and believed that Guderian was about to turn to the east, bypass the southern flank of the Bryansk Front and strike at Moscow ...

. Chernihiv region during the Great Patriotic War (1941-a): Collection of documents and materials. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, . S. 47.

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September 5th. Bridgehead expansion. Apparently, on this day, the 131st Infantry Division crossed to the Vyblinsky bridgehead, which crossed the Desna above the mouth of the Again, in the zone of the 66th Rifle Corps of the 21st Army:

morning led the battle to the east. env. Wibli and on the south and west. outskirts of Peska. 13.00 to the enemy infantry regiment, having crossed to the south. bank of the river Desna at Boromyka and Avdeevka, captured Gorbov. 135th Rifle Division, having turned two joint ventures in the direction of Gorbov, the rest of the units are fighting in the Vibli area ... A detachment of the Pinsk flotilla, consisting of 4 ships, has arrived and is operating together with 15th Rifle Corps, "the Operational Report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0133 to 22 reported hours on September 5, 1941, the combat operations of the front.

The 21st Army, having exhausted its forces by this day in unsuccessful attempts to connect with the Bryansk Front, began to withdraw to the southern bank of the Desna. However, the main forces of the army were concentrated not on the left flank, near the Vyblinsky bridgehead, but on the right, where Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group was advancing:

"... The army goes on the defensive with the front line along the south. be regu r. Desna front Shabalinovo, Star. Butovka, Volovitsa, Saltykova Maiden, Kovchin with the task of regrouping army units to the right flank and the subsequent offensive ...

... 66 sk to occupy and firmly defend the Volovitsa, Saltykova Maiden, Kovchin, Gorbovo line.

Advance detachments Burkovka, Gusavka, Borki.

One spa to have a reserve area Vershinova Muraveyka.

Border on the left: Drozdovka, Vershinova Muraveyka, Brusilovo, VYkhvostovo.

KP 66 - Veresoch, "the Combat order of the commander of the troops of the 21st Army No. 065 dated September 5, 1941 for the withdrawal of army troops to the southern bank of the river. Gum.

The settlements indicated in this order - Saltykova Devitsa, Kovchin, Gorbovo, Vershinova Muraveyka - are located in front of the eastern wing of the Vyblin bridgehead. However, by the evening of September 5, the 66th Rifle Corps was still on the northern bank of the Desna. Judging by the combat report of V.I. Kuznetsov ?, he was thrown back from Boromyk to the east, to Lake Olshanoe. Opposite Boromyk, on the southern bank of the Desna,

1,244 joint ventures of the 41st Infantry Division.

? Combat report of the commander of the troops of the 21st Army No. 040 dated September 5, 1941 on the results of the military operations of the army troops and the decision to withdraw them beyond the river. Gum. SBD WWII. T. 43.

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there are Uborki, occupied by the 460th regiment of the 260th division, and Gorbovo, where our 135th rifle division was located and attacked the 260th division. It was here that the 135th Rifle Division, the 131st Infantry Division, crossed over and hit the rear.

September 6-12. The opening of the Vyblinsky bridgehead, a breakthrough to the railway and the exit of the 260th division from the battles. On September 6, our division continued its offensive and reached the Kyiv-Chernigov railway south of Anisov. Here, my unforgettable spectacle opened up to us," Tim Gebhardt concludes his story about the battles of the 260th division at the Vyblinsky bridgehead. "On the eastern bank of the Desna lay huge mountains consisting of Russian vehicles, weapons, ammunition, dead Russians and their horses." The ring around Kyiv was closed. September 19, 1941 city! fell, and the Wehrmacht reported 675,000 prisoners. Marshal Budyonny, in the evening, on the eve of the loss of Kyiv, went to Moscow. He was so shocked by the losses suffered during the battle around Kyiv that he wanted to commit suicide right in Stalin's office.

After crossing the Desna, the "deer horn division"? was mentioned in the message of the Wehrmacht as follows:

"In the center of the Eastern Front, German troops were advancing in an extremely tense struggle for the river. Ammunition. and food, on absolutely swampy and silty logs, in swamps, were moved forward so timely, using all physical strength, that the fighting

—  
went as planned. Strong Soviet formations, leaving many dead, were driven back ... "3

Unfortunately, considering the history of the 260th Infantry Division, we had only two short fragments at our disposal - the machine gunner of the 480th Regiment Goetz and Hauptmann of the 470th Regiment Tim Gebhardt. These passages dealt with battles only on the Vyblin bridgehead. The further participation of the division in the battles of the Kyiv pocket can be traced from Soviet documents. In this case, we will start from the German periodization of the history of the 260th atep-  
P1\1\$up:

Kyiv.

? The emblem of the 260th Infantry Division depicts an antler.

3 Vadep-U/agietbegawe Ogmzyupep ip 2.\MeKpev. Gizattepwese wop VidoGUYSN.  
Kag5glpe: Wayar S. Wtip, 1957. \$. 61.

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- September 1-6: fighting on the Vyblinsky bridgehead;

- September 7-12: continued participation in the Kiev pocket by pursuing the enemy and saddling the Chernigov-Kiev road ("From Chernigov they struck further at Kiev and cut off the return path of Russian units. The regiments, having settled on the Chernigov-Kiev road, repelled all Russians to fall in. The badly damaged division thus no longer took part in further battles in

ve around Kyiv. Remained in the achieved positions and rested. Only starting on September 14, the regiments set off again, to the northeast in the direction of Bryansk, and then north to Dubrovka, "one of the German websites reports);

- September 13: withdrawal from the battle due to heavy losses, regrouping and march from Chernigov to Starodub and Roslavl.

The chronology of the 260th Infantry Division, after the opening of the Vyblisky bridgehead, looks like this according to Soviet documents.

6 September:

- "Parts of the 135th Rifle Division were thrown back in the morning by the enemy to the south of Wibli to the railway, at 17.00 went on the offensive and reached the southern encirclement. Wibli, "- reported in the Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0135 by 22 o'clock on September 6;

- "At the same time, the enemy, having crossed the river. Desna area Avdeevka, Boromyki, parts of 260 infantry division took possession of Gorbovo and is developing success in the south-west. direction ... 15 sk, 9 microns, 1 airborne, river flotilla, firmly holding the line of Bobrovitsa, x. Aleksandrovsky, Singers, Shamovka, Nv. Belous, with the right flank, destroy the enemy in the Gorbov, Vibli area and, by the end of 7.9.41, reach the southern bank of the river. Desna front Avdeevka, Pigs to destroy the crossings induced by the enemy ... Aviation with successive strikes to assist in the destruction of the Gorbovsky grouping of the enemy by 15 wells and prevent its further crossing to the southern bank of the river. Des on, "- from the Combat Order of the Commander of the 5th Army No. 0043 dated September 6, 1941 to destroy the enemy in the Gorbov, Vybli area and regroup the troops of the left flank of the army.

Apparently, it was on this very day, September 6, and not the 8th, as the residents of Vybley say, that an SB bombardier was shot down over the bridgehead. Gerard Alekseevich Kuznetsov, who tracked down this plane by establishing the names of the crew members, received the following documents from the archive in Podolsk:

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- Zaitsev A.D. Weapons of the strong in spirit: Textbook. Part 1. Monino, 1984. S. 235-236: "September 6, 1941, the crew of the 48th bap consisting of: commander Lieutenant Komochkov M.P., navigator Lieutenant Zhelitsyn I.I., air gunner-ra dist Kosyanovsky on South-Western Front near the city of Chernigov sent a damaged aircraft to the enemy troops ";

- Operational report No. 0124 dated September 6, 1941 of the headquarters of the 48th bap: "... During the day, the regiment made 2 single SB sorties to reconnaissance enemy troops in the area of Brusilovo, Vibli, Polubotki, Gorbov and one SB sortie led by five of the 150th air regiment to bombard the bridge near Brusilovo across the river. Desna ... In the district of Brusilovo, Wibli, Gorbov on the N-2000 m, they patrolled up to 6-8 Me-109 single

in pairs.

The crew that took off at 6.10, lieutenant Komochkov, navigator Zherlitsyn, sergeant Kostyanovsky, did not return to their airfield for reconnaissance of troops against the nickname Brusilovo, Vibli, Gorbov for some unknown reason ”;

- Opersvodka No. 137 dated September 6, 1941 of the headquarters of the 17th Aviation Division: "... The crew of 48 sbap lieutenant Komochko, navigator ml. lieutenant Zherlitsyn, gunner-radio operator sergeant Kosyanovsky ... during the shelling of an infantry and cavalry column from a height of 50 meters at the crossing on the 5th approach, the enemy's ZP was shot down by fire. The plane caught fire and crashed in the area of the crossing near Brusilovo on enemy territory.

September 7:

- "As a result of strong fighting during September 5-7, the situation on the Southwestern Front became more complicated ... The enemy, having come out kr. Desna, in the Avdeevka-Vibley sector, is striving with a force of more than two divisions to develop a strike around the city of Chernigov and go to the rear on the communications lines of the 5th Army. By 14.00 7.9 the enemy captured Vershina Muraveyka, Bogdanova Muraveyka, Ani sovo, "confirms the opening of the bridgehead and the exit of the 260th Infantry Division to the railway. To the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Direction on the situation at the front.

- "The 5th Army ... The enemy, developing an offensive to the south in the direction of Wibli, Anisovo, pushed back parts of the 135th Rifle Division, captured Anisovo and Baklanova Muraveyka ... The 135th Rifle Division is fighting on the line

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or Kulikovka, Yanovka. | vdb s-244 sp is fighting on the southern outskirts of Anisovo, "the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0137 reports by 22 hours on September 7, 1941 on the combat operations of the front troops.

8 September:

The history of the 134th Infantry Division reports a strong explosion in Chernigov that occurred early in the morning. Obviously, it was the bridges across the Desna that were blown up. Thus, the units of the 15th Rifle Corps located in Chernigov and north of Chernigov were forced to retreat to the southwest along the right bank of the Desna, in the hope of reaching the crossings of the 31st Rifle Corps. But along the Desna, along the left bank, the 260th Infantry Division developed its offensive. The remnants of the 15th sk, which will be able to swim across the Desna, will go straight to the positions of the 260th division.

- "The 5th Army with the forces of 135th Rifle Division and 9th Mk is counterattacking the opponents in the direction of Kulikovka. On the night of 9.9 allots 62, 45, 193 and

200 sd charge. Gum. th

135 sd 13.00 counterattacked the enemy in the direction of Kuli forging. There are no data on the results of the battle. | vdk's 244 sp is fighting for the west and south-west. Lukashevka, the latter is occupied by the enemy.

9 MK counterattacked the enemy in the direction of Vershinov Muraveyk, no data was received on the result of the battle, "the deployment and actions of the troops are reported in the Operative report of the SWF headquarters No. 0139 by 22 hours on September 8, 1941. As we know from the stories of local residents, since morning September, they still heard the noise of the battle, but after dinner there was silence ...

However, not all of the 260th Infantry Division went on the offensive from the Vyblin bridgehead. The starting point before seizing this bridgehead, as Tim Gebhardt told us, was the village of Kiselevka, on the northern bank of the Desna. Between Kiselevkoy and Chernigov, located to the west, is only 4 km. It is obvious that both Chernigov and Kiselevka were covered by the opposing troops during the entire struggle for the bridgehead.

On September 8, when the Soviet troops began to withdraw from Chernigov, the 3rd battalion of the 480th regiment went to the city from the side of Kiselevka. Why didn't the commander of this unit use the lesson taught by the machine gunner to the 260th division

' Yanovka - now the village of Ivanovka, is located 10 km south of Chernigov on the road Chernigov - Kyiv.

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Cemetery of the 3rd battalion of the 480th regiment of the 260th division on the outskirts

Chernigov (Yatsevo).

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Mykola near Tupichev is unclear. As soon as the battalion approached the hills on the outskirts of Chernigov, history repeated itself. Naholma, covering the withdrawal of troops, equipped a position for themselves 7 people with a machine gun "Maxim ...

... After the war, the corpses of all seven were excavated and reburied. According to the note in the medallion, we managed to establish the name of one of our soldiers - Xenophon Nikitovich Kuvytchenko from the Rostov region.

Unfortunately, as is customary for us, the German cemetery, which was equipped right there, at the battlefield, under the hill, was destroyed after the liberation of Chernihiv. And along with it, the "material evidence" of the heroism of our soldiers was also destroyed.



Once every few years, the Germans also come to the battlefields - veterans and children of veterans of the 260th Infantry Division. "We were talking about the graves of our comrades in Yatsevo, who are buried next to the road to Kiselevka. About 30 of our comrades lie in this place. Meanwhile, buildings - mostly business buildings - came close to the graves. With everything close to them is now a gas station. We believe that if the building continues to move forward, then the graves will fall victim to the excavator," one of the photographs of this cemetery of the 260th division that has been preserved since 1941 is signed. "Here lie 26 fallen soldiers of the 3rd battalion of the 480th regiment," reads the caption on another copy of the photograph.

Obviously, Germans from other divisions of the division were also buried here - local residents say that in 1941 there were from 45 to 50 crosses in the cemetery ...

9th of September:

- "The 5th Army, fighting fierce battles with the enemy, trying to cut off the escape routes and intercept the crossings across the river. Desna, departing.

135th Rifle Division fought with the enemy in the Orlovka region with a front to the north and northeast. Before the front, up to four battalions of 260 infantry divisions with tanks.

On the 1st vdk, the remnants of the 9th MK were fighting in the Yanovka area!, - reports the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 014] by 22 o'clock on September 9, 194] on the combat operations of the front troops.

Yanovka (Ivanovka) is located opposite Shestovitsy, where the 62nd and 45th rifle divisions of the 15th rifle corps of the 5th army took their last battle.

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10 September:

"The 5th Army continued to withdraw its units to the east with fighting. bank of the river Desna and with difficulty held back the advance of the enemy on its right flank.

135 sd, 1 ptabr, | vdk 9 microns were driven back by the enemy by force to the front (260 front) with 20 tanks to the front of Stodoly, Perekhodovka, Olishevka, Krasnoe.

62 and 45 rifle divisions, breaking through to the river. Desna, having lost all the materiel and convoys, which requires verification, are transported in small groups across the river. Desna by swimming in the Shestovitsy region, "says the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0142 by 10 o'clock on September 10, 1941.

By the evening of that day, the situation had worsened even more:

"The 5th Army is fighting hard, being part of the forces surrounded and part of the forces under the influence of superior enemy forces from the front.

15 speed

Remains of 135 sd, 1 ptb, | vdk 9 microns - a total of 1000 active fighters with difficulty hold back 260 infantry divisions, supported by 30 tanks and long-range artillery of the enemy at the Perekhodovka front, sowing. edge of the forest (southern Olishevka), (suit) Red. Pontoon and engineer battalions (army) were thrown into the Olishivka area.

45 and 62 sd continue in separate groups with the help of improvised crossing means and swim across to the east. bank of the river Gum. Artillery and tractor materiel were blown up and destroyed. Data on the losses of the divisions were not received.

... The 193rd, 195th and 215th divisions under the command of Major General Nesmelov continue to fight surrounded in the Slabino, Capricorn region, making their way to the crossing on the river. Desna, "- reports the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0143 by 22 o'clock on September 10, 1941.

11 September:

- "The enemy forces opposing the South-Western Front are grouped as follows on September 10, 1941 ... From the direction of Chernigov to the south, they develop success 260, 134 and 17 infantry divisions, having a depth of up to one infantry division ... Enemy actions ... Chernigov direction. During 10.9, the enemy continued to develop success in the entire sector of this direction ik [5.00 10.9, units 134 and 260 pd reached the Khotinovka, Olishevka, Ladinka line" - this was

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the last mention of the 260th Infantry Division in the documents of the Southwestern Front!.

The exact losses of the 260th division during its battle in the Kiev pocket are unknown to us. They probably corresponded to the general assessment of the situation in the 2nd Army of Weichs:

"Equally unsatisfactory was the situation with motor vehicles, especially in the 2nd Army. On September 13, a report from the headquarters of the 2nd Army stated that "the state of the Army's automotive equipment calls into question the maneuverability of divisions and the supply of troops. Losses of vehicles are increasing every day and cannot be replenished even approximately at the expense of captured vehicles. The carrying capacity of the existing fleet of automotive equipment has decreased from 2900 to 1500 tons, and due to the severe deterioration of the material part, it should be reckoned with its further decrease, "2 Reinhardt told us and made us think.

After all, if those colossal trophies that were captured

Germans in the Kiev cauldron, even approximately could not replenish their own losses, then how much did they lose?

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Intelligence report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 78 kb per hour on September 11, 1941 to the enemy grouping in front of the front on September 10, 1941 SBD WWII. T. 40.

From Reinhardt K. Turn near Moscow. The collapse of Hitler's strategy in the winter of 1941/42: An historical essay / Per. with it. G.M. Ivanitsky. Ed. A.I. Babin. M.: Voenizdat, 1980 (Ketyaga! K. Remepfe yog MozKats. az ssNetsepg deg "gaere N'er\$ t miieg 1941/1942. Zziivap: Veshesve \UePa8\$ - Apman, 1972. 5. 71).

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3 RAMREC-OGU1ZOM

Short story. 3rd Panzer Division! was formed in October 1935. The main stages of the military path: 1939 - Poland; 1940 - Holland, Belgium, France; 1941 - Brest, Slutsk, Bobruisk, Rogachev, Zhlobin, Mogilev, Sozh, Roslavl, Mglin, Unecha, Starodub, participation in the encirclement of Soviet troops in Ukraine, Tula; 1942 - Orel, Kursk, Kharkov, Caucasus; 1943 - Terek, Rostov, Mius, Belgorod, Kharkov, Dnieper, Cher cash desks; 1944 - Cherkasy, Uman, Bug, Dniester, Baranov, Narev; 1945 - Hungary, Styria, capitulation to the Americans.

The 3rd Panzer Division included: one tank, one artillery and two motorized regiments, as well as anti-tank, reconnaissance and engineer battalions. During the joint operation of the Army Groups "Center" and "South", aimed at fulfilling Hitler's order to destroy the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapov and outgrew the encirclement and destruction of the entire South-Western Front, the composition of the 3rd Panzer-P01 \ 1 \$ 10p included:

And

Emblems of the 3rd Panzer Division.

'  
The German source on which we relied in this chapter: Sezsisme Cheg 3. Rapgeg-Bmchup Ve lt-VtapFelbyte 1935-1945. Negaizrerebebe vat Tga@yuopzuefat@ 4er OBg\$yup. Veish: Uetsayo 4er Visnpapashiya Sisheg EsMeg, 1967.

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- Rapheg-Kevitepi 6 (three battalions);

- Zpihep-Veritepe 394 (two motorized rifle and one motorcycle battalion);

- Zspamep-Keritep! 3 (two motorized rifle battalions);

- APShepe-Veritepe 75 (two divisions);

- Rapgetzaweg-AMEPopv 521;

- Raprecareg-AMetCopr 543;

- Ai hip2\$-AMeyYipv 1;

- Rucheg-VayaShop 39.

The 6th Panzer Regiment, commanded by Oberst von Lewinsky in 1941, was

Commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, the only tank field

B. Model. commander of the 3rd division. To the top howl

our regiment consisted of 215 tan

kov: 58 - Ryo IP, 29 - R2 Shs with a 37-mm gun, 81 - R; Shs 50-mm cannon, 32 - R2 U and 15 command tanks.

On the eve of and during the Battle of Kiev, the 3rd Panzer Division under the command of Lieutenant General Walter Model was part of the 24th Army (motorized) Corps of the General of Tank Forces, Baron Geyer von Schweppenburg. The corps belonged to the 2nd Panzer Group, Colonel General Heinz Guderian, who operated as part of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Fedor von Bock (born 1880).

In the battles of late August-September 1941, the 3rd Panzer Division was in the vanguard of the Guderian group and played a key role in encircling and defeating the troops of the Southwestern Front in the Ukraine.

The commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, Walter Model, rose to the rank of field marshal during the war and was known as a master of defensive operations - "the rescue anchor of the Eastern Front." Model, along with Rundstedt, Rommel and Manstein, was considered the best strategist of the Wehrmacht. He was cruel and very demanding towards the officers of his headquarters.

In 1941, near Moscow, already in command of a corps, Model sharply scolded his subordinates for their inability and unwillingness to conduct winter military operations: "Why did you postpone the attack? After all, tomorrow will not be warmer! And it does not interfere with the Russians!"

In May 1942, a bullet from our sniper tore Model's left lung. In the 43rd, he saved his troops from defeat near Rzhev. It is believed that in the Battle of Kursk, Model also showed himself as a master of defense. In 1944, after the destruction of the Army Group "Center" by the Soviet army and the opening of the Commander of the 2nd tank horn to East Prussia, the group G. Guderian. Model confirmed his title, having managed to build a defense against the "Russian steamroller". After the assassination attempt on Hitler, Model was the first of the commanders of the Eastern Front to send a telegram to the Fuhrer with assurances of his loyal feelings. In the same year, 1944, the "Eastern expert" Walter Model was transferred to the Western Front. Participated in the planning of the Ardennes operation, which was the second winter offensive operation of the Wehrmacht after the attempt to deblock Stalingrad. On April 21, 1945, Model committed suicide.

The situation on the fronts and the assessment of the future actions of the Germans by the command of the SWF and SWN. The 3rd Panzer Division, as part of the Guderian group, was supposed to force the Western Bug at the start of the war, break through the Soviet defenses and quickly reach the Roslavl, Yelnya, Smolensk area. "After fulfilling its mission, the tank group was to receive new instructions from the command. The directive of the main command of the ground forces on strategic deployment indicated that after the next task of the 2nd and 3rd tank groups there would be an offensive towards the north and the capture of Leningrad, "writes Guderian

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an. And only at the third stage of the war, after the capture of Leningrad and the connection with the Finns, the Army Group Center, together with the Army Group North, were to advance on Moscow?

From about the 20th of July, the general offensive line of the 3rd Panzer Division, as well as the entire Guderian group, began to shift from the eastern ("Moscow") to the southeastern direction, and from mid-August it was already an almost constant advance in the southeast and south ("Ukrainian") direction. We deliberately put the names of the directions in quotation marks, because "Moscow" did not mean "to Moscow".

vu", and "Ukrainian" did not mean "to Ukraine". Where exactly the Army Group Center would turn, reaching Smolensk, no one, neither Mtlr, nor his generals, let alone Moscow, knew. But everyone was ready for something.

Army Group Center, hoping to get the Fuhrer's approval, was preparing to storm the prestigious target - Moscow.

Moscow, which began to be bombed by the 2nd Air Fleet of the Luftwaffe and specially deployed bombers from the West3 as a "repression" for the Soviet bombing of Bucharest and Helsinki, was preparing for a tough defense.

Hitler tossed between alternatives. Connect with the Finns, take Moscow or conquer the resources of Ukraine? There was not enough strength for everything at once ...

Moscow, having correctly determined that the most powerful German grouping was the central one, made a mistake in assessing the depth of the strike and sincerely assumed that after Smolensk the Germans would continue their offensive to the east - to Moscow.

Budyonny and Kirponos turned out to be the most far-sighted in their assumptions about the future.

On August 13, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front ordered the chief of staff of the 5th Army, Major General D.S. Pisarevsky:

"To the right of you FOR the Central Front ... Establish contact with it and support it firmly. In the current situation, this is very important. At the front, the enemy is active against

Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 197.

: Hitler's Directive No. 2] dated December 8, 1940, "Plan Barbarossa" (Herr'\$ Var Opesnue\$ 1939-1945. 1 ...: 31A\lsK Ala Wacson, 1964).

- Hitler's Directive No. 33 of July 19, 1941 [...: Za8lsk Ala)ackSop, 1964.

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the right flank of the army in a southeasterly direction. In your operational reports, always indicate the position of the left-flank units of the FOR.

Deputy Chief of Staff of the SWF  
Major General Bagramyan  
Military Commissar of the Staff of the  
SWF Colonel Zinoviev"1.

On August 16, the Commander-in-Chief of the YuZN Budyonny, in his report to Stavkuo, the situation of the troops, reported, among other things, the following:

"of particular importance

Moscow

Headquarters of the High Command

Comrade Stalin

I report the situation in the South-West direction.

Southwestern front.

... Thus, during the last week, the enemy approached the Dnieper River for a long distance and thereby creates a threat of forcing the river and reaching the most important directions for us. In this regard, the Southwestern Front faces the task of strengthening the defense of the left bank of the Dnieper from Kyiv to Kremenchug inclusive in the shortest possible time and creating at least small reserves ...

... It will be more profitable for us to withdraw the right flank of the Southwestern Front (5th Army and 27th Corps) to the east beyond the Dnieper.

The withdrawal of the right flank is also ripe because the neighboring Central Front, according to available data, is leading a boom on the approaches to the Bryansk-Unecha line. The sooner we create a reserve behind the right flank of the Southwestern Front, the more stable our position will be ...

... I ask the Headquarters of the High Command to give instructions on the issues raised.

S. Budyonny, N. Khrushchev, Pokrovsky?

b Order of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front dated August 13, 1941 to the chief of staff of the 5th Army to establish and maintain contact with the troops of the 3rd Army. SBD WWII. T. 40.

Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Forces of the South-Western Direction dated August 6, 1941 to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the situation of the troops of the South-Western and Southern Fronts. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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On August 17, 1941, the commander of the troops of the Southwestern Front, Hero of the Soviet Union M.P. Kirponos reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov that: "Judging by the current

operational-strategic situation, it should be assumed that after the enemy reaches the lower reaches of the Dnieper, his main efforts can be directed against both flanks and the deep rear of the SWF. The most probable directions for these enemy strikes will be: from the north - from the Gomel region to the southeast and from the south - from the Kremenchug, Dnepropetrovsk front to the north! The same report reported that "in order to secure and cover the right flank of the SWF from possible enemy attacks from the north from Gomel and to the east, it is necessary to strengthen the southern bank of the river in the shortest possible time. Desna in the area from Chernigov to the right border of the front.

Thus, it is this document, dated August 17, that is the first and most accurate forecast in assessing the future actions of the Germans.

The right border of the Southwestern Front with the Central Front (3rd and 21st armies) was the line: Kursk, Lgov, Glukhov, Gorodnya, Loev, Yurevichi, Stolin (all points for the SWF are exclusive). Significantly, Kirponos suggested that:

1. The main efforts of the Germans will be directed not against any one flank, but against both flanks and the deep rear of the SWF.
2. The attack on the right flank will be carried out not by the "traditional" Army Group "South" for the Southwestern Front, but by the "traditional" Army Group "Center" for the "Moscow" direction.
3. Army Group Center will attack the South-Western Front not only from the north, from Gomel, but also from the area east of Gomel. (So it turned out later: from the direction of Gomel, the 2nd Army of Weichs hit the South-Western Front, and from the side of Starodub, the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian, including the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model.)

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Report of the commander of the troops of the South-Western Front dated August 17, 1941 to the Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the South-Western direction on the degree of readiness of the defensive line along the river. Dnepr (SBD WWII. T. 40. M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

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In other words, in the second decade of August, the southwestern command, both Kirponos and Budyonny, assumed that, based on the position of the enemy troops on the entire Soviet-German front, there was a possibility that the southwestern front would be pincered by two German army groups. And that these pincers will not be the usual flank breakthroughs in the South-Western Front with access to its near rear, but an invasion immediately into the deep rear of the front without breaking through the lines of its defense.



Position of the Stavka and G.K. Zhukov. On July 29, Headquarters and the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Hero Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov. As protective measures, G.K. Zhukov suggested:

- First of all, to strengthen the Central Front, including by weakening the South-Western Front (withdrawing the South-Western Front and transferring one army to the Central Front);
- withdraw the troops of the South-Western Front beyond the Dnieper and leave Kyiv;
- to create reserves at the junction of the CFI SWF;
- launch a counterattack on the Germans in the Yelnya area!

Stalin, having listened to Zhukov's proposals, removed him from the post of chief of the General Staff and sent him near Yelnya to organize the proposed counterattack.

August 19 G.K. Zhukov, at that time the commander of the Reserve Front and a member of the Headquarters, sent I.V. A telegram to Stalin, in which he again reported on a possible enemy strike to the south, after which - "the main attack on Moscow, bypassing the Bryansk forests and an attack on the Donbass"<sup>2</sup>.

On the same day, the Stavka's reply was also received: "We consider your ideas about the probable advance of the Germans towards Chernigov, Konotop, Pryluk correct. The advance of the Germans ... will mean bypassing our Kyiv group from the eastern bank of the Dnieper and encircling our 3rd and 21st Armies. In anticipation of such an undesirable incident and for his

} Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 2 vols. M.: Olma-Press, 2002. S. 350.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 3 3rd

and 21st armies were part of the Central Front.

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warning created the Bryansk Front, headed by Eremenko. Other measures are being taken, which we will report separately. We hope to stop the advance of the Germans. Stalin, Shaposhnikov"<sup>1</sup>.

It should be emphasized that in both Zhukov's proposals to Stalin (July 29 and August 19) it was not about the need to strengthen the Southwestern Front.

And those measures that were taken by the Headquarters, the strengthening of the South-Western Front were also not:

- the order of the Headquarters of August 19 to withdraw the troops of the South-Western Front to the left bank of the Dnieper, leaving *tete-de-po nov* on the right bank and with the task of holding the Dnieper Kyiv? did not contain almost anything that would allow the SWF to protect its right flank. Due to some reduction in the front, part of the troops of the 5th Army, Major General M.I. Potapova passed into the subordination of the South-Western Front as a front reserve and concentrated north of Chernigov. However, in just a few days, already in the course of the fighting in the northern direction, these troops will be dispersed between the 5th and 40th armies;

- the creation of the Bryansk Front on August 14 under the command of Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko cannot be considered a measure to protect the right flank of the South-Western Front from Guderian's troops marching to the south. After all, the main task of the Bryansk Front was defined as follows: "Cover the Moscow strategic region from the southwest and prevent the breakthrough of Guderian's tank group through the Bryansk Front to Moscow"<sup>3</sup>.

A certain, perhaps sinister, role in the decision of the Stavka was played by the experience of 1920, when the blow of the Western Front against the Poles eased the situation of the Southwestern Front. The task of holding Kyiv at any cost could also have been born out of the sad experience of 1920, when Soviet troops were forced to surrender Kyiv and retreat across the Dnieper without leaving any advantageous footholds behind them. Then, when the general offensive began, we had to cross the Dnieper, form a bridgehead and take Kyiv. The headquarters knew about this precedent by no means

1 Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 2 vols. M.: Olma-Press, 2002. S. 360.

. Operational Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001084 dated August 19, 1941 to the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction for defense along the eastern bank of the river. Dnepr (SBD WWII. T. 40. M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

. Eremenko A.I. At the beginning of the war. M.: Nauka, 1965. S. 290. 192

from textbooks on military art: Stalin in the Polish campaign was a member of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, and Shaposhnikov was the head of the Operational Directorate of the Field Headquarters of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic... |

It is possible that the clue to the actions of the Headquarters in relation to the Southwestern Front is also hidden in the conversation between Stalin and Kirponos, which took place on August 8, 1941. During this conversation, Stalin told Kirponos: "The Defense Committee and the Headquarters ask you to take all possible and impossible measures to defend Kyiv. In two weeks it will be easier, since we will have the opportunity to help you with fresh forces, and within two weeks you need to defend Kyiv at all costs "...! Based on this mysterious timeline reported by

Kirponos on August 8, it can be assumed that around August 22 (plus or minus) the situation on the fronts should have changed in such a radical way that the question of the need to hold Kyiv would cease to be relevant. It is quite obvious that the Stavka overestimated the possibilities of counterattacks by the Zhukov and Eremenko fronts against the enemy, who was waiting for these strikes and prepared for defense ...

However, it should be noted that Zhukov's assessment of the state of the troops of Army Group Center as unsatisfactory, which he reported to Stalin on July 29, is fully confirmed by Hitler's Directive No. 34 of July 30, in which the 2nd and 3rd tank groups 10 days were given to "rehabilitate their formations", and the Army Group "Center" was ordered to go on the defensive, "using a suitable landscape." K., unfortunately, Zhukov's counterattack hit the already replenished, rested and dug into the "suitable landscape" troops of Army Group Center ...

An interesting, unparalleled assessment of the actions of the Stavka and G.K. Zhukov was given by Hero of the Soviet Union, Professor, General of the Army S.P. Ivanov, who in the summer-autumn of 1941 served as chief of the operations department - for the deputy chief of staff of the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front?:

| Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections: In 2 vols. M.: Olma-Press, 2002. S. 358.

? At the junction of the 13th and 21st armies of the Bryansk Front tank group Gude

Ryan with the 3rd Panzer Division, which is moving in the vanguard, will pass into the deep rear of the South-Western Front.

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"I allowed myself to express a number of assessments that are not consistent with the interpretation of certain phenomena generally accepted until recently ...

... The main argument in favor of the fact that the enemy plans were allegedly uncovered in a timely manner by the Soviet command is a letter from G.K. Zhukov (he then headed the Reserve Front), sent on August 19, 1941 to I.V. Stalin. I take the liberty of quoting it more fully than is usually done.

"Moscow, Comrade Stalin.

1. The enemy, convinced of the concentration of large forces of our troops on the roads to Moscow, having on his flanks the Central Front and the Velikie Luki grouping of our troops, temporarily abandoned the attack on Moscow and, having switched to active defense against the Western and Reserve Fronts, all his strike he threw mobile and tank units against the Central, Southwestern and Southern fronts.

Possible intention of the enemy: |

Defeat the Central Front, reaching the area of Chernigov, Konotop, Priluki, defeat the armies of the South Western Front with a blow from the rear. After that - the main blow to Moscow, around the course of the Bryansk forests and a blow to the Donbass ...

2. In order to counter the enemy and prevent the destruction of the Central Front and the enemy's access to the rear of the Southwestern Front, I consider it my duty to report my thoughts on the need to assemble a strong grouping in the area of Glukhov, Chernigov, Konotop as soon as possible. The echelon of cover of concentration should immediately be thrown onto the river. Gum.

This grouping must be enabled:

1) Up to 1000 tanks, which are to be assembled at the expense of the mechanized corps of the ZakVO, RGK tanks and further 300 tanks to be taken from the Far Eastern Fleet.

2) Up to 10 rifle divisions.

3) 3-4 cavalry divisions.

4) 400-500 aircraft assembled at the expense of the ZakVO, the Air Force of the Marine Fleet, the Air Force of the Moscow Air Defense Zone.

If we set ourselves a more active way of counteracting this very dangerous action of the enemy, the entire proposed grouping must be urgently assembled in the Bryansk region, from where they should strike the enemy in the flank!

Now, without waiting for the end of the concentration of the Bryansk

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At this point, I.Kh. Bagramyan in his memoirs.

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grouping, it is expedient to reinforce the right wing of the Western Front with 4-5 more rifle divisions, 8-10 heavy regiments of the RGK and immediately go on the offensive with the aim of reaching the Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk front.

A strike by the right wing of the Western Front with the aim of reaching the Polotsk, Vitebsk, and Smolensk fronts will also be very useful in the operation of our troops on the Desna River.

Zhukov 19.8.41"1.

What can be said about this document? First of all, we are not talking about a peremptory disclosure of enemy actions based on specific intelligence data, but about the assumption of G.K. Zhukov. He writes about a possible plot against Nick. In my opinion, the author of the document is mistaken when he believes that the enemy does not strike at Moscow just because

I was convinced of the concentration of large forces of our troops on the roads to Moscow. As countermeasures, G.K. Zhukov recommends three options:

a) to assemble a colossal force group (which was completely unrealistic in the absence of reserves and the difficulties of their delivery) in the area of Glukhov, Chernigov, Konotop;

6) the same in the region of Bryansk;

c) reinforce the right wing of the Western Front and immediately go on the offensive with the aim of reaching the Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk line.

It is necessary, I think, to say frankly that if the Headquarters had complete confidence in the presumed

1 Zhukov himself, in his memoirs, quotes his assumptions and proposals of August 19 in this form and volume (op. cit. p. 359): our Central Front and the Velikoluksky grouping of our troops, temporarily abandoned the attack on Moscow and, going over to active defense against the Western and Reserve Fronts, threw all its shock mobile and tank units against the Central, Southwestern and Southern Fronts. A possible plan of the enemy: to smash the Central Front and, having reached the Chernigov-Konotop-Priluki region, defeat the armies of the South-Western Front with a blow from the rear. After that - the main blow to Moscow, bypassing the Bryansk forests and a blow to the Donbass. In order to thwart this dangerous intention of the Hitlerite command, I would consider it expedient to create as soon as possible a large grouping of our troops in the Glukhov-Chernigov-Konotop region, so that with its forces they could strike at the enemy's flank as soon as he began to carry out his plan. The strike force must include 10-11 rifle divisions, 3-4 cavalry divisions, at least a thousand tanks and 400-500 aircraft. They could be singled out at the expense of the Far East, the forces of the Moscow defense and air defense zone, as well as the internal districts.

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enemy plan, and if she had such fantastic reserves in those conditions, then it would be possible not only to prevent the success of the Wehrmacht, but also to turn the fascist troops back, defeating them in one fell swoop. It is known that the Headquarters reacted very quickly to the report of G.K. Zhukov. On the same day he was sent a reply...

... From this answer it is clear that if the Stavka considered G.K. Zhukov about the enemy's intention to strike in the direction of Chernigov, Konotop, Priluki was correct, she by no means drew the same conclusions from this as he did, but considered it possible in the enemy's plans only to bypass the Kiev grouping of the Southwestern Front. The Headquarters apparently believed that its encirclement could be avoided. First of all, it refers to the encirclement of the 3rd and 21st armies, that is, the armies of the Central Front, which at that time were already in the semicircle.

Noting the existence of these documents and the fact that they indicated to one degree or another the possible intention of the enemy, which was subsequently actually carried out, it is necessary to emphasize once again that the content of the documents mentioned was at that time only an assumption and therefore an episode. , which far from fully determined the practical activities of the Soviet command. After all, even G.K. Zhukov not only did not draw the necessary practical conclusions from his generally correct forecast, but also expressed directly opposite considerations. Here is a squeak from the order signed by him on August 26, 1941, that is, after the Nazi troops began to turn

South:

"Order No. 0024 / op of the Reserve Front dated 26.8.4 1

1. The enemy, defending on the front of the 24th and 43rd armies, is concentrating his mobile forces against the troops of the Bryansk Front, presumably with the aim of striking in the coming days in the directions of Bryansk, Zhizdra ... "

From this order it clearly follows: the commander who drafted it believed that the Wehrmacht was delivering the main blow to Moscow and, moreover, bypassing Bryansk from the north, but carrying it from the south. So, apparently, G.K. Zhukov did not have a firmly established point of view at that time.

If you look at the instructions given by the Headquarters to the Bryansk Front at that time, it turns out that it acted in accordance with the assumption that an enemy strike would be launched on Bryansk and then on Moscow, that is, in fact, it did not take into account

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attention to the above considerations of the Commander of the Reserve Front. Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov August 24 in negotiations with A.I. Yeremenko pointed out in no uncertain terms that the main forces of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group were aimed against the 217th and 279th Rifle Divisions (these right-flank divisions of the 50th Army of the Bryansk Front were at the junction with the 43rd Army of the Reserve Front). He literally said the following: "... therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the second echelon here and scatter mines in order to prevent its attack on Zhizdra bypassing Bryansk from the north." This means that the Headquarters, along with the possibility of an attack on Moscow after bypassing Bryansk from the south, believed that Bryansk was generally an important object of the enemy's aspirations and that it was here that Guderian's main forces, rushing towards Moscow, would operate ...!

Thus, although until August 21 the Germans themselves did not know that they would be turned to Ukraine, the most correct forecast about the possibility of such a turn, in combination with an attack on the southern flank of the SWF, was made by M.P. Kirponos.

A brief chronology of events relating directly to the 3rd Panzer Division in the days preceding the Kiev encirclement looks like this:

August 14th. The Bryansk Front was created, and the city of Novgorod-Seversky, which was soon captured by Model's division, entered its zone of responsibility.

On August 16, the 3rd Panzer Division took Mglin and went  
go south.

August 17th. Model's division took Unecha, cut the Gomel-Bryansk railroad, and continued the offensive in a southerly direction, towards Starodub. The purpose of the "southern march" of part of the troops of the Army Group "Center" and the 3rd Panzer Division these days was to prevent the Soviet troops stationed in the Go area from retreating to the east.

1 Ivanov S.P. Headquarters of the Kirov: front-line headquarters. M.: Military Publishing House, 1990. S. 147-149.

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grinding!. A few days later, this goal was achieved, and the troops of the 3rd and 21st armies of the Central Front, instead of retreating to the east, began to retreat to the south - to Ukraine. Thus, a cover for the right flank of the Southwestern Front began to form in a "natural" way.

August 21st. A very important day. The 24th Panzer Corps, which included the 3rd Panzer Division, captured Kosto beaver - railway. station on the territory of Ukraine, thereby cutting the railway between Novgorod-Seversky and Novozybkov and ended up at the butt between the 21st Army of the Central Front and the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front.

On the same day, units of the 13th Army, which were destined in the initial phase of the formation of the Kiev pocket to engage in battle with the 3rd Panzer Division and other formations of the 24th Panzer Corps, received an order from the commander of the 13th Army, Major General Konstantin Dmitrievich Golubev:

"1. The Starodub grouping of the enemy creates a threat of spreading to the south-south-east, threatening our left flank and Stykus 21A.

2. To eliminate this threat, in addition to changing order No. 056, 143 sds 699 ptap and 12 ozads (located in Nov Gorod-Seversky), advance and create an all-round defense in the Semenovka and Novgorod-Seversky regions by the end of 22.8.41.

To reinforce the division, pour into it the remnants of the 148th Rifle Division, located in Novgorod-Seversky, and one marching battalion in

consisting of 1000 bayonets, which are transferred along the railway. present Pirogovka"2.

To assess the strength of the forces allocated for all-round defense, it should be taken into account that, as of August 19, the 143rd Rifle Division numbered 2,450 people, of which only 800 people had rifles.

Sh`uderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 265.

? Private combat order of the commander of the 13th Army No. 057 dated August 21, 1941 19.20 for the creation of all-round defense by the 143rd Infantry Division in the Semenovka, Novgorod-Seversky area (SBD VOV. T. 43. M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the Union SSR, 1960).

3 Operational report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 02 by 20 o'clock on August 19, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front (SBD VOV. T. 43. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

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22 August. "The 13th Army completed the battle in the area of Unecha and Starodub, withdrew units from the encirclement and began to fortify at the line of Semtsy - Baklan - Pogar - Kister - Semenovka. At the same time, on the path of the 3rd Panzer Division at the turn of Pogar - Kister - Vorobyovka, the 4th Airborne Corps!, 6th and 307th Rifle Divisions were to take up the defense. The front from Pogar to Kister is a line running from north to south. A from Kister, in the direction of Semyonovka, this line turns southwest. The breakthrough of this particular section of the front brought the Germans back to the South-Western Front. And since the Germans, on August 21st, occupied Kostobobr, located south of the Kister-Semenovka line, it can be stated that the defense line of the Bryansk Front was "broken" by the Germans even before the troops occupied this line.

To the left, to the west, from units of the 13th Army, at the turn of Luzhki - Lobanovka - Zamyshevo - Novozybkov, units of the 21st Army of the Central Front were defending. The forty-kilometer stretch between Luzhki, the extreme right point of the 21st Army, and Vorobyovka, the extreme left point of the 13th Army, was not occupied by Soviet troops ...

On the same day, August 22, the commander of 13A ordered the 50th Panzer Division to concentrate in the Vorobyovka area (24 km northwest of Novgorod-Seversky) and prepare for counterattacks in the directions: Vorobyovka - Starodub and Vorobyovka - Semenovkaz3. The village of Vorobyovka is located just 8 km from the village of Kostobobrov and 14 km from the railway. station Kosto beaver, which had been occupied by the 3rd Panzer Division the day before, on 21 August.

The 50th Panzer Division, which was supposed to take up defense in Vorobyovka on August 22, 1941, as of August 5, 1941, consisted of the 99th and 100th tank regiments, the 50th motorized rifle regiment and a reconnaissance battalion. commanded



50th Panzer Division, Colonel B.S. Bakharov, the military commissar was the battalion commissar Aplesnin, the chief of staff

1 4th Airborne Command was commanded by General A.S. Zhidov, and after his departure to the 3rd Army - Colonel A.F. Kazankin.

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 08 by 20 o'clock on August 22, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front (SBD VOV. T. 43. - M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

3 Private combat order of the commander of the 13th Army No. 059 dated August 22, 1941 for the concentration of the 50th Panzer Division in the Vorobyovka area

(SBD VOV. T. 43. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

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lieutenant colonel Chepurnoy!. As of August 30, there were no more tanks in this division.

Judging by the documents available to us, on August 22, neither at the headquarters of the 13th Army, nor at the headquarters of the Bryansk Front, no one knew or assumed that the Germans, represented by the 24th Corps and its 3rd Panzer Division, were already behind open adjacent flanks of the Bryansk and Central fronts ...

August 23. The Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, arrived at the headquarters of Army Group Center and informed Guderian, who had been called there, that on August 21, Hitler had decided to attack primarily not on Leningrad and not on Moscow, but on Ukraine and Crimea. "It was obvious to us that the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder, was himself deeply shocked by the fact that his plan for developing an offensive against Moscow had failed," Buderian writes. On the same day, Guderian flew to the Fuhrer's headquarters in East Prussia, where he unsuccessfully tried to prove to Hitler that it would be more efficient to capture a large railway junction and an industrial center - Moscow, than to own the raw materials, industrial and energy resources of Ukraine, while securing his own power base in Romania from Soviet air raids.

Very important for understanding the relative safety of the actions of the Soviet military and political leadership in these days were the following words of Guderian: "I

.remembered to him (Hitler. - Auth.) that the troops of Army Group Center were already in full combat readiness to go on the offensive against Moscow "...

In other words, if in the 20th of August the Soviet leadership had any serious intelligence information about the Army Group Center, then this information

The mission unequivocally indicated that the offensive would be launched precisely in the direction of Moscow. Nevertheless, we emphasize once again that the very disposition of German troops, hanging over the South-Western Front, in conjunction with the value of the resources of the UK-

) Order of the commander of the 50th Panzer Division No. 26 dated August 5, 1941 on shortcomings in the organization of intelligence and instructions for their elimination (SBD VOV. T. 33. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1957).

2 p uderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 267.

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the ruins and the south of Russia, made it possible to assume a strike on the Southwestern Front ... Roughly speaking, the way of thinking of Budyonny and Kirponos corresponded to the way of thinking of Hitler, and the way of thinking of Stalin - to Halder and Guderian ...

On the same day, August 23, Lieutenant General Eremenko ordered the commander of the 13th Army: "On the left flank in the Novgorod-Seversky region, have one rifle division (283rd rifle division)." According to the same order, it was necessary to prepare several cut-off positions and tete-de-pons along the western bank of the Desna. On the way and in the area of the upcoming hostilities, the 3rd Panzer Division was ordered: to prepare a cut-off position for Pogar, Borschovo, Kister, Art. Ugly-Zavod and create "the strongest tête de pon" in the Novgorod-Seversky region!. Obviously, given that the Ugly-Zavod station is only 4 km from the Kostobobr station, the command of the Bryansk Front, like its left-flank 13th Army, had no information about the real location of the enemy ...

Particular attention at these lines of defense and cut-off positions was ordered to be given to the construction of anti-tank obstacles with all-round defense and the construction of anti-tank artillery positions with flank fire. Reserves of anti-tank artillery, mines and bottles of "KS" had to be created on the expected directions of movement of German tanks.

Apparently, despite the limited time for preparing for the defense, some lines of anti-tank defense were actually created: "Wide anti-tank ditches with tree trunks driven into the ground delayed the tanks ... Artillery fire from large-caliber guns shot down tank barriers. With the help of explosions, sappers made passages in anti-tank ditches, "writes Paul Carell in the chapter on the capture of Novgorod-Seversky by the 3rd Panzer Division2?.

24 August. The "planned" passage of the Germans to the rear of the Southwestern Front. On this day, August 24, the 24th Panzer Corps Pus, having thrown back the Soviet troops behind the Unecha-Starodub line, captured Novozybkov. And on the same day Guderian received

1 Combat order of the commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front No. 03 / O0OP dated August 23, 1941 for defense (SBD VOV. T. 43. M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

with | Karel P. Barbarossa: from Brest to Moscow. Smolensk: Rusich, 2002.

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official order to begin on August 25 movement to Ukraine. Konotop was indicated as the initial target. Thus, in the eyes of an outside observer, nothing changed in the movement of the 3rd Panzer Division moving south: Mglin - Unecha - Starodub - Novgorod-Seversky and Konotop - everything is on the same line running from north to south.

However, in the eyes of a non-outsider, too, unfortunately, nothing has changed.

"The prisoners captured in the battles on August 23 showed that the 3rd Panzer Division, which occupied Starodub, had the task of advancing south. The 4th Panzer Division, judging by the same testimony, was supposed to advance to the right, parallel to the 3rd Panzer Division, writes Eremenko, commander of the Bryansk Front. - These testimonies of the prisoners were confirmed on August 25 by aviation reconnaissance data, which discovered a motorized enemy column (more than 500 vehicles) moving along the Unecha-Starodub highway and further south. Comprehensive information about this was conveyed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the next day during negotiations with him by direct wire.

Simultaneously with the movement to the south, the enemy was active in the Pochep area. With a strong attack by tanks and motorized infantry, the Nazis pushed back the left-flank units of the 260th Rifle Division. At least 100 tanks and vehicles with motorized infantry were found here.

On the basis of these facts, I came to the conclusion that the enemy was conducting active reconnaissance with strong forward units, supported by powerful tank weapons, possibly with the aim of striking at Bryansk in the near future. However, the Nazis did not deal this blow. Then we believed that they had learned about the creation by us on the outskirts of Bryansk of defense, which consisted of three defensive lines, reinforced

: Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 274.

But the captured non-commissioned officers from the 3rd Panzer Division reported to Eremenko that "the 3rd Panzer Division had as its task to act to the south, to cut off Budyonny." And Eremenko, as is clear from the recording of his conversations with Shaposhnikov, informed the Chief of the General Staff that "this message has some basis, since the 3rd Panzer Division on 19.8 began to move south from Starodub, and then

rushed to the west and rose somewhat north of Starodub. The prisoners claim that they returned because someone bypassed their rear "(SBD VOV. t. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

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ny anti-tank ditches. In fact, the 47th Panzer Corps, whose attack on Bryansk we feared, had the task of supporting the 24th Panzer Corps, which was striking south in accordance with Hitler's order. For this purpose, the 47th Corps struck at Trubchevsk, thereby ensuring the strike of the same 24th Tank Corps at Novgorod-Seversky. Only later did it become clear that this was the provision of a much deeper blow to the south.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command, without revealing this strategic maneuver of the enemy, orientated us to the fact that Guderian's main grouping was aimed against the right (northern) wing of the Bryansk Front ...

Thus, fragmentary intelligence about the movement of separate units to the south by the front command, nor the Headquarters, which was informed of this, was not temporarily assessed as a turn to the south by the 2nd field army and the 2nd tank group.

A very interesting document for studying the issue of the passage of the Guderian group and its 3rd Panzer Division behind the rear of the Southwestern Front is the Combat Order of the commander of the 13th Army, Major General Golubev No. 60, given by him on the evening of August 24?.

According to this order, the 13th Army was to "defend the line along the river. Judgment at the front (suit.) Pochep, Pogar, Kister, Ponurovka, Voronok, Meadows.

The line from Pogar to Kister is a line running from northeast to southwest. The troops stationed here were supposed to fulfill the main task of the Bryansk Front - to prevent the Germans from breaking through to Moscow through the southern wing of the Bryansk Front. The Kister-Luzhki section runs from east to west. The troops defending this line were facing north and were supposed to provide a junction with the Central Front and prevent the enemy from breaking through from north to south, rearing the Southwestern Front. To the west of Luzhkov, also facing north, the 21st Army of the Central Front retreated to the rear of the Southwestern Front. Thus,

| Eremenko A.I. At the beginning of the war. M.: Nauka, 1965. S. 307.

Combat order of the commander of the troops of the 13th Army No. 60 dated August 24, 1941 for the defense of the Pochep, Pogar, Kister, Luzhki line (SBD VOV. T. 43. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

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the left wing of the 13th Army, in the Kister-Luzhki sector, and the right wing of the 21st Army, in the Luzhki-Novozybkov sector, were de facto a cover for the rear of the Southwestern Front from attacks from the north by motorized troops of Army Group Center.

However, the order of the commander of the 13th Army, based on the main task of the Bryansk Front, included a dangerous thing - the withdrawal of the left wing of his army from the east-west line (cover line of the South-Western Front) to the north-south line (cover line of Moscow).

According to order No. 60:

- The 307th Rifle Division, together with the 462nd Corps Artillery Regiment, was supposed to defend the Pogar, Borshchevo, and Kister fronts. At the same time, the 307th Rifle Division was ordered to prepare a defensive line on the Pogar-Gremyach front. In other words, a retreat from Pogar was not planned, but the left flank of the 307th Rifle Division could withdraw east, to Gremyach!;

- The 6th rifle division, having replaced parts of the 4th airborne corps, was supposed to defend the front (claim.) Kister - B. Andreikovichi - Ponurovka and at the same time prepare a defensive line on the front Kister - Buchki - Buda Vorobyovskaya. Here, as in the case of the 307th Rifle Division, the retreat of the right flank was not planned, but the left flank could retreat to the previously prepared lines in the east.

A fatal role in the future drama of the Southwestern Front was played not only by the planned straightening of the 13th Army counterclockwise in a north-south line, but also by the regrouping of its troops, which coincided in time and space with the decisive German offensive to the south:

- The 143rd Rifle Division, which had previously been ordered to take up all-round defense in Novgorod-Seversky and Semenovka, was now ordered to move forward and, having replaced units of the 4th Airborne Corps, to defend the line on

`front (suit.) Ponurovka - Funnel - Meadows. This line had to be occupied by August 25, and the defense of Novgorod-Seversky and Semenovka transferred to the 283rd Rifle Division;

- The 283rd division was ordered to be in Novgorod Seversky as an army reserve. The division was supposed to prepare Novgorod-Seversky for defense and "have a mobile

1 Gremyach is a settlement on the territory of Ukraine, not far from the confluence of the river. Judgment in the Desna, 45 km north of Novgorod-Seversky.

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a group in vehicles of at least a battalion "in readiness to counterattack the Germans in the directions of Pogor, Ponurovka and Luzhki. The problem was that the 283rd division was not yet in Novy Gorod-Seversky. The Army Air Forces were ordered to cover her unloading in the city only on 26 August. And this is exactly the day when the 3rd Panzer Division captured Novgorod-Seversky;

- units of the 4th airborne corps, after occupying its defense lines by units of the 6th and 143rd rifle divisions, were ordered to leave for the front reserve in Suzemka;

- The 50th Panzer Division, which was the reserve of the 13th Army, was ordered to be in the Vorobyovka area and be ready to attack the enemy in the directions of Kister, Pogor, Kostobobr and Luzhki. By August 24, this division received 17 tanks for its reconstruction.

"From the Desna to the Sula. The Great Battle around Kyiv" - this is the title of the chapter from the history of the 3rd Panzer Division?, dedicated to the encirclement of the South-Western Front, which it is time for us to start studying:

On August 24, the army group orders the tank group to go on the offensive to the south, to the rear of the Soviet 5th army defending near Kyiv. The first target is the city of Konotop. XXV army (motorized) corps will be the edge of the sword of the army when overcoming the Desna. The corps orders the 10th Infantry Division (motorized) to march on the Hills - Avdeevka, the 3rd Panzer Division - to capture the crossings across the Desna. 4th Panzer Division - will first clear the western bank of the river, and then follow the 3rd Panzer Division - this is how the story of the participation of the 3rd Rap? eg-Gu \ op in the creation of the Kiev

kotlaz.

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Record of negotiations between the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army with the commander of the Bryansk troops on August 24, 1941 about the situation in the Bryansk Front. SBD

. T. 43.

? Sezsyste Cheg 3. Rapgeg-Omyyup Ve! t-Bran4epbige 1935-1945. Negaizrerebebe vat Tgadyupzuefap 4er Om5yup. Ve: Uecav eg Wispnape Someg Speg, 1967.

3 Sezsyste 4er 3. Rapkheg-R!u15yup Ve t-Vgap4depbige 1935-1945. egaiizverebep ut Tgadyupzuefapa 4er P!51yup. Weirsch: Wayav 4er Visppapaipe Sisheg Husmeg, 1967. \$. 160.

The above order, according to which the 3rd Panzer Division went south - behind the rear of the 5th Army of the Southwestern Front, was signed by the commander of Army Group Center, von Bock, and read:

Army Group Center

Operations Department No. 900/41.

Top secret 24.5. 1941

#### ORDER FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS:

1. The task set by the supreme command is to destroy the 5th Soviet army before it manages to withdraw beyond the line of Sula, Konotop, r. Desna, by striking the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "Center" and "South". With the fulfillment of this task, it is necessary to gain a foothold in the area east of the middle reaches of the river. Dnieper and continue the operation in the direction of Kharkov.

2. To accomplish this task, the Army Group "Center" advances through the Rechitsa, Starodub line in a southerly direction: a) the 2nd Army - consisting of the 13th and 43rd Army Corps and the 35th temporary formation, a total of seven infantry divisions and one cavalry division advances on Chernigov on the right flank; b) The 2nd Panzer Group (directly subordinate to the commander of the army group) operates as part of the 24th and 47th tank corps, since these corps will be combat-ready.

The immediate task of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group is to seize the bridgeheads between Chernigov and Novgorod-Seversk, from there, depending on the development of the situation, to advance further to the south or southeast.

3. Army Group "South" forces the 6th Army r. Dnieper and r. Gum. Its northern flank had already crossed the river. Desna on Ostra. The army was ordered to continue the offensive on Nizhyn, and part of the forces to launch an offensive from the south to Chernigov!.

4. The 4th Army expands its defensive front to the south and takes over guarding in the area between Pochep and

On August 23, the 6th Army crossed the Dnieper near Okuninovo. But she failed to capture Oster on the move. Chernigov, after the opening of the Okuninovsky bridgehead on the Dnieper, will be attacked by the 98th Infantry Division. The attack on Nizhyn failed due to the failure of the German troops near Ostrom. This paragraph of von Bock's order proves that the main goal of both army groups was not to encircle the South-Western Front, which the Germans did not even hope for, but to encircle and destroy only Potapov's 5th army.

the former southern flank of the 4th Army, which until now was controlled by the 2nd Panzer Group ...

(...)

5. Boundary lines: a) between the 2nd Army and the 2nd Panzer Group - Surazh, Klintsy, Klimovo, Churovichi, Sosnitsa (settlements are included in the area of the 2nd Panzer Group); at crossroads, parts of the tank group have the right of preferential passage ...

(...)

von Bock.

Von Bock's order, in turn, was a development of the famous "Principal instruction OKU/AMMESUASCH.T .. - [Op - Mg. 44141/41" dated August 21, 1941, in which Hitler stunned his generals preparing to attack Moscow with tasks that were completely unexpected for them:

"The proposal of the army to continue the operation in the east from 18.8 does not coincide with my intentions. I order the following:

1. The most important goal to be achieved before the onset of winter is not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, the industrial and coal Donetsk region, and the blocking of the Russian oil inflow from the Caucasus region ...

2. The extremely favorable operational situation that arose as a result of reaching Gomel-Pochep should be immediately used for a concentric operation by the adjacent flanks of Army Groups "South" and "Center". Its goal should not be to push the 5th Soviet Army across the Dnieper with an offensive by the forces of the 6th Army alone, but to destroy this enemy before he can break out of the line Desna - Konotop - the bend of the Sula ...

3. So many forces need to be allocated for this to the Army Group "Center", without regard to subsequent operations, so that the goal, the destruction of the 5th Army, is achieved and so that the army group can at the same time repel enemy attacks in the center of its front in a power-saving mode ..."2.

b Bok's order is quoted from: Eremenko A.I. At the beginning of the war. M.: Nauka, 1965. S.295.

\*

Cit. by: Nairi no. Ge \$sMas it MozKai. 2001. S. 107. 207

25-th of August. Exit of the 3rd Panzer Division to their original positions.

However, let us return to the story of the environment and the death of Yugo-



## Western Front through the prism of history

"The 3rd tank division is approaching the Desna valley 600-1000 m wide. The city of Novgorod-Seversky separates the division from the river ... Oberst Kleeman (Keetapp) arrived with his headquarters, the 1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment also arrives, 3rd motorcycle battalion and 1st reconnaissance detachment. More slowly, along sandy roads and dense forests, along ravines, batteries approach the city. In the hours that followed, the unit commanders discussed the plan of the offensive, which was to begin the next morning at 5 o'clock. On the available bad cards! the bridge across the Desna looks like it was painted at the northern entrance of Novgorod. With a sudden attack, he should be captured by the tank company of Ober-Lieutenant Vopel (\rel) (commander of the 1st company of the 6th tank regiment), reinforced with anti-tankmen and motorized streaks. At the same time, if the need arises, the remaining companies of the 1st battalion should provide fire cover on the heights in front of the city. Oberst Kleemann's battle group is attacking the city from the north, and von Lewinsky's battle group (Ge\mup\$K1) is attacking the southern entrance of Novgorod Seversky from the west.

On this day, August 25, when the 3rd Panzer Division left Kostobobra and took up their starting positions near Novgorod-Seversky, the other units of the 24th Panzer Corps - the 10th Motorized Division - occupied Semenovka and rushed to Kholmy and Avdeevka. Nothing threatening was recorded in the Operational Report of the Bryansk Front for that day:

"The armies of the front continue to defend their positions, strengthening them in terms of engineering and conducting reconnaissance on the entire front ... The 13th Army is defending the line along the river. Judgment at the front (claim.) Pochep, Pogar, Kister, Ponurovka, Voronok, Meadows"2.

Meanwhile, the Germans were already 40 km south of the Kister-Luzhki line and only 2 km from Novgorod-Seversky! ..

1 German maps were superior to ours in paper quality and color (5 colors), but they were based on Soviet maps of 1931, made on the basis of cartographic surveys of 1908-1909 and 1910-1912. (VIZH.1990. No. 4. P. 81).

2 Operational report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 014 by 20 o'clock on August 25, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front (SBD VOV. T. 43. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960).

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On the same day, the day the troops of the Army Group "Center" began to advance to the south, several more fatal events occurred. Based on the fact that the troops of the Central Front - the 21st remnants of the 3rd Army - retreated to the rear of the Southwestern Front, Marshal S.M. Budyonny suggested to the Headquarters: either to subordinate the 5th Army of the South-Western Front to the Central Front, or to transfer

21st and 3rd Army of the Central Front as part of the Southwestern Front !;

However, continuing to believe that the "enemy is cunning" and is about to turn to Moscow, the Stavka transferred the troops of the Central Front to the Bryansk Front.

Unfortunately, this was not the end of the matter. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief appointed: Commander of the Central Front, Lieutenant General M.G. Efremov - Deputy Commander of the Bryansk Front, Commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General V.I. Kuznetsov - commander of the 21st Army, commander of the 21st Army, Major General V.N. Gordova - Chief of Staff of the 21st Army. At the same time, the commander of the 13th Army, Major General K.D. Golubev and the chief of staff of the Central Front, Lieutenant General Sokolov, were relieved of their posts, and Major General Avksenty Mikhailovich Gorodnyansky was appointed commander of the 13th Army.

Thus, the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model, which had just begun to fulfill the order to strike at the rear of the 5th Army of M.I. Potapova in the direction of Konotop through Novgorod-Seversky and located already behind the focal lines of defense at the junction of the 13th and 21st armies, received one more additional head start - a change in the fronts, headquarters and commanders opposing it with the inevitable dezorg in such cases nization.

It would seem that against the background of all these upheavals, a certain ray of hope was the order of the Headquarters of August 25 on the creation of the 53rd Army, which was supposed to stand in the way of the 3rd Panzer Division, and the entire 24th Panzer Corps, and those Weichs divisions,

[ Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction of August 25, 1941 to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the creation of a unified leadership of the troops in the Gomel and Chernigov directions (SBD VOV. T. 40. M.: Military publishing house of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1960 ).

? Combat order of the commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front No. 04 / OP of August 25, 1941 on the inclusion of the troops of the Central Front in the troops of the Bryansk Front.

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who attacked the SWF from Gomel. However, this army, renamed the 40th on August 28!, was formed at the expense of units of the Southwestern Front itself, due to its weakening in other sectors, and in fact turned into a left-flank army of the Bryansk Front ...

August, 26th. Capture of Novgorod-Seversky and the bridge across the Desna.

"The advanced detachment of Lieutenant Vopel, reinforced by the 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment, the 3rd battery of the 543rd pro-

anti-tank battalion and a sapper platoon of the 394th motorized regiment, left its original position at 03.45. On tanks and armored personnel carriers, as soon as they started moving, enemy artillery and mortar fire was immediately opened ... The bridge over the Roma? was moved and, approximately in 1 km southeast, the first Soviet infantry for an elephant was broken. The next 2 km went along a ravine<sup>3</sup> until they came under fire from heavy infantry guns. The fighting machines rushed at them at full throttle, and the guns were crushed.

At the fork in the road 3.5 km northwest of the city, enemy resistance intensified. Here they even had to stop the tanks, and the riflemen jump out of the armored personnel carriers in order to force the Russians to retreat with the help of hand grenades. Lieutenant Aye (Aue), commander of a platoon in the 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment, was killed during negotiations with a Soviet envoy. Shortly thereafter, the lead combat vehicles reached the northern outskirts of Novgorod-Seversky. The machine-gun nests that appeared here were quickly crushed by tanks. But where is the bridge?

Meanwhile, Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott (Zsvpi4-O ()) with his other companies fought his way to the heights. From here a wonderful picture opened up to the soldiers. To the left, the wide channel of the Desna with both branches stretched. To the right, a beautiful city spread over steep hills, and behind him

1 The note to the Operational Directive of the SWF No. 00332 dated August 28 (SBD VOV. Vol. 40) says, with reference to the Archives of the General Staff (f. 15, op. 153ss, d. 0292a, l. 93), that "40th the army was introduced into the South-Western Front on August 26, 194].

2 River, 6 km north of Novgorod-Seversky, a tributary of the Desna.

3 From the landscape characteristics of Novgorod-Severshchina: "Beams and ravines cut into Cretaceous deposits, dry and damp, under linden-oak-pine forests on the slopes" - Atlas of the Chernihiv region. M.: Glavn. management of geodesy and cartography under the Soviet. Min. USSR, 1991. S. 19.

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measured at a distance of 4 km - a high bridge, along which stretched a continuous stream of trucks and carts.

The artillery liaison officer explained that the artillery, which had moved far from the warheads, was not able to reach the bridge and help take it with their fire. Then Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott contacted Vopel's battle group by radio, told him the exact location of the bridge and gave the command to seize the bridge immediately.

Tanks, armored personnel carriers and motorcycles rushed forward. Immediately, Russian attack aircraft pressed on them ?, but they hardly caused damage. Vopel's company, with anti-tankers and motorized riflemen, rushed to the bridge. Where it turned out at least a

any resistance, tank guns and machine guns spoke to the enemy with their iron language. The Russian truck that blocked the road to the bridge was immediately destroyed. The clock showed 10:00 when the tanks stopped in front of a high wooden bridge 700 meters long!

While the forward elements of Oberst Kleemann's battle group quickly approached their target, Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky's battle group approached from the west towards the southern part of the city. The 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment began to move with the units assigned to it at about 0700 hours from Forostovicheys. Here the Russian artillery hit the ravines and the road. The battle group reached a stubble field, over which Russian machine-gun nests and forward guard posts were scattered. As the tanks steadily rumbled east, the men of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Motorized Regiment drove the enemy groups out of the fields one by one. Now the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment was led by Major Zimmermann, who had returned from the hospital. His predecessor, Hauptmann Enzhelin (Enzelen), was sent to Eberswalde (Ebers\val4e) to complete his studies at the General Staff (at the end of the war he was a regimental commander in Courland).

Around 09.00 Oberst Lieutenant von Lewinsky in one of

1 bezsysme eg 3. Rapgeg-B/15yup Ve! t-Branenlier 1935-1945. Negaibrerefep vot TtadyupzueapYa 4er Olm5yup. Veglt: Wuenav money Wisppapaip? Sishmeg EKsmeg, 1967. \$. 160.

2In the original - TieYereg, which translates as "low-flying aircraft" German-Russian dictionary. 3rd ed. / Comp. A. M. Taube. M.: OGIZ, ).

- Forostovichi - a village 10 km west of Novgorod-Seversky.

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numerous ravines arranged a meeting with the commanders of his battle group. In this case, it was primarily about interaction with the batteries, which very slowly moved forward across this area. Soviet fire covered a group of officers. The commander of the 75th Artillery Regiment Oberst Reese (Kez) was killed. Simultaneously with him, Lieutenant Welemann (Vubshegtapp) from the 1st division of the 75th artillery regiment was also killed. Unter-officer Lipschitz (E1p\$ss1{2}), who would later become a senator in Berlin, was seriously wounded and lost his arm.

The 7th company of the 6th Panzer Regiment is placed by von Lewinsky at the head of the battle group and crosses the railway embankment right in front of the first houses of the city. When the tanks crossed the tracks, they immediately ran into the position of the Russian 152-mm battery. The Soviets were just getting ready to take on the front of tall shapeless tractors with wide

mi caterpillars their heavy guns. Tank shells exploded among these guns and vehicles, leaving behind only steel frames and a cloud of burning oil and gasoline.

Shortly thereafter, at 10:30 a.m., von Lewinsky's battle group breaks into Novgorod-Seversky. Lieutenant General Model, in his open command car, drove up to the head of the column and ordered communication between the two battle groups to be established. The 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment is to clear the area around the station. The division sends one battalion further south towards Yukhnovo! to capture the bridge there as well.

The reinforced forward company (Ober-Lieutenant Vopel) of the northern group meanwhile approached the river. The area sloped down steeply and then rose just as steeply. Between the rises, like a connection, an important high bridge stands on 4 strong pillars. Suddenly machine-gun shots from the bridge guard posts flooded over. Both lead tanks opened fire and destroyed the posts. From 20 to 30 Russians fled to the bridge sole?.

Quite unexpectedly, Lieutenant Shterk (sapper platoon of the 394th motorized regiment) appeared in the car of the 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment. He circled the front line of military vehicles and rushed to the bridge. soviet guns,

1 Yukhnovo is a village on the Desna, 6 km south of Novgorod-Seversky.

? Sessyume 4er 3. Rapher-Rumup Veshint-Brandeinigr 1935-1945. Negatszvevefep vat Tgadiyupzuegfap@ deg Omzyuop. Vet: Wyar deg Visppap4shn8 Sishcheg Vs chег, 1967. \$. 161.

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mortars and machine guns from the opposite bank opened fire. Oberleutnant Vopel placed his tanks in a wide front, and they opened fire from cannons and machine guns on enemy positions. The sappers' armored personnel carrier stopped 60 meters from the entrance to this huge, hardly visible bridge. Lieutenant Shterk (\$16gsK) jumped out of the car, followed by sergeant major Geieres (Nueges), non-commissioned officer Straken (ZgasKep), chief corporal Fun (Eijp) and corporal Beile (VeUe). Crouching low, they ran to the bridge under the cover of tank fire, which was trying to suppress the enemy. Lieutenant Shterk and Corporal Beile paid no attention to the shooting. Their eyes searched for explosive charges - and indeed, they were there. The lieutenant found the first charge in a box placed in one of the bridge's oblique columns. The sappers ran up to the box, pulled out the wire and threw the box into the water. Lieutenant Shterk rushed on, found the second line of ignition, the third, the fourth.

The fire of Russian machine guns forces the sappers to look for some kind of shelter. Several Russian soldiers are trying to escape with

bridge and reach the saving shore. The tankers continue to fire, and Lieutenant Shterk continues to work. Another half explosive charge flies into the water, and another. But valuable time is running out, and no one knows how much explosives are still in the bridge. Need to do something! Oberleutnant Vopel decided to take advantage of the enemy's confusion and not wait for the sappers to finish their dangerous work. Every minute a long bridge can fly into the air ... And the chief lieutenant decided to use the chance given to him. He ordered: "Tanks - forward!"

The cars sped off. They rumbled across the bridge, past Lieutenant Sterka, who was still disabling demolition charges, to take possession of the opposite bank. Non-commissioned officer Borovchek (Vogo \ s2ekK) (4th company of the 6th tank regiment) leads the first tank, on it is the orderly of the rifle brigade, Lieutenant Hiltmann (Nlitapp). Oberleutnant Vopel follows in the thick of all these vehicles. Close behind them are the soldiers of the 39th engineer battalion under the command of Lieutenant Ta Harzer (Nuggeg).

At 11.00 German tanks enter the southern bank of the Desna! The Soviets are so overwhelmed that they leave their positions in flight. Oberleutnant Vopel intends to move on. With his reinforced company, he rushes after the fleeing columns in order to win those who are 800 meters high. At that

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while the Russian infantrymen are running away, the enemy artillery, anti-tank 76.2-mm guns are hitting the rolling tanks. One of the combat vehicles receives a direct hit from an anti-tank gun, the vehicle of the chief lieutenant is also damaged. At this moment, General Model arrives at the bridge and orders Oberst Lieutenant Audersch (AuChozsy) to report on the situation. He cannot believe that this great bridge is in our hands intact. He orders Lieutenant Sterck to be presented for the award of the Knight's Cross immediately. This cross will be handed to him later - in front of the Eagle thanks to General Model.

Now the Soviets understood the great danger that hung over them as a result of the loss of the bridge. They cover the bridge and approaches to it with a flurry of fire. But it was already too late. Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott approached with all his companies. The commander raced first along the 700-meter track, followed by Lieutenant von Kriegsheim (KievzVet) with other tanks. One combat vehicle was hit by an anti-tank gun, but was able to move on on its own. At this time, an explosive charge exploded, which the sappers did not have time to neutralize. But, fortunately, he caused only slight damage to the wooden beam system of the bridge!

A new participant in the capture of the Novgorod-Seversky bridge and new details of this success are reported to us by Guderian and Carell.

"... In the afternoon, I went through Mglin to Unecha, where the command post of the tank group was transferred," Guderian writes about the events of August 26. - On the way, I was delivered a joyful and completely unexpected report for me that the energetic actions of the tank unit of Oberleutnant Buchterkirch (6th Panzer Regiment) made it possible for the 3rd Panzer Division to capture the bridge 700 m long unscathed. . Desna east of Novgorod-Seversky. This happy occasion greatly facilitated the conduct of our operations at that time.

According to Paul Carell, the assault on Novgorod-Seversky began on August 25, and at the moment when the commander of the 75th army was killed

1 bessyshe 4er 3. Rapgeg-Omyup Ve t-Vgapdepbigv 1935-1945. Negamzverebep wat Tga@! yuopzuegfapa 4er O!\$jup. Wesh: Wayav deg Visprap4mpa Ssteg VsMeg, 1967. \$. 162.

2 in `uderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 277.

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of the Tillerian regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Reese, was wounded by a fragment of a mortar mine and Model himself. On August 26, the attack on the city was continued. Ober-Lieutenant Vopel's battle group "also included Ober-Lieutenant Buchterkirch from the 6th Tank Regiment, the chief specialist of the Model for capturing bridges." Further events developed as follows. At eight o'clock in the morning a powerful explosion was heard in Novgorod-Seversky - the small bridge across the Desna was blown up by the Russians. Spurred on by this, Buchterkirch and Sterk rushed to the big bridge. Vopel's tanks took up positions on the heights near the coast, and Buchterkirch's tanks moved down the slope under the coastal part of the bridge. Sterk and his sappers with machine guns ran out across the bridge. From the fire from the opposite bank, they hid behind the fire boxes with sand on the bridge. In addition to "green rubber bags with powerful explosives," gasoline canisters were tied to the beams of the bridge, and an aerial bomb with a timed explosive lay in the middle of the bridge. While the sappers were neutralizing all this under enemy fire, Buchter Kirch, with machine-gun fire from tanks, destroyed a subversive group of 30-40 people who made their way to the bridge with canisters of gasoline, bundles of grenades and bottles of incendiary

mixture. :

As you can see, the Soviet side prepared a multivariate system for undermining the bridge. But, alas, it did not work, and "the heavy bolt on the gates to Ukraine was moved...!

"The 1st company of the 6th tank regiment took up positions at heights of 800 meters on the other side of the bridge and came under heavy enemy artillery fire," the chroniclers of the Model division continue their story. - The battalion that arrived on time significantly eased the situation. The 4th company of the 6th tank regiment took the forest on both sides of the road under fire. The Russians quickly withdraw.

Riflemen of the 1st company of the 394th motorized regiment are rescuing a tank company that has fallen into a difficult situation. In the next hour, Oberst Lieutenant Audersch moves the entire 394th Motorized Regiment to the east coast! The motorized riflemen are expanding and reinforcing the bridgehead so quickly obtained. In doing so, they infiltrated enemy firing positions and, along with many prisoners, captured several guns and anti-aircraft guns.

. Carell P. Barbarossa: from Brest to Moscow. Smolensk: Rusich, 2002. 53.

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After that, Oberst Lieutenant Audersch receives an order: a combat group consisting of the 1st battalion of the 394th motorized regiment, the 1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment, anti-tankists and units of the 1st reconnaissance battalion immediately (despite the impending night) to strike in a southerly direction and interrupt the important Kiev-Moscow railway line" - thus ended this day in the history of the 3rd Panzer Division!.

However, from the evening combat documents of the Bryansk Front it is not clear that our headquarters already knew about the capture by the Germans of Novgorod-Seversky and the bridge across the Desna ...

"During the day of 26.8.41, on the front of the armies of the Bryansk Front, battles took place with enemy reconnaissance groups trying to penetrate the location of our troops ... On the front of the 13th Army, the enemy, with the strength of two infantry battalions, after three times bombing, went on the offensive and at 15.30 ov landed Semtsy (12 km south of Pochep). Parts of the army are fighting with the advancing enemy; the results of the battle have not been received by the front headquarters by the time the report was compiled. In the remaining sectors of the army front, the situation remains unchanged. Units continue to strengthen the occupied defense areas... Communications with the 13th Army - telegraph and radio - worked intermittently... Khutor Mikhailovsky is creating an operational group of the front, "the Operational Report of the Headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 16 was reported by 18 o'clock on August 26, 1941.

Confirms the suddenness of the capture of Novgorod-Seversky and Combat Order No. 061 (for the capture of Starodub), signed on the evening of August 26 by Major General Golubev.

The order states that "A large enemy grouping of motorized infantry with artillery and tanks is developing an offensive from Starodub towards Novgorod-Seversky", and orders the 13th Army "from the morning of 27.8.41 to attack Staro Dub with the task, having captured Starodub, to inflict a blow to the rear of the enemy who has broken through and destroy his northwest. Novgorod-Seversky.



1 Sezsysme 4er 3. Rapgeg-Omyup Ve t-Vgapdepbitr 1935-1945. Negaizvevebep ut TgaFiyuopzueapa 4er R!m\$op. Vet: Uezaz deg Wisprap@ip8 Siteg E burned, 1967. \$. 163.

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This order shows what Soviet units the 3rd Panzer Division could encounter during the exit to Novgorod-Seversky, in the city itself and on the eastern bank of the Desna:

- The 307th Rifle Division was located north of Kister, and it is obvious that its enemy was the 4th Panzer Division following the 3rd;
- The 6th Rifle Division - occupied the B. Andreikovichi - Buda-Vorobyevskaya line, which was bypassed by the 3rd Panzer Division from the west and which, as in the case of the 307th Rifle Division, was in the path of the 4th Panzer divisions;
- The 143rd Rifle Division, by its active actions on August 27, was supposed to hold down the enemy offensive and prevent it from spreading beyond the Smyach - Sheptaki - Forostovichi line. But the Forostovichi located on the left flank of this line, at least as early as the evening of August 25, were occupied by the Model division and served as the starting point for its offensive against Novgorod-Seversky;
- The 50th Panzer Division (which was under restoration on August 24 and received 17 tanks; and by August 30 was already without tanks again!) On August 27, received an order to advance to the Vorobyovka - Chaikino - Smyach area and ensure the junction of the 6th and 143rd rifle divisions;
- On August 27, the 52nd Cavalry Division was ordered to cover the left flankarmie along the Desna River southeast of Novgorod-Seversky.

Thus, the units that met the 3rd Panzer Division on the approaches to the city, in the city and immediately behind the bridge, could be: the 143rd rifle division, the 50th yatdi, the 52nd cd. In the city itself, on the day of its capture, the 283rd Rifle Division was to land.

On the same day, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front ordered the formation of the 53rd Army. We present this order in full with some preliminary explanations.

About the troops originally included in the 53rd (later - 40th) army: |

- 135th Infantry Division, Major General F.N. Laughter tvorova fought from the very border and, as I.Kh. Bagra-myang, "it is not difficult to imagine what state she was in

1 The plan of the commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front to conduct an offensive operation from August 30 to September 15, 1941 to destroy about IVNIKa in the Roslavl and Starodub directions. SBD WWII.

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niii. By the time of leaving the Dnieper, on August 19-25, the division had about 4000-4500 fighters, about 25 heavy and 60 light machine guns, about 80 guns of various calibers, 17 mortars and 12 anti-aircraft machine guns?. This division was withdrawn from Potapov's 5th Army - the same army that was most often mentioned by Hitler in all his directives of the initial period of the war and which, as a Primary goal, was indicated by the Fuhrer in the order to turn the troops of Army Group Center to south;

- The 5th artillery anti-tank brigade, which may have been commanded by Colonel A.A. Gusakov, was also withdrawn from the 5th Army. The division had several dozen guns and its own transport;

- 293rd Infantry Division of Colonel P.F. Lagutina was just formed, and it could be considered quite full-fledged, if you do not take into account the lack of combat experience;

- The 10th separate tank division, after heavy losses in the first weeks of the war, was reorganized, received several dozen tanks and an experienced commander - Major General of the Tank Forces Kuzma Aleksandrovich Semenchenko, who received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war, commanding the 19th tank division.

The order of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front on the creation of the 53rd Army to repel the enemy offensive in the Novgorod-Seversky-Korop area read:

"August 26, 1941.

City of Pryluky

1. The left-flank armies of the Bryansk Front are defending the front of Klinty, Novozybkov, Teryukha. The armies of the Southwestern Front hold the line of the Dnieper River. According to the data of the VNOS air defense posts, in the points of Mashevo and Makovya, enemy tanks of an unknown number.

In the area of Novgorod-Seversky, an enemy airborne assault was thrown out, with which our units are fighting.

I Bagramyan I.LKh. Thus the war began. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1988. S. 267.

2 Vladimirsky A.V. On the Kiev direction. According to the experience of conducting combat operations by the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front in June - September 1941. M.: Voenizdat, 1989. P. 213.

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2. By a resolution of the Military Council of the Southwestern Front, the 53rd Army is created, consisting of the 293rd, 135th rifle divisions, the 10th tank division and the 5th anti-tank brigade, allocated by order of the commander of the 5th army.

From the beginning of its formation, the headquarters of the 53rd Army should be located in Konotop.

The task of the 53rd Army is to firmly defend the southern bank of the Desna River on the front of Shostka, Pirogovka, Velikoye Ustye, Volovitsa, to prevent the enemy's motorized mechanized units from breaking through to the south in the direction of Glukhov, Vorozhba, which broke through to destroy LIVE.

3. In fulfillment of this task, I order:

a) the 293rd Rifle Division, covering itself with part of the forces from the north along the Pirogovka-Shostka line, with the main forces to firmly defend the south-eastern bank of the Desna River on the Pirogovka-Zhernovka front. Have a strong reserve - no less reinforced battalion - and be ready for a counterattack together with the 10th Panzer Division in the direction of Glukhov.

Division headquarters - Andreevka.

6) 135th Infantry Division - to firmly defend the southern bank of the Desna River on the Velikoye Ustye, Ushnya front. To be ready, if necessary, to cover the front of Sokhachi, Velikoye Ustye with part of the forces.

Borzna division headquarters;

c) the 10th Panzer Division with the attached 5th Anti-tank Brigade to concentrate by 1600 on August 27 in the area of Poloshki, Dunaets, Nekrasovo, to form a strike maneuver group of the 53rd Army.

Tasks:

Prevent the introduction of the enemy's motorized mechanized units end-to-end of the South-Western and Bryansk fronts, be ready to destroy the enemy in the directions of Novgorod-Seversky, Glukhov, Vorozhba;

d) transfer the 5th anti-tank brigade to the area where the 10th tank division is concentrated by rail. Loading station Veresoch, unloading station Krolevets.

After unloading the 5th anti-tank brigade, concentrate in the area of Poloshki, Dunaets, Nekrasovo, where they will be placed at the disposal of the commander of the 10th tank division.

4. Until the arrival of the commander of the 53rd army in Konotop, command units (293rd, 135th rifle divisions,

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10th Panzer Division and 5th Anti-tank Brigade) I place on the commander of the 135th Infantry Division, Major General Smekhotvorov.

5. Confirm receipt of this order.

Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General  
Kirponos

Member of the Military Council of the Front Burmistenko  
Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front Major  
General Tupikov"1.

The following should be said about the lines of defense and the distribution of forces of the 53rd Army:

- the general line of the army - Shostka, Volovitsa - was oriented by the front to the north-west, and the weakest division, the 135th, was on the left wing of this line, at the junction with Potapov's 5th army;

- the right wing of the army - the 293rd rifle division - was stronger. But it was precisely on the path of the Model, at Shostka, that it was ordered to have only cover, but the reinforced reserve of the division had to be ready for a counterattack to the east - to Glukhov.

- the strongest units of the 53rd army - the 10th tank division and the 5th anti-tank brigade - were concentrated east of the general front of the army and had to be ready for counterattacks in the directions to the northwest, northeast and even southeast .

In other words, the disposition and missions of the 40th (53rd) Army, whose main forces were on the southern flank of the Bryansk Front, were focused more on protecting the rear communications of the Bryansk Front than on protecting the right flank of the SWF. Obviously, when giving the order to create an army, the Stavka nevertheless proceeded from the assumption that Guderian's movement to the south pursued the goal of bypassing the Bryansk Front from the south. After that - a turn to the northeast, a blow to the communications of the Bryansk Front and further along Mo

well...

1 Quoted from the book: Chernigovshchina during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945): Collection of documents and materials. Kiev: Publishing House of Political Literature of Ukraine, 1978. P. 45 (with reference to the Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, . 229, op. 161, d. 11, l. 320-321).

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August 27th. Capture of Shostka and the bridgehead at Pirogovka.

By morning, the command of the Bryansk Front already knew that Novgorod-Seversky, located in its zone, was occupied by the enemy, that the defense front had been broken through and the enemy was on the eastern bank of the Desna:

"On the right wing of the front in the direction of Roslavl, during August 26 and at night on August 27, there were battles with enemy reconnaissance groups. On the left flank in the direction of Starodub, Novgorod-Seversky, stubborn battles were fought with the enemy, who had gone on the offensive. In the afternoon, the enemy captured Novgorod-Seversk and continues to develop the offensive in the south. direction ... On the left flank of the army, in the direction of Starodub, Mishkovka, Novgorod-Seversky, in the afternoon of 26.8, the enemy broke through the defense front with large forces (one tank and one motorized divisions!) And occupied Nov Gorod-Seversky, continuing to develop the offensive in a southerly direction ... The air forces of the front during the day 26.8 with successive strikes continued to bomb the discovered columns of the enemy, moving from the directions of Starodub, Novgorod-Seversky ... Communication with the 13th Army - telephone, telegraph - worked intermittently, "reported in Operational report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 017 by 06.00 on August 27, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front2?.

In the meantime, on the night of August 27, the battle group of the 3rd Panzer Division under the command of the commander of the 394th motorized regiment, Oberst Lieutenant Audersch, as part of the 1st battalion of this regiment, the 1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment, against anti-tank and parts of the | th reconnaissance battalion continued to move south, in the direction of the Kiev-Moskvaz railway line:

"Advancement goes through wooded and swampy areas; the overwork of the group, due to the very wearisome battles of the last days, is extraordinary. At any short stop, which is due to bad roads and

The 10th Infantry (Motorized) Division of the 24th Army (Motorized) Corps advanced parallel to and west of the 3rd Panzer Division.

2 SBD WWII. T. 43.

3 "The experience of military operations showed a number of weaknesses of the enemy troops. These include: a) the inability to fight at night ... "- with these words, the commander of the Bryansk Front reduced the night combat readiness of his troops on August 24 (Eremenko A.I. At the beginning of the war. M.: Nauka, 1965.

.300).

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heavy fire from the forest, drivers immediately fall asleep, chiefs and company commanders run from car to car to keep people awake. After the small bridge near Ivot was crossed at dawn, the rear of the marching column came under heavy fire. We immediately had to turn back and, thanks to the use of tanks under the command of Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott, the enemy attack was repelled. The advance of the battle group continued. At 8 o'clock in the morning, the lead group of the 394th motorized regiment, supported by four tanks of the 1st tank battalion of the 6th tank regiment and tank destroyers, approached the northern part of Shostka. But the city itself could hardly be seen once. Dense, yellow-orange smoke from a burning gunpowder factory enveloped the territory for many kilometers around. Without more resistance, the settlement was taken.

Now the battle group has approached the Kyiv-Moscow railway line. And just at that moment, when the lead tanks and armored personnel carriers crossed the heights in front of the road, a Russian military train appeared. Towards the steel train shots of tank guns and machine guns lashed out. The train stopped, the locomotive and tanks began to burn. Soldiers of the Russian reserve battalion were jumping out of the freight wagons with their hands raised. They had a combat order to harm the German paratroopers (!) near Novgorod-Seversky! The Kyiv-Moscow railway line was blocked by a burning train, the combat mission was completed! 2

In our opinion, in this passage from the history of the 3rd Panzer Division, we are talking about one of the marching battalions, which was intended either for the 21st Army, which not one of the 20,000 recruits promised to it by the Stavka had reached, or to replenish the 13th Army (<... and one marching battalion consisting of 1000 bayonets, which will be transferred by rail to Pirogovka station, "says the order of the commander of 1ZA dated August 24), or for the 293rd Rifle Division of the 40th Army. This division was recruited in Sumy and, according to the original plan, the South-Western Front was to take up positions north of Chernigov. As can be assumed, based on far from complete

| The question mark is in the original - the German tankers are sure. that their advance was not preceded by an airborne assault.

2? Sessmeme 4er 3. Rapkheg-Omyup Vegt-Vgapaen Bige 1935-1945.  
Negaizrerebelep vot TgaduopzuefapYa 4er ABOUT! m \$ 1 yuop. Veit: Uecpar 4et  
Visppapashpya Sosheg Es Meg, 1967. 5. 163.

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th set of combat documents that we have, the Southwestern Front watched more vigilantly what was happening north of the Glukhov-Gorodnya-Loev line, which was the right border of its zone of responsibility than

those who were supposed to do it by state. In the order of the South-Western Front dated August 26 - on the creation of the 40th (53rd) army - it was reported that the posts of the VNOS air defense discovered German tanks of "unknown number" in Mashavo - a village located between Semenovka and Novgorod-Seversky, 30 km northwest of the latter. "In the area of Novgorod-Seversky, an enemy airborne assault was thrown out!, With which our units are fighting," the same order says. It is obvious that one of these marching battalions was urgently sent to "neutralize the German paratroopers near Novgorod-Seversky", as we are told with surprise in the history of the 3rd Panzer Division. It was hard to believe, although such a development of events was assumed that only 20-30 km from the border of the front there were large mechanized formations of the enemy and were moving in their direction! Fighters from air defense posts near the villages of Kholmy, Radomka and Kamka entered the first battle on the border of the South-Western Front with the German 10th motorized division that had broken through, which was advancing parallel and west of the Model division. They opened fire on the German motorcycle sheets directly from the fire towers. Having blown up the distillery in Kholmy, the fighters of the air defense posts went into the forest together with the partisans, and then moved on to break through to their units<sup>2</sup>. Probably, they were one of the first "encirclement" of the Kyiv cauldron...

In the meantime, the Germans, having taken Shostka and blocked the railway<sup>3</sup> with a burning train, continued their swift march to the south:

' Pilots who jumped out of downed planes were often mistaken for "enemy airborne troops", as evidenced by A.I. Pokryshkin (To know yourself in battle. M.: DOSAAF, 1986. P. 37).

? Vodopyan I.I. Granite. Memoirs of the former secretary Kholmin of the underground district committee of the Communist Party. Kyiv: Politizdat of Ukraine, 1982. . 15.

3 Among other things, the sudden seizure of the railway. meant that, for example, 700 tractors did not have time to evacuate from the MTS of the Chernihiv region alone. (From the information of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR on the evacuation of tractors and MTS property dated October 4, 1941, given in the collection of documents and materials "Chernigovshchina during the Great Patriotic War", p. 46). All these figures should be added to the losses of the Kyiv encirclement.

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"Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott and Oberst Lieutenant Audersch are trying not to linger. But the roads are so times. wet, which is required for the further advancement of tanks; lay a gati. Finally, the soldiers of the battle group approached Voronezh!. The lead vehicles of the 1st reconnaissance battalion of Hauptmann Zirfogel (7lleguove!) were the first to penetrate the industrial part of the city.

Unfortunately, the rifle companies lagged behind, as they often had to defend themselves against attacks still in the woods; enemy. Thus, the city outskirts were occupied by only a few tanks and armored personnel carriers. In the second half: the fault of the day, they repulsed the attack of enemy reconnaissance armored vehicles. At that moment, General Model appeared, who, recognizing the merits of the combat units, but taking into account the far behind parts of the division, ordered that Voronezh be left at [07.00] the combat group left this settlement and went on the defensive in Zkm northwest of the city.

Von Lewinsky's battle group approached Yukhnovo this morning, but here the sappers had to repair the bridge.

They manage to build a ferry faster, and at 1100 the first four self-propelled guns of the 1st anti-tank battalion were transferred. Later, after the riflemen of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment expanded the bridgehead near Pirogovka, tanks also crossed here. Russian aviation these days became very lively and, in spite of everything, tried to destroy a large bridge across the Desna. The stormtroopers almost constantly pounced on the bridge and the bombs roared incessantly raining down. The strongest was the simultaneous attack of twenty-one Soviet bombers.

Already on August 26, the 2nd sanitary company organized a dressing station in Novgorod-Seversky. The seriously wounded are transported to the field hospital in Starodub. 1|-; sanitary company and the 3rd sanitary-vehicle platoon.

, Voronezh - a settlement in the Sumy region, 6-7 km south of Shostka.

? Yukhnovo is a village 5-6 km south of Novgorod-Seversky, on the right bank of the Desna. The battle group Audersch advanced along the left bank.

SG original: Ze 6\$ Chana e(en, which is translated by the Taube dictionary as "self-propelled gun carriage". Obviously, we are talking about 47-mm self-propelled guns that were in service with anti-tank divisions in 1941. The guns of these self-propelled guns, created on the basis of a light Czech tank, could penetrate 70 mm armor from a distance of 500 m.

y Pirogovka is a village on the left bank of the Desna, opposite Yukhnovo.

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Pirogovka, in the area where the Germans managed to create a bridgehead, was in the defense zone of the 293rd Infantry Division of the 40th Army. Major General Kuzma Petrovich Podlas, a former infantry inspector of the KOVO, took command of the army.

"He was a battle-tested general," writes I.Kh. Bagramyan. - The army was created in a hurry... The 293rd Rifle Division was only



front of recruits ... At the end of August, two rifle divisions appeared on the 125-kilometer front from Shostka to Volovitsa (south of Mena) - the 293rd and 135th. They took up defense already under the blows of the enemy. The 293rd was in a particularly difficult situation: the enemy, taking advantage of the gap formed at the junction between the 40th Army and the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front, bypassed the right flank of the division and struck from the east, in the rear of its units. We must pay tribute to Colonel P.F. Lagutin and his subordinates. Unfired fighters showed amazing stamina. Neither the raids of fascist tanks on the rear of the division, nor the psychic attacks of fascist submachine gunners broke them. General Podlas moved the units of the 2nd Airborne Corps and the 10th Panzer Division against Lagutin's units to help him!

"... At the same time, the Southwestern Front had little strength to prevent an attack from the north, since it used up all the reserves to repel enemy attacks at its junction with the Southern Front on the Dnieper," Eremenko writes. - About this (about the advance of the troops of the Army Group "Center" to the south. - Auth.) The headquarters was promptly informed, but it limited itself to half measures, ordering the formation of the 37th and 26th armies from part of the forces? - 40th Army (created on August 25) and deploy it on the Desna north of Konotop. Believing that this army would hold back the advance of the enemy to the south, the Headquarters decided to entrust the Bryansk and Reserve Fronts with the task of defeating the opposing enemy forces of Army Group Center. It was overwhelming

'  
Bagramyan I.Kh. Thus the war began. S. 267.

? In fact, and this is also the tragedy of the South-Western Front, the 40th Army was formed not at the expense of the 37th and 26th armies located on the Dnieper, but at the expense of Potapov's right-flank, under attack from the north, Potapov's 5th Army. The forcing of the Dnieper by the Germans north of Kiev in the sector of the 27th Artemenko Corps of the 37th Army of Vlasov forced the South-Western Front to cancel its directive No.

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task, although I was forced to accept the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to defeat Guderian, but there were not enough forces for this, despite some reserves allocated by the Headquarters and assistance from aviation. Our offensive began on September 2, and on September 1, Guderian had already reached the Desna and captured a bridgehead on its left bank near Shostka.

As we already know, the 3rd Panzer Division created a bridgehead in the Shostka area, having forced the Desnuu Pirogovka, on August 27.

"During 27.8, parts of the division (293rd. - Auth.) Repelled the attacks of the enemy, acting in the direction of Sobykh, Klishki (villages south of Pirogovka. - Auth.). 8 enemy tanks were knocked out. In the Korop area, the enemy, with a force of up to an infantry company with three tankettes, crossed to the left bank. Gum

(the 10th motorized division of the Guderian group crossed here. - Auth.). The detachments of the division are fighting to destroy the enemy in this area ...

... The enemy, pursuing the retreating units of the 21st and FOR the Bryansk Front, approached the front line of the defense of the 15th sk (north of Chernigov. - Auth.) ", - according to the operational report of the SWFF!.

However, in spite of all of the above, we cannot accuse either the Stavka, let alone Eremenko, of having "overlooked". Guderian himself justifies them:

"Simultaneously with the movement of the tank group from north to south, other formations were moving from west to east; The 167th Infantry Division proceeded through Mglin, the 31st Infantry Division - north of Mglin, the 34th Infantry Division - through Kletnya, the 52nd Infantry Division - through Perelazi, the 267th and 252nd Infantry Divisions moved along the Krichev road , Cherikov, Propoisk (Slavgorod).

All these divisions were part of the 2nd Army. If, at the very beginning of the attack on Kyiv, at least one part of these divisions had turned south, then the repeated crises on the right flank of the 24th Panzer Corps could have been avoided.

This quote obviously contains another interesting point: the crises of the 3rd Panzer, 4th Panzer and 10th Infantry (motorized) divisions, which made up the 24th

} Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00117 by 22:00 on August 28, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

. Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 310.

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army (motorized) corps, Guderian connects with the right flank, that is, with strikes from inside the future boiler, and not from the side of the mainland. These blows, on the right flank of Guderian, were inflicted by the 21st army of V.I. Kuznetsov, whose history has not been studied at all.

August 28. Expansion of the Pirogovsky bridgehead. Battles for Voronezh. "Bad weather on August 28 makes it much more difficult to move forward," says the history of the 3rd Panzer Division. "Vehicles, even tanks, are buried in mud. The 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment is being withdrawn from Pirogovka, since the bridgehead available here is still insufficient to launch a large enterprise. The battalion crosses over the large bridge of Novgorod-Seversky to the previously transferred 1st Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment; The 3rd tank battalion of the 6th tank regiment is already in

Shostka.

In the afternoon, when the rain had subsided a little, this battalion left its position and attacked the enemy's flank in the area of Pirogovka. Despite the almost impassable roads, Hauptmann Schneider-Kostalski (Schneeg-Koz {a1\$K!}) strikes at the Russian positions and at 17.00 with the lead tanks reaches the front lines of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment. At the same time, the bridgehead opens up. On this day, Lieutenant Engelhardt (EnzeShaga! ()) And two corporals of the 6th tank regiment were killed. Tanks and eight self-propelled guns of the 521st anti-tank battalion arrived just in time. Shortly before this, the 2nd battalion of the 3rd engine The 9th company of the 3rd Motorized Regiment, Ober-Lieutenant Bigon (Viegop), was able to reunite with his regiment only at 2 am, the 75th Artillery Regiment lost another battery commander - Lieutenant Evert (Emeg).

The battle group Audersha (Apshdogzsv) in the first half of the day left its defense area on the orders of the division and at about 11.45 again - primarily with the 1st reconnaissance battalion - penetrates into Voronezh. During the second half of the day, the enemy, risking tanks, tried to recapture the city, but was repulsed. In the evening, the battle group sends reconnaissance in a southerly direction. The 2nd company of the 394th motorized regiment, with the support of three combat vehicles, penetrates into the lake defile at

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ZagiKamo!. Contrary to expectations, this undertaking is carried out very quickly. The riflemen even advanced 5 km further from the ordered target. The railway line passing here is undermined by mines.

Now the enemy is trying to regain the initiative! Nevertheless, the Soviet command, perhaps, learned that the German strike to the south did not lead to the capture of the Desna, but, probably, to the Ukraine. Marshal Timoshenko, whose headquarters were in Shostka just a few days ago, personally directs the operations to return the lost part of the Desna.

On this day, units of the 13th Army, located to the north-west of Novgorod Seversky, which the 3rd Panzer Division passed on August 25-26, tried to hit its rear communications, but ran into the 4th Panzer Division, which followed for the 3rd with the task of clearing the area from the enemy. The position of the southern wing of the 13th Army on August 28 was as follows:

- 307 sd Colonel V.G. Terentiev - "... having up to 50 tanks and motorized infantry in front of him. By the end of the day, on 28.8, the division left Pogor ";

- bsd - "... during the day she retreated to the east. bank Desna to the border of the forest east. Stone. The retreat has been suspended, the division has the task of capturing the former line. Gremyach is busy with tanks

tivnik about 100 pieces. This division was commanded by Colonel M.A. Popsuy-Shapka, and after his death - Colonel M.D. Grishin;

- 50 TD - "due to the departure of the 6th Rifle Division, the withdrawal to the east began. bank of the river Desna from the line of Vorobyovka, Rogovka, the retreat was stopped with the task of restoring the situation";

- 132 sd General S.S. Biryuzova (as well as the 52nd cavalry) - on the eve of the capture of the Novgorod-Seversky bridge, was in the reserve of the Bryansk Front northeast of Nov Gorod-Seversky, on the east bank of the Desna. On August 28, the 132nd Rifle Division fought "battles with enemy motorized infantry and Zaki Ztd tanks at the Birin line; Prokopovka";

- 52 cd Colonel N.P. Yakunin - "as a result of the battle,

This settlement could not be identified on modern maps.

2 Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko will replace Marshal of the Soviet Union S.M. Budyonny as Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction and will take up this position only on September 14.

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went on the defensive to the west. outskirts of Antonovka and the forest southwest of it. It was ordered to continue the offensive in order to reach the river. Desna south of Novgorod-Seversky";

- 143 sd - "There is no information about 800 and 383 joint ventures. 635 cn assembled in the hut area. Mikhailovsky about 600 people. unarmed," he reported in his. Combat report of the commander of the 13th Army, Major General Golubev!. The 143rd Rifle Division was commanded by General D.P. Safonov, and after his injury - Colonel G.A. Kurnosov.

All the units named by Golubev, except for the 143rd Rifle Division, retreated from their former lines by 5-15 km. The Mikhailovsky Farm is located 30 km east of Forostovich, the line of defense of the 143rd Rifle Division on the eve of the Model Division's attack on Novgorod Seversky... |

"Conclusion: The army is not in a position to destroy the enemy that has broken through with available forces. The most expedient under the circumstances, as I already reported in the combat report of August 27, is the withdrawal of the army to the east. bank of the river Desna for stubborn defense and preparation of a more solid offensive, for which, for the second time, I ask for your permission. The existing situation will create the threat of defeating the army in parts. With these words, the army commander ended his combat report.

On the same day, the Southwestern Front sends the 3rd Airborne Corps of the 37th Army of A.A. to the aid of the 40th Army. Vlasov, who was ordered to take a position just in the direction of the attack of the 3rd Panzer Division:

"3 VDK no later than the morning of 31.8 to concentrate motor vehicles in the area of Guta, Popovka, Vyazovoe. Shtakor - Konotop...

... The 40th Army (293, 135 sd, 10 td, 2 airborne, 5 ptabr), having taken parts of the Korop section, M. Ustye, transported by motor transport 2 airborne, continue to defend the southern bank of the river. Desna at the front Pirogovka, Stepanovka.

The task of the troops is to prevent the enemy from breaking through in the Krolevets, Vorozhba and Konotop directions and to secure the right wing of the front from enemy attacks.

'  
Combat report of the commander of the troops of the 13th Army to the commander of the troops of the Bryansk Front dated August 29, 1941 on the situation of the Argi troops and the need to withdraw them to the eastern bank of the river. Gum. SBD WWII.

.43.

2 Operational directive of the commander of the troops of the South-Western NY No. 00332 dated 16.00 on August 28, 1941 for defense along the river. Dnieper. SBD .T. 40.

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This directive clearly shows how the northern wing of the Southwestern Front was being destroyed:

- The 293rd Rifle Division, the 135th Rifle Division, the 10th Rifle Division, the 5th Infantry Division were previously part of the 5th Army, which, and not the entire Southwestern Front, was the main goal of the joint operation of the troops of the Army Groups "Center" and "South";
- The 2nd and 3rd airborne corps were withdrawn from the 37th army, which defended Kyiv and tried, together with the 5th army, to throw the Germans from the Okuninovskiy bridgehead on the Dne to the north of Kiev. It was through this bridgehead that the 6th Army of Reichenau was supposed to move, and will move, to Chernigov and Nizhyn, in order, together with the 2nd Weihsai Army coming from the north, to cut off the escape routes of Potapov's 5th Army, to surround it and destroy.

The fact that with the turn of the troops of Weichs and Guderian to the south of the front line for the South-Western Front was extended by almost 250 kilometers, the Headquarters did not pay attention. All its energy and reserves were concentrated on the counterattacks of the Eremenko and Zhukov fronts. To paraphrase the well-known words about the "mirage of encirclement", one can say: "The mirage of an attack on Moscow, bypassing Bryansk from the south and from the north, primarily embraced the General Staff and Headquarters"...

August 29th. The advance faltered. "On August 29, under strong air and artillery cover, constant Russian attacks begin," we continue to study the history.

Ryu of the 3rd Panzer Division. — Own vehicles stop due to lack of fuel. The division could only rely on itself, since the 4th Panzer Division was still only advancing towards Novgorod-Seversky. Only 22 R-1 tanks, 9 R-Sh tanks and 6 R-1PU tanks remained in the 6th Tank Regiment that day. It was not much more than the armored weapons of one company!!

At 0630, the Soviets attacked Shostka and were able to advance all the way to the first houses. Our units found themselves in a difficult situation, as the enemy managed to cross the railway and, at the same time, tear the German battle groups apart.

1 Sezsysme 4er 3. Rapgeg-Omzyup Vełt-Vtapaepfitv 1935-1945. Negaizrerebebe vat TgaChlyuopzue ap 4er Pu \$op. Veit: Uetsav 4er VisNvapa Yashipp8 Sioscheg Vsshcheg, 1967. \$. 164.

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All military units located in Shostka and around it grabbed their weapons. Only at about 09.30 this great danger was again eliminated, and the enemy retreated through the woods to the east of Shostka.

When during the day, sunny and warm, counterattacks followed on Voronezh, for the second time our units had to leave the city and retreat to Shostka. The Soviets were persecuted without delay. In the 1st battalion of the 394th regiment, lieutenant Hecht (Nesv®), Ober-sergeant major Müller (Meg) and 4 ordinary soldiers die.

Three officers - Lieutenant Roos (B 005), Lieutenant Wurm (U / gt) and Lieutenant Maize (Me!5e) - are injured. Only the 1st reconnaissance battalion remains in defense of the territory near Voronezh; on the bridgehead near Pirogovka, the situation is not so tense. There the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment was able to improve its position. Major Baigel (Ve1ve]) with the 543rd anti-tank battalion, the 1st and 3rd companies of the 39th engineer battalion and the 94th anti-aircraft artillery battalion protects the front of the division.

On August 29, the CFU Army Corps (motorized) was forced to stop the advance of the 3rd Panzer Division and the 10th Infantry (Motorized) Division. The 4th Panzer Division, after clearing the banks of the Desna, moves through Novgorod Seversky and is now pulling up to the 3rd Panzer Division, which, despite all the troubles, takes 800 people prisoner.

On August 29, the commands of the Southwestern and Bryansk fronts, having recovered from the shock, began to organize counterattacks on the troops of Army Group Center in the direction of their breakthrough. |

On that day, the 40th Army of Podlas attacked the 3rd Panzer and 10th Motorized Divisions of the 24th Army (Motorized) Corps!:

"10 TD with one SME and 6 tanks attacked the enemy in the direction of Voronezh - Glukhov, Shostka in the morning. In the area of Voro-

tender - Glukhov, three tanks destroyed the command and observation post, 5 anti-tank guns, 6 machine guns and 3 mortars of the enemy. In the Shostka area, the enemy is defending with a force up to a battalion. Voronezh - Glukhov is also engaged in the power of up to a battalion. There are no data on the mastery of these areas. To the right of the 52nd cd (Bryansk Front) in the morning advances on Novgorod-Seversky. The results of the offensive are unknown. 293 sd

1 These corps began to be called tank corps from 1942.

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is fighting with the enemy in the areas of Pirogovka, Korop. At 1500, the enemy, up to an infantry regiment with 15 tanks and tankettes, launched an offensive against Altynovka. By decision of the army commander, forces of 10 TD, 293 RD and units of 2 Airborne Forces counterattack the enemy in the direction of Korop. There was no information about the start of the attack. 135th Rifle Division had no contact with the enemy. 5 ptabr operates in conjunction with 10 td.

Shtarm 40 - Konotop... 3rd VDK is transported by road to the area of concentration of Guty, Popovka, Vyazovoe (Kono top area). There were no reports about the speech!

In the order of the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko, handed over to them at 7 am on August 29, says:

"1. On August 26, 1941, the enemy (3 TDs with motor units) broke through the left flank of the 13th Army, crossed the river. Desna in the Novgorod-Seversky region and spreads in the direction of Yampol'i Sosnitsa, while simultaneously developing the offensive in the direction of Semenovka, Shchors, trying to cut and envelop the flanks of the 13th and 21st armies.

(...)

4. Mobile group (108th division, 141th brigade, 4th cd) under the general command of Major General Comrade. Ermakova? advance in the direction of Gruzlov, Sosnovka, Pogar, Tarasovka, Voronok, Zhelezny Most, Mashevo, Novgorod-Seversky with the aim of destroying the enemy who had broken through in the direction of Novgorod-Seversky.

(...)

By the end of August 31, 1941, reach the Novgorod-Seversky region.

According to Guderian:

"On August 29, large enemy forces, supported by aviation, launched an offensive from the south and west against the 24th Panzer Corps. The corps was forced to suspend the offensive

leniye of the 3rd Panzer Division and the 10th Motorized Division.

| Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 00119 by 22:00 on August 29, 1941 about the combat operations of the troops of the front northeast of the Vee SBD of the Great Patriotic War. T. 40.

? Complete the assigned task to the group of the deputy commander of the VVyansk and Front A.N. Ermakov failed.

3 Combat order of the commander of the Bryansk Front No. 07 dated August 29 for an offensive in the direction of Pogar, Starodub, Novgorod-Seversky. SBD WWII. T. 43.

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The 4th Panzer Division, having completed its task of clearing the western bank of the river from the enemy. Judgment, was pulled up to the 3rd Panzer Division in the Novgorod-Seversky region. After a personal acquaintance with the situation in front of the front of the 24th Panzer Corps and in the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions, I decided to set the task for the 24th Panzer Corps for August 30 - to eliminate the threat to our flank on the right, and for August 31 - continue the offensive in the direction of the southwest; 47th Panzer Corps - to advance along the eastern bank of the river. Judgment, and then continue the offensive along the river. Desna to Novgorod-Seversky!

As you can see, the main reasons that forced Guderian to suspend the offensive to the south were the counterattacks of the Soviet troops from the south and from the west. In the south, on the path of the 3rd Panzer and 10th Motorized Divisions, the troops of the right flank of the 40th Army of Podlas stood up. From the west, Guderian was attacked by the troops of the 21st Army of V.I. Kuznetsov, which were transferred after the disbandment of the Central Front to the Bryansk Front.

The long-suffering 21st Army, made up of the remnants of the troops of the 3rd and 21st Armies, with its front facing north and being in a semi-encirclement, slowly retreated to the south. Neither with the right flank of the South-Western Front (5A), nor with the left flank of the Bryansk Front (13A), did the 21st Army have elbow contacts. It was cut off from the South-Western Front by the divisions of the 2nd Army of Weichs, advancing on Chernigov from the direction of Gomel, and from the Bryansk Front by the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian. South of the 21st Army, on the Desna, the 40th Army took over its defensive lines, the main forces of which were concentrated on the eastern wing. After subordinating the army to Lieutenant General: V.I. Kuznetsov to the Bryansk Front, its main forces began to concentrate on the eastern flank for counterattacks by Guderian's troops, thereby opening the Weichs passage along the Snov River to the Desna. The Germans will soon take advantage of this circumstance, capturing an important bridgehead near Chernigov itself with their 260th Infantry Division.

As of August 29, the 21st Army included:

- 67 sc (42 sd 277 sd);



- 28 sc (187 sd, 219 msdi 117 sd).
- 66sk (55 sd, 266 sd, 75 sd, 232 sd, 20 MP, 65 ur, 46 bepo and 50 bepo);

WINE

Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 281.

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- cavalry group (47, 43 and 32 cd);
- army reserve: 24sdi 214 vdbr;

Divisional Commissar Kolonin was a member of the Military Council of the 21st Army, Major General V.N. Gordov. The main efforts of the army were concentrated on counterattacks in the direction of Semyonovka against the 10th Motorized Division, units of Guderian's 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions. On the left flank and in the center, the 21st Army fought the divisions of Weichs' 2nd Army.

August 30th. Battles with Soviet tanks in the Shostka area. "The corps orders for August 30 to clear the territory away from the roads, so that the tank divisions that have rushed forward will no longer be in danger of being cut off from their rears. Under the leadership of Oberst Kleemann, a large forest area east of Shostka was combed that day. This combat order was vital for the 3rd Panzer Division, since its rear services, convoy, repair company were still 16 km from Novgorod-Seversky, or were arriving there on the same day. Under any circumstances, the threat to them should have been excluded!

From early morning, the 394th Motorized Regiment (Oberst-Leutnant Nantes Audersch) fought off strong enemy attacks that were made from a dense forest in the direction of Lokotki and Shostka. The enemy used 52-ton tanks in these enterprises, against which our tank destroyers were powerless. Therefore, separate artillery pieces - and the 75th Artillery Regiment is now commanded by Oberst Lieutenant Dr. Weissenbruch (U15ssenbruch) - were moved forward into the rifle lines. The gunners worked hard, trying to neutralize these colossi with direct fire.

As the strength of the attack continues unabated, the 6th Panzer Regiment is called in to help. The j-th battalion of the 6th tank regiment went to Lokotki to reinforce the rifle battalion defending there. The 2nd Battalion, 6th Tank Regiment is ordered to clear the area to the east. At the same time, the brave commander of the 8th company, Lieutenant Dr. Koehler (KoSheg), was killed. While the German and Russian tanks are firmly

bit into each other, a battle broke out in the area of the 3rd motorized regiment, whose companies were still located near Pirogovka. Here it was necessary to improve their positions

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tion to rule out a Russian threat to the flanks. At about 9 a.m., the 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment was sent to reconnoiter enemy positions in the Sobich area. The armored personnel carriers of the company stretched out on the ground and, met on the approach to Xel by the fire of Russian anti-tank guns, were forced to retreat to the hills in front of this settlement. Meanwhile, unter-officer Simon (Simop) moved on and discovered a road that led from the north through the swamp directly to Sobich. Oberleutnant von Zitzewitz (7u2e\u2) immediately sent the entire company along this road, and soon the armored personnel carriers managed to enter the village without being noticed.

The Soviets are quite taken aback. Non-commissioned officer Buggert (Wizwep) clears the left flank, while the 2nd platoon, under the command of Lieutenant Brown (Bgain), strikes in the direction of the southwestern exit from the village. Two of our cars are blown up by mines. The intervention of Lieutenant Shuster (Espizeg, 7th company of the 3rd motorized regiment) with his platoon in the fight leads to the end of the battle. The enemy garrison of zones - a total of 200 people - surrenders.

The decisive active actions of the 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment made it possible to quickly capture the reconnaissance object. But the high command did not have any premonition about this success - and the "ituks" for the bombing of Sobich were already in flight. At this moment, Lieutenant Nantes von Zitzewitz finally allowed the radio station operator, Chief Corporal Pranzhe (Prapee), to send a message to the division about the capture of the village. And at the last minute, the division managed to stop the attack of the "pieces" and redirect them to another object.

The 394th Motorized Regiment and the 6th Tank Regiment begin mopping up the territory near Shostka from noon. The 1st battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment is turning southeast and the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment ensures its advance. And again everywhere it comes to fighting with enemy tanks. Only in the area between Makovo and Voronezh, 25 Russian combat vehicles were stopped. Since their own forces were too small, only one defensive line had to be formed with the front to the south. Enemy tanks are

'  
Sezsysis money 3. Rapgeg-Royup. Veglt-Vgapdepbigr 1935-1945. NegaizveveEn  
vot Ttadoptzuefapt@ 4er Pu yup. Veit: Uenav 4er Visprap4 pia Sasheg VsNeg, 1967.  
5. 165.

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began to cross the railway embankment after the first of them stumbled upon a German mine. The 1st Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 394th Motorized Regiment attack Devichi across an almost open area. The enemy defends himself fiercely. But, despite this resistance, our attack leads to the rapid mastery of the terrain and the capture of the settlement. The main enemy forces managed to slip out of the encirclement. Sergeant-major Schroeder (Zsngbodeg) from the 1st Battalion of the 394th Motorized Regiment and the crew of his armored personnel carrier achieved particular success in this enterprise. The armored personnel carrier withstood an enemy tank attack. The gunner of the 3.7-cm anti-tank gun mounted on it, the young corporal Aizen (Elzep), knocked out 8 enemy tanks from this small gun within 15 minutes! Leite Nant Peter (Raeg) knocked out 3 more tanks.

In the afternoon, the 3rd Panzer Division went on the defensive throughout the won territory. On the whole, the night passed quietly, with the exception of minor and planned clashes between patrol groups. The division pulled up supply groups. The 2nd platoon of the tank repair company had already arrived in Novgorod-Seversky, but the main part of the company was still in Unecha. On the same day, the 6th Panzer Regiment received reinforcements from the 25th Reserve Tank Battalion in Erlangen (Eranzen). However, these people were not applicable at the moment, since at home they were trained only on the R-G tanks and the Czech 381. which were not available in the division.

By the evening of August 30, the Southwestern Front had the following information about the events of that day:

"The 40th Army is engaged in a stubborn battle with enemy mechanized units advancing in the direction of Bakhmach.

10 TD - SME division, being counterattacked near Shostka by the enemy with a force of at least an infantry battalion with tanks, left Shostka and occupies a forest 2 km east. Shostka. The main forces of the division were located in the Voronezh-Glukhov region, which is occupied by the 28th NKVD SME.

293rd Rifle Division, having beaten off the attacks of the pr-ka against its right flank, holds the previous line.

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(...)

The 42nd Rifle Division (of the Bryansk Front) was advancing in the direction of Volynka and Avdeevka in the morning of 30.8. 52 cd (Bryansk Front) advances in the direction of Novgorod-Seversky ... `Shtarm 40 - Konotop!'.  
[REDACTED]

August 31. The third capture of Voronezh. "On August 31, the 3rd Panzer Division was unable to continue moving forward, as the Soviet

you suddenly attacked Novgorod-Seversky from the northeast. The need for defense forced the deployment of parts of all formations to the north. At the same time, the Russian attack on Voronezh continued. The 3rd company of the 394th motorized regiment and the 1st reconnaissance battalion were forced to retreat due to the superiority of the enemy. The Soviets occupied the city with 30 tanks. Did the 394th motorized regiment clean? forest near Makovo, and the 3rd Motorized Regiment occupied the heights southwest of Shostka. Immediately in the afternoon, the attack of the "pieces" on Voronezh turned the industrial part of the settlement into ruins. The Soviets were to suffer significant losses. When the soldiers of the 1st reconnaissance battalion probed the city, they did not find any enemy there. After that, the reconnaissance battalion occupied the city for the third time during the last three days.

By 6 a.m. on August 31, the Southwestern Front did not yet know who exactly the 40th Army was fighting in the area of Shostka and Voronezh:

"In front of the right flank of our troops and units of the neighbor on the right, facing the front to the north and northeast, the enemy grouping is not entirely clear.

According to the information of the Republic of Uzbekistan, from the Starodub, Gomel, Mozyr region, behind the departing parts of the neighbor on the right in the south and southeast directions, 3, 4, 17 TD, 10 MD, 258, 131, 17, 31, 134, 260, 45, 293 operated pdi 1 cd.

u Operational report of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front No. 0121 by 10 p.m. on August 30, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front northeast of Kiev. SBD WWII. T. 40.

in the original, the word "zdibegi" is used, which the military German-Russian dictionary A.M. Taube in the 1942 edition is translated as: "Clean", "cleanse".

3 Sessieme eg 3. Rapgeg-Pu15yup. Vegit-Vgapaepbigr 1935-1945.

Egaizrerebebe Wat TgaChiyupZuebap 4er Ohm \$10op. Vegit: Ueyav 4er Visprapamiyo Sameg Vsmeg, 1967. 5. 166.

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According to the latest data, it has been established that against our right-flank formations in the general direction of Konotop, Bakhmach, there are 10 md (in the direction of Bakhmach. - Auth.) and at least TD of unknown numbering (3rd tank in the direction of Konotop. - Auth.) " ...1

From the evening operational report of the Bryansk Front, the counteroffensive of the 13th Army from the northeast to Novgorod-Seversky is not visible, which can be explained by the episodic connection with the 13th and 21st armies:

"Parts of the Bryansk Front continue to conduct defensive

battles and partially went on the offensive in the Pochep direction. Particularly stubborn battles are being waged in the center and on the left flank of the front in the area of Pochep, Trubchevsk and Novgorod-Seversky. The enemy continues to develop active offensive actions in the directions of Novgorod-Seversky, Glukhov ... The 13th Army during 30 and 31.8.41 conducted stubborn holding battles on the entire front of the army ... by the forces of Gudok, the unarmed part of the Khug. Mikhailovsky (! - Auth.) ... The communication of the front with the armies is only by radio and delegates. Telephone and telegraph do not work. The wires were torn by enemy aircraft"2.

The remaining divisions of the southern flank of the Bryansk Front - 6th Rifle Division, 50th Rifle Division (already tankless), 52nd Rifle Division and 132nd Rifle Division were located east and northeast of Novgorod-Seversky. At the same time, the 6th Rifle Division even held a small tete-de-pon on the western bank of the Desna in the Kamen area (30 km north of Novgorod-Seversky).

September 1. Resumption of attack. Fights for Esman. "The 3rd Panzer Division - with the 4th Panzer Division attached to its right flank - is advancing south again. This time the rifle brigade is in front, followed by the 6th tank regiment: on the right is the 2nd tank battalion, on the left is the 1st tank battalion, in the center is the 521st anti-tank battalion. 1st

' Intelligence report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 67 kb per hour on August 31, 1941 on the grouping and actions of the enemy in front of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40. |

> Operational report of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front No. 025 / OP by 18 o'clock on August 31, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD VOV.T. 43.

b Obviously, we are talking about the 3rd Infantry (ZsNitep) Brigade, which included the 394th and 3rd Infantry Regiments.

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Development of the situation from 26 to 31 August (according to Guderian).

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the battalion of the 394th motorized regiment is being pulled up to the front as a corps reserve. September 1 at 0700, after a short artillery raid, the attack begins. The resistance of the enemy in front of the brigade is insignificant. The riflemen, without a serious struggle, were able to advance to the southern part of Voronezh, which was left by the enemy under the impression of yesterday's attack by the "pieces". Only outside the city, the Russians, who had dug into the ground, began to offer vigorous resistance to the von Manteuffel battle group (Mashcheiye!).

To the south of Voronezh, in the middle of a vast forest area, the enemy occupied the railway and auto-horse bridges across the Esman stream. The 2nd battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment (Major Zimmermann) receives a combat order to take both bridges. The 7th company of the 3rd motorized regiment, advancing from the right, reaches the railway bridge at about 10:00 and lies under enemy fire. The 6th company, advancing from the left, with its head platoon, makes its way to the auto-horse bridge. But just at that moment, when the first two cars drove onto the bridge, the enemy opened aimed machine-gun fire on them. The platoon leader, Commander of the Knight's Cross, Chief Sergeant Major Moder (Modog), was wounded; shooter killed. The Soviets, who had the opportunity to look over the wide sandy forest road, stopped any movement. Despite this, several fighters from the 10th company of the 3rd motorized regiment tried to remove the mines laid by the enemy, but, having fallen under heavy fire, were forced to abandon their intention. Thus, the advance of the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment was halted.

Meanwhile, the division built a strong defense around Voronezh. At the same time, the 2nd battalion of the 6th tank regiment took over the defense of the southern outskirts and the western part of the city. The 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment and the 3rd company of the 39th sapper battalion formed a special detachment group intended for

The Soviet 19th Tank Regiment of the 10th Tank Division of the 40th Army, which had taken Voronezh, urgently departed in the southwestern direction, near Korop on the Desna, even before the raid of the "pieces" (Eremenko A.I. At the beginning of the war. M.: Nauka, 1965, pp. 321 et seq.).

? Esman is a swampy rivulet 6 km south of Voronezh, flowing into the Ret, and then into the Desna. Roads run south through this Esman, to Krolevets, and then to Konotop, the ultimate goal of the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Division. From Esman to Krolevets - about 20 km, to Konotop - about 50 km. There is another Esman in the area of military operations - a larger river that flows through Glukhov and flows into the Seim.

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poking "burning" places. Marching on the western flank, from Sobich in the direction of Klishki, the 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment and the 4th tank division encounter vigorous resistance. With the support of several tanks of the 35th Panzer Regiment, the resistance is broken and 350 people are taken prisoner. The 3rd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment protects the VIZIA's left flank, which is growing ever longer to the east.

The battle groups of von Manteuffel and von Lewinsky begin to move forward around 13.00 to finally open the lake defile and get the bridge. The division must in any case go through this defile, as the swamps on both sides make it impossible for any advance with motorized vehicles. In order to stop the offensive on Krolevets, the Soviet leadership is ready to hold this defile. The unit of the 23rd Soviet Police Division (GPU)<sup>1</sup> that is stationed here cannot be shaken by either tanks or artillery.

Sparing no effort, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment (Oberst Lieutenant Schmidt-Ott) and tank destroyers (Major Frank) finally manage to get close to the second bridge. But since it had already been destroyed, and the enemy was well acquainted with the territory, our units had to stop again. In the meantime, communication was restored between the 6th (Ober-Lieutenant Tank) and the 7th (Ober-Lieutenant Mente) companies of the 3rd Motorized Regiment. And in the afternoon, staying with the Pisareviches? The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment resumed the offensive. Another bridge was discovered right in front of the settlement by the patrol group. True, there was an enemy here. A short boardwalk was laid across the creek. Since the forest in this place reached the very water, Major Zimmermann (IGlitégtapp) decided - should the battalion cross here ?.

Immediately the head platoon of the 7th company of the 3rd motorized

ÿ: original - "23 zoshcheizsNep Ro | 2e! -Otmchyuop (SRYTS)". On this teaching

stke was the 28th motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD and parts of the 293rd rifle division of the 40th army.

? Pisarevichi are absent on modern maps. Perhaps this is paradise on Pirotchino, which is 1.5 km west of the bridges on Esmani.

3 Sezsysshe 4er 3. Rapneg-Om5yup. Vetip-BrittenBigE 1935-1945. Negaizrerebebe vot Tgadiyuopzuet Bapta 4er .O!y51otp. Vet: UeNar eg Wisbpapashpv Sameg Esmeg, 1967. \$. 167.

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the regiment under the command of Lieutenant Shefler (Zspe @ er) encounters a strong enemy. The young officer and non-commissioned officer zer Traue (Tgaie) were mortally wounded at the same time, but advance through the dense grove succeeds. In this situation, the commander receives a message that a side branch from the main railway line has been found in the middle of the forest. This side path was not marked on any map. Major Zimmermann immediately sends the 7th and 8th (Oberleutnant von Becker) companies of the 3rd motorized regiment there.

Thus, both companies make their way to the main route and thus find themselves in the rear of the Russians - about one kilometer from their positions. The arrows imperceptibly approached the railway bridge. Ahead was the commander, followed by his orderly, Lieutenant Baron von Eckardstein (M E! lg. u. EsKagakhet), Lieutenant Paukstadt (Raisk \$ {ad%, 8th company of the 3rd motorized regiment) and sergeant major Schneider (Zsppe! Eg , communications platoon!). The Soviets were so shocked that they could not act for several minutes. With hand grenades, the 8th company rushed at the enemy; at the same time, the adjutant, Lieutenant Brandt (Brandt), brought here the 6th company, which attacked the enemy from the flank. The railway bridge was taken, but the advancing darkness prevented the taking of the road bridge as well.

The offensive in the center of the front did not advance further. And the division called "pieces". At 6:15 pm, nine aircraft with howling engines dropped their deadly cargo on enemy positions in the lake defile. However, the enemy did not flinch. When the gunners of the tank tried to move forward, they were met and stopped by the same heavy fire as they had an hour earlier. They also did not try to attack in this area at night. Enemy aircraft repeatedly attacked Voronezh, but without significant results. Only with the onset of night did the enemy stop these bombardments in order to resume them at about 5 o'clock in the morning.

At about 2300, the command post of the division, which was located in the middle of a clover field north of Voronezh, received an order from the corps command. He demanded a resumption of the offensive to the south.

TV original - "Masig. Gir", which can also be translated as "reconnaissance platoon".



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The documents of the Southwestern Front on the battles of the 40th Army in the indicated area report the following:

"The 40th Army is fighting to encircle the enemy group in the Korop area in the conditions of a possible bypass of its right flank by the enemy in the direction of Glukhov.

The 293rd Rifle Division with the attached 28th NKVD SMEs, having retreated to the south with its right flank, from 18.00 went over to the defensive at the turn of the sowing. edge of the forest north-west. Dubovichi, r. Esman, Sev. env. Chepelevka, left bank of the river. Desna to Raygorodok. In front of the division's front, up to two regiments of motorized infantry and a battalion of enemy tanks.

2 vdk 10 tds 14.00 conducted a successful battle in the Korop area with the enemy with a force of up to two regiments of motorized infantry 10 md.

10 TD was captured by Tsarevka. 3 vdb is fighting on the west. and sowing env. Karelian, repelling the attacks of the avenue from the direction of Korop. 4 airborne brigade is fighting in the south. env. Atyusha, Empty Rowing. 2 vdb mastered Yegorovka, is fighting in the west. and southern env. October.

135 sd 791 sp captured Suchachi and is fighting in the west. env. Rybotin.

The remaining units of the 135th Rifle Division are defending the line V. Ustye, Volovice.

Shtarm 40 - Konotop!

As you can see, | September, the main efforts of the 40th Army, which stood in the way of the 24th Army (motorized) Corps, were concentrated on the Desna, where the enemy's 10th Infantry (Motorized) Division crossed the river and created a bridgehead in the Koropa area. On August 31, the 10th Panzer Division of the 40th Army was transferred from the Glukhov area to the Korop area along the route south of Krolevets.

2 September. Capturing the bridgehead on Esmani. "At dawn on September 2, the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Division was resumed. The 2nd Battalion of the 6th Tank Regiment moved through the dense forest towards the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment, which was in front. At the same time, the lead tanks of the 2nd company of the 6th tank regiment are blown up by mines. The company is commanded by Lieutenant Meyerhofer (Meupo ([eg), who showed exceptional valor even during the Western campaign. His predecessor, Lieutenant Buchterkirch (VischegKisy), just these days

b Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0125 by 22:00 | September 1941 combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

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left the division and departed for his homeland to receive a new values.

During the first half of the day, the division reinforced its subunits lying in the lake defile. Thus, the 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized regiment also advanced to Es mani. Were pushed forward and subordinated to Oberst von Manteuffel (MashcheyYe!) And sappers armed with flamethrowers and smoke throwers!. Finally, at about 1400, after almost all of the division's artillery had subjected the enemy positions to the strongest fire raid, the reinforced 3rd Motorized Regiment went over to the attack.

The arrows rushed forward through the swamp and entered into a fight with a hard-defending enemy. With the help of sappers, the enemy managed to be smoked out. The 2nd battalion rushed into the gap to the east and went out on the path of the enemy's retreat. Fortunately, the armored patrol of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Tank Regiment launched an attack at the same time and in the same direction...?

At about 6:45 p.m., the lake defile was opened, and a bridgehead was created on the other side of the Esmani! The 1st battalion of the 3rd Motorized Regiment of Major Velmann (\\eltapp), with the 2nd company on the right and the 3rd company on the left, immediately goes further south, combing the forest on both sides of the road and in the Apdgop area Coy? gives a hand to the tanks of the 3rd battalion of the 6th tank regiment! At this point, the motorized riflemen went over to the defensive.

Only sentinel armored cars and motorcycles of the 1st time of the vedbat continue to scour the roads and in the evening reach the area 5 km north of Krolevets. Here, individual platoons and companies had to take up all-round defense for the night, since the enemy was everywhere in the forest. During the day, the division pulled to Esmany, to establish a crossing, the 3rd company of the 39th engineer battalion with a pontoon-bridge park.

At night, the division reinforces the von Manteuffel combat group, which on September 3 will have to launch an offensive on Krolevets. This group includes: 3rd Motorized Regiment,

`In the original - "Mebeme[eg]", which can be translated as "smoke gun" and as "chemical mortar", but in fact it is a b-barreled rocket mortar, which inherited its name from the First World War.

2? Sezsyshe Cheg 3. Rapgeg-Om op. Veith-Brandeenite 1935-1945. Negaizreveben ut Tgadi1opzuegbapa 4er Otmyayuop. Vegln: Vejāv 4er VisNvapashiya Somer E sTeer, 1967. 5. 168.

3 Failed to identify on the map.

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1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment, 1st company of the 521st anti-tank battalion, 2nd division of the 94th regiment

ka air defense and the 6th battery of the 11th air defense regiment "I.

On September 2, the 10th Panzer Division of the Hero of the Soviet Union? Major General of Tank Troops K.A. Semchenko withdrew from the battle in the Koropa area. The German bridgehead was liquidated, and the division began to clean up the territory in the area of Korop, Volny and Mikhailovshchina. "There are prisoners and a lot of trophies ... According to the testimony of the prisoners, the 10th motorized division operated in the Korop area (the 41st and 20th motorized regiments, the 10th artillery regiment and the 10th anti-tank division)", - reported the chief of staff of the 10th tank division, Colonel Semchuk, to the chief of staff of the 40th

miiz.

The composition of the 10th Panzer Division itself was at that time the same kin:

- 19th tank regiment;
- 20th tank regiment;
- 10th motorized rifle regiment;
- 10th artillery regiment;
- 10th separate reconnaissance battalion;
- 10th separate anti-aircraft artillery division;
- 5th anti-tank brigade;
- 32nd Rifle Regiment (perhaps it was the 1032nd Regiment of the 293rd Rifle Division, which was later "forgotten" in the Raygorodok area (near the Pirogovsky bridgehead) and the 10th reconnaissance battalion was sent to search for it).

A very important event of this day is the visit of Field Marshal Kesselring, Commander of the 2nd Air Fleet, to Guderian, about which the latter recounted the following:

1 bezsysme @er 3. Rapheg-OMyup. Veit-Brannurya 1935-1945. Negaizrerebebe vat Ttadopzuetbapta 4er Om 5yup. Veit: Uetsav deg Vispvapa opium Sosheg Vsveeg, 1967. \$. 169.

2 In some publications they squeal that Kuzma Alexandrovich Semchenko received the Hero for Khalkhin Gol. In fact, this title was awarded to him on July 22, 1941 for the battles of the first weeks of the war, when he commanded the 19th Panzer Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps of the 5th Army.

3 Combat report of the headquarters of the 10th Panzer Division No. Bot on September 2, 1941 about the capture of Korop. SBD WWII. T. 33.

"On September 2, the commander of the air fleet, Field Marshal Kesselring, appeared at the headquarters of the tank group for negotiations. He informed us that Army Group South had advanced, and that it had seized certain bridgeheads on the Dnieper. As for the direction of the further development of the operation, there is still uncertainty about it: whether to attack Kharkov or Kiev" (.

It can be seen from this report that even after the successful advance to the south of Army Group Center and after the capture of the Kremenchug-Derievsky bridgehead on the Dnieper by Army Group South, the German high command had not yet planned to encircle the entire Southwestern Front.

On the same day, September 2, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Division, General Model, and the commander of the 17th Panzer Division, General Baron von Thoma, were slightly wounded, as Guderian also told us about.

September 3rd. Attack on Krolevets. Capture important prisoners. "Exactly at 07.00, the Apagop!Koi area was abandoned by the advance detachment of Lieutenant Zitzevitz (1 tank platoon, 1st anti-tank platoon, mine search task force, 1st company of the 3rd motorized regiment, two 10.5- cm and one 8.8 cm gun). Close behind him went the main group of Oberst von Manteuffel, additionally reinforced by the 2nd division of the 75th artillery regiment of Oberst Lieutenant Welemann (VbShegtapp), the history of the 3rd Panzer Division tells us about the next breakthrough. - The lead vehicles without significant enemy resistance make their way to Podol, almost to Krolevets itself. Again the stream winds through the offensive path, this is Ret. Major Velmann (Veitapp) throws the 2nd company of the 3rd motorized regiment onto the still intact railway bridge. The bridge was already prepared for the explosion, but the shooters managed to take it and form a bridgehead on Podil?. However, there was no continuation, as suddenly Russian tanks appeared on the southern outskirts of the village.

Now it's the turn of the 1st battalion of the 3rd motorized

1 Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. Smolensk: Rusich, 1999. S. 283.

2 In the original - Rodo] oy. Obviously, we are talking about Podil, the northern outskirts of Krolevets. The Ret River flows at 0.5— | km north of Krolevets.

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leg of the regiment, he rushes to where the 2nd company achieved success, and he manages to expand the bridgehead to the south of Podol. At the same time, von Manteuffel's battle group deviated to the east and from there turned towards Krolevets. The 1st battalion of the 6th tank regiment joins the case and by noon approaches Retik through Gruzskoye!. From here, his companies must vigorously support the attack

von Manteuffel group. However, the existing bridges across the Ret are so weak that only R-P can cross them and help the motorized riflemen. The battalion remains in Retik.

Both battalions of the 3rd Motorized Regiment are slowly advancing from two sides towards Krolevets and pushing the enemy back into the city. Despite the onset of darkness, the arrows do not lose contact with the enemy and the advance continues. Around 23.30 both battalions unite in Krolevets!

In the rear of the von Manteuffel battle group, the 3rd company of the 39th engineer battalion, together with the pontoon-bridge column, set to work and, with the help of two sections, restored the damaged bridge over the Ret. The battle group Auderscha, remaining in Androniki (ApdgorKoy), expanded the left flank of the division with its 9th company of the 6th tank regiment.

On this day, as on all the previous ones, starting from Shostka, at the spearhead of the offensive of the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model there was only one, moreover, a rifle division, the 293rd division with the attached 28th motorized rifle regiment of the NKVD. Breaking into Krolevets, the Germans divided this group into two parts. One of them retreated to the southeast and, having taken the Solomashino-Buivolovo line, 4-5 km from Krolevets, blocked Model's road to Mutin on the Seimas.

The other part of the 293rd infantry division of the 28th NKVD detached to Altynovka, which is located 15 km south-west of Krolevets. In the same area, in Krasnopolye (15 km east of Krolevets), our 10th Panzer Division was also located - the only northern tank formation of the SWF with tanks, and one of the two tank formations that were put up by the Stavka against the passage to the south of Army Group Center. First of

1 Retik is a village and a stream 8 km north-east of Krolevna, in | km back to the road to Moscow.

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of them - the 50th Panzer Division of the Bryansk Front - continued to counterattack parts of the 2nd Panzer Group of Guderian in the Novgorod-Seversky area. The 10th Panzer was thrown, in turn, either against the 3rd, then against the 4th Panzer Division, then against the 10th Motorized Division, which advanced south, covering each other's flanks and clearing the rear, with a single fist. As a result, as of September 3, the 10th Panzer Division

. ZIA "... Has significant losses, the number of which is being specified"!

Based on the Combat Order of the commander of the 10th Panzer Division, given to them on the night of September 2-3, we can assume

live, in which areas Semenchenko's division had skirmishes with the 3rd Panzer Division of the Model on this and subsequent days:

«|. Up to 50 enemy tanks with motorized infantry and motorcyclists in the Dobrotovo area, a forest 2 km south of Optovo; small reconnaissance groups of the enemy were found on the eastern outskirts of Lukny and the eastern outskirts of Krasnopolye. From the Dobrotovo area separate enemy groups with tanks are moving towards Altynovka. Small enemy groups from the Obolonye region are crossing the river. Desna and advance in the direction of Lysaya Gora, Korop2.

(...) | |

3. The 10th Panzer Division occupies the Tarasovka and Krasnopolye area for defense with the task of covering the Koropskoe direction from the east and southeast, with a subsequent transition to the offensive to defeat enemy tanks and motorized infantry in the Dobrotovo area.

4. The 10th motorized rifle regiment with three mortar batteries to occupy the eastern and southeastern outskirts of Karyl'skoe for defense. Conduct combat reconnaissance in the direction of Budenovka.

5. The 32nd Rifle Regiment continue to defend the Raygorodok-Zaitsev line and prepare the Raigo rodok line, the forest of Zkm south of Raygorodok for defense.

The strike group of the regiment should be concentrated in the Zhernovka area.

| Operational report of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 0129 by 22 hours on September 3, 1941 on the combat operations of the troops of the front. SBD WWII. T. 40.

2 Obolonye, Lysaya Gora, Korop - the sphere of activity of the 10th infantry (motorized) division of General Leper.

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6. The 5th anti-tank brigade to create an anti-tank area along the southern bank of the Strizhen stream in the Tarasovka area. Bold, height 133.4, Berezentsev.

7. Organize all-round defense in the Krasnopolye area for the 10th Artillery Regiment.

8. The 19th Tank Regiment should concentrate in the area of Tara sovka in readiness for operations in the direction of Karyl'skoye, Budenovka.

9. The 20th Panzer Regiment should concentrate in the forest east of Tarasovka in readiness for action in the direction of Krasnopole, Altynovka.